Pritt v. John Crane Inc.

682 F.Supp.3d 114

Ruth A. PRITT, Individually and as Executrix of the Estate of Arnold L. Pritt, Plaintiff, v. JOHN CRANE INC., Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-12270-NMG

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts

Signed July 11, 2023

Ben A. Vinson, Jr., Pro Hac Vice, Tampa, FL, Kelsey Early, Mark A. Alonzo, Pro Hac Vice, Vinson Law, PA, Tampa, FL, Christopher P. Duffy, Duffy Law LLC, Salem, MA, for Plaintiff Arnold L. Pritt.

Ben A. Vinson, Jr., Pro Hac Vice, Madison McComas, Tampa, FL, Kelsey Early, Mark A. Alonzo, Pro Hac Vice, Vinson Law, PA, Tampa, FL, Christopher P. Duffy, Duffy Law LLC, Salem, MA, for Plaintiff Ruth A. Pritt.

Brian J. Schneider, Schneider Law Group PLLC, Richmond, VA, Christopher Owen Massenburg, Manning Gross and Massenburg LLP, New Orleans, LA, Jonathan F. Tabasky, Megan K. Sullivan, Stephanie M. Batchelder, Ryan M. Murphy, Manning Gross Massenburg LLP, Boston, MA, Viiu Spangler Khare, Berkes Crane Santana & Spangler, LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT (DOCKET ENTRY # 107)

BOWLER, United States Magistrate Judge

Pending before this court is a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint filed by plaintiff Ruth A. Pritt ("plaintiff" or "Ruth Pritt"). (Docket Entry # 107). Plaintiff requests leave under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) ("Rule 15(a)(2)") to clarify her strict liability claims as well as add claims for wrongful death and punitive damages. Defendant John Crane Inc. ("defendant") opposes the motion to amend. (Docket Entry # 112).

Specifically, and on the basis of futility, defendant opposes plaintiff's request for leave to amend the complaint to pursue and include certain damages: (1) pain and suffering damages and medical expenses because they are available only in a survival action and general maritime law does not recognize a survival claim seeking to recover such damages; and (2) loss of consortium damages and punitive damages under the wrongful death claim because these nonpecuniary damages are not available under general maritime law. (Docket Entry # 112).

After conducting a hearing on May 23, 2023, this court took the motion (Docket Entry # 107) under advisement.¹ A jury trial is set for December 4, 2023. (Docket Entry # 231).

BACKGROUND

Ruth Pritt and her late husband, Arnold Pritt, ("plaintiffs") commenced this action by filing a complaint in Massachusetts Superior Court (Middlesex County) against defendant and several other companies on November 18, 2020. Defendant then removed the action to this court on December 22, 2020. (Docket Entry # 1). Following the December 26, 2022 death of Arnold Pritt, plaintiff filed the motion to substitute the parties and for leave to file a second amended complaint. (Docket Entry # 107). The unopposed motion to substitute was allowed on March 30, 2023. (Docket Entry # 108).

The original complaint raised the following causes of action against defendant: (1) negligence (Count I); (2) breach of express and implied warranties (Count II); and (3) loss of consortium (Count III). (Docket Entry # 1-3). Plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint solely against defendant in April 2021, which added design defect claims to the negligence and breach of warranty counts. (Docket Entry # 20). Plaintiff now seeks leave to amend the first amended complaint ("the complaint"). The proposed second amended complaint sets out: (1) a design defect negligence claim (Count I); (2) a design defect strict liability claim (Count II); (3) a failure to warn negligence claim (Count III); (4) a failure to warn strict liability claim (Count IV); (5) a breach of implied warranties claim (Count V); (6) a breach of express warranties claim (Count VI); (7) a spousal pre-death loss of society and consortium claim (Count VII); (8) a wrongful death design defect claim (Count VIII); (9) a wrongful death failure to warn claim (Count IX); (10) a wrongful death breach of implied and express warranties claim (Count X); and (11) a wrongful death claim based on the death of plaintiff's husband due to complications from mesothelioma (Count XI). (Docket Entry # 107-3). The proposed second amended complaint also includes a separate count for punitive damages under chapter 229, section two, of Massachusetts General Laws ("Massachusetts wrongful death statute") (Count XII). (Docket Entry # 107-3).

As previously indicated, defendant does not specifically challenge each of the 12 causes of action plaintiff seeks to add to the complaint. Rather, defendant seeks to prevent plaintiff from adding: (1) the survival remedies for pain and suffering and medical bills; and (2) the loss of consortium and society damages as well as punitive damages under the wrongful death claim. In particular, defendant therefore seeks to preclude the foregoing damages that are "alleged in paragraphs 28, 33, 40, 47, 55, 62, 72 [and] 79," as well as to preclude "the entirety of Counts VII (loss of society/consortium) and VII [sic]² (punitive damages)." (Docket Entry # 112, p. 2, fn. 2).

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Rule 15(a)(2) states that a party may only amend its pleading with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave. The rule instructs that leave is freely given when justice so requires. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Absent an "apparent or declared reason-such as undue delay, bad faith," or futility of amendment - "the leave sought should be . . . 'freely given.' " Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962) (citation omitted). Defendant opposes the amendment on the ground that the amendment of the complaint to include survival remedies, loss of consortium damages, and punitive damages under plaintiff's wrongful death claim is futile because these claims are not recoverable under general maritime law. (Docket Entry # 112, p. 2).

In assessing futility, the court must apply the standard which applies to motions to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ("Rule 12(b)(6)"). Adorno v. Crowley Towing and Transp. Co., 443 F.3d 122, 126 (1st Cir. 2006). "Futility," in this sense, means that the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Glassman v. Computervision Corp., 90 F.3d 617, 623 (1st Cir. 1996). When determining whether a proposed amendment would be futile, there is no practical difference between a denial of a motion to amend based on futility and the grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Id.

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint must include factual allegations that, when taken as true, demonstrate a plausible claim to relief "even if . . . actual proof of [the] facts is improbable." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). If the complaint fails to conform to the applicable governing law, such as seeking damages that are not available, then a court may deny a motion for leave to amend a complaint as futile. See Holbrook v. Boston Sci. Corp., 487 F. Supp. 3d 100, 111 (D. Mass. 2020).

In determining whether an amendment is futile, this court's review is confined to the proposed amended complaint and the attached documents (Docket Entry # 107-3), as well as external documents that fall into certain narrow exceptions applicable to review of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Jaundoo v. Clarke, 690 F. Supp. 2d 20, 22 (D. Mass. 2010) (quoting Alt. Energy, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 2001)). Under these exceptions, this court may consider extrinsic documents such as " 'documents the authenticity of which are not disputed by the parties; . . . official public records; . . . documents central to the plaintiff's claim; [and] . . . documents sufficiently referred to in the complaint' without turning the 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary judgment." Newman v. Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., 901 F.3d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting Freeman v. Town of Hudson, 714 F.3d 29, 36 (1st Cir. 2013)). As such, futility of the proposed amendment will be considered in light of the proposed complaint and those documents that fit within a recognized exception.

B. Jones Act and Death on the High Seas Act Applicability

Plaintiff argues that the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 ("The Jones Act"), and the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30301-30308 ("DOHSA") do not apply. Specifically, the Jones Act does not apply because defendant was not the employer of plaintiff's late husband ("decedent") and DOHSA does not apply because decedent's injuries were indivisible. (Docket Entry # 220). Plaintiff therefore reasons that general maritime law applies. Moreover, in contrast to defendant's arguments, plaintiff maintains that general maritime law allows for punitive damages, loss of consortium damages as well as survival damages for decedent's pre-death pain and suffering and medical expenses. Further, because the Jones Act and DOHSA do not apply, state law can fill in the gaps, according to plaintiff. (Docket Entry # 220). Defendant argues that "because both [DOHSA] . . . and the Jones Act preclude recovery of loss of society damages and punitive damages," those damages "are not available." (Docket Entry # 112, p. 3). Defendant also argues that general maritime law does not recognize a survival claim seeking to recover pain and suffering damages and medical expenses and nonpecuniary damages in a wrongful death claim. (Docket Entry # 112). Relatedly, neither the complaint nor the proposed amended complaint includes a Jones Act or DOHSA claim. As previously stated, the proposed complaint seeks to clarify plaintiff's strict liability claims and add causes of action which encompass survival remedies, as well as loss of consortium damages and punitive damages under a wrongful death claim. (Docket Entry # 107-3).

The Jones Act states that "a seaman injured in the course of employment or, if the seaman dies from the injury, the personal...