Procurement, LLC v. Ahuja

197 Conn.App. 696

234 A.3d 135

PROCUREMENT, LLC

v.Gurpreet AHUJA et al.

AC 41680

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued November 14, 2019

Officially Released June 2, 2020

Richard C. Robinson, with whom was Jonathan A. Kaplan, Hartford, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Peter Milano, Branford, for the appellees (substitute defendant et al.).

DiPentima, C. J., and Keller and Harper, Js.

KELLER, J.

The plaintiff, Procurement, LLC, brings this action sounding in vexatious litigation, abuse of process, violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42a-110g et seq., aiding and abetting, and tortious interference with contractual and business relations, and seeking damages from the defendants Gurpreet Ahuja¹ and Ahuja Holdings, LLC (Holdings), on the ground that they generally sought to impede the plaintiff's development of a mixed use development project. The plaintiff appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered after the granting of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that (1) the trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that Ahuja's zoning appeals with regard to the plaintiff's proposed development plan were not objectively baseless and, therefore, the sham exception to the Noerr - Pennington doctrine was not applicable, and (2) the court misinterpreted the sham exception under the Noerr - Pennington doctrine.² We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following procedural history, as set forth by the trial court in its thorough, well reasoned memorandum of decision, is relevant to this appeal. This appeal and the underlying litigation arose "out of a series of interrelated administrative and judicial proceedings ... involving [the plaintiff's development project]." The plaintiff's development plan involved "the construction of a large childcare center and approximately twenty residential units on High Ridge Road in Stamford." "For ease of reference, the court ... describe[d] the allegedly wrongful activity at issue ... [in] three distinct, though related, administrative and judicial proceedings, each involving [the] defendants’ opposition to a particular zoning application made by [the] plaintiff in connection with its High Ridge Road project. ...

"The initial round of administrative and judicial proceedings arose out of a set of applications submitted by [the plaintiff] to the Stamford Zoning Board (board) in April, 2010. These included an application for special exception approval, and an application for approval of site and architectural plans, each of which related to [the plaintiff's] intention to develop a two-story building consisting of a day care center and nine residential units on the subject property ( [collectively referred to as the first application] ). The board held hearings on the first application in December, 2010, and voted on January 10, 2011, to deny the application for a special exception. [The plaintiff] timely appealed the denial to the Superior Court.

"Ahuja's formal involvement in the first application did not come until over a year later, on February 22, 2012, when she filed a motion to intervene in the appeal pending in the Superior Court. The motion described her status as a statutorily aggrieved landowner pursuant to General Statutes § 8-8, based on the fact that she owned property within 100 feet of the subject property. Ahuja alleged that her participation as an intervenor had become necessary because there was no longer true adversity between [the] plaintiff ... and [the board] due to the board's recent action on a second, modified zoning application [for a special permit] made by [the plaintiff], which the board had approved while the appeal of the decision in the first application was pending. ... Ahuja argued that [the plaintiff] and the board were now essentially on the same side, and would settle the appeal unless the court permitted her to intervene in support of the board's denial of the special exception sought in the first application.

"Ahuja's motion to intervene was denied by the court (Adams, J. ), on May 30, 2012.... The [court, denying intervention,] weighed the various factors relevant to permissive intervention and determined that a majority of those considerations counseled denial of Ahuja's motion to intervene. The existence of Ahuja's then pending appeal from the board's approval of the second application ... gave [the court] pause, because it was possible that intervention might not lead to more efficient proceedings in light of that appeal ... but [the court] ultimately chose to exercise [its] discretion to deny intervention. To ensure that Ahuja's interests would be protected, [the court] ordered the parties to provide three weeks’ notice to Ahuja in the event of a settlement [of the plaintiff's appeal], which would allow her to participate in any hearing for judicial approval of the settlement under ... § 8-8 (n). There is no suggestion anywhere in the [court's decision denying intervention], express or implied, that Ahuja's motion to intervene was frivolous, vexatious or otherwise objectively unreasonable.

"Ahuja sought appellate review of [the court's] intervention order by filing a timely petition for certification pursuant to ... § 8-8 (o) and Practice Book § 81-1. Certification was granted by the Appellate Court on October 24, 2012. A game of litigation chess followed. [The plaintiff] (which had opposed Ahuja's motion to intervene) filed a motion in the Superior Court case to implead Ahuja as a party defendant on May 25, 2013. Ahuja (who had sought to intervene) initially objected to [the plaintiff's] motion to implead. The board also objected. [The court, Berger, J. ] granted the motion to implead on August 23, 2013. Ahuja withdrew [her] appeal in the Appellate Court on October 4, 2013, and the Superior Court case proceeded on the merits. Ahuja's trial brief, filed on October 15, 2013, adopted the board's trial brief in its entirety and added less than two pages of additional argument. [The court] held a merits hearing on December 6, 2013, and issued a decision on February 14, 2014.... [The court] found that the board's decision denying a special exception was not supported by substantial evidence, and therefore sustained [the plaintiff's] appeal in connection with the first application.

"In late July, 2011, after the board's denial of the first application and while the appeal of that denial was pending in the Superior Court, [the plaintiff] filed a second application for a special permit with the board. The second application sought to develop a day care center and twenty-two residential units at the subject property, an increase from the nine units proposed in the first application. A series of five public hearings on the second application were held by the board in the latter part of 2011.... The board voted to approve the second application on December 12, 2011.

"Ahuja appealed the board's decision. ... The matter was fully briefed and argued in the Superior Court. On January 4, 2013, [the court, Berger, J. ] issued a memorandum of decision denying the appeal .... Ahuja filed a petition for certification from that decision, which was denied by the Appellate Court on July 24, 2013 ....

"On September 17, 2014, [the plaintiff] filed [a third] zoning application, which requested modification of certain conditions imposed by the board in its approval of the second application. More particularly, [the plaintiff] sought to increase the number of residential units from seventeen to nineteen units; increase the amount of available parking by three additional spaces; open an entrance exit on Bradley Place without the obligation to install a traffic signal; and change the form of residential ownership from condominiums to apartments. After public hearings, the board approved the third application on November 17, 2014. Ahuja appealed the board's decision to the Superior Court on ... December 2, 2014. [The plaintiff] moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it was not returned to court within the time required by General Statutes § 52-46a. The motion to dismiss was granted on July 6, 2015. No appeal was taken. ...

"[The plaintiff] also alleges that [the] defendants engaged in wrongful conduct outside of the immediate context of the [aforementioned] legal proceedings .... These allegations relate to false or otherwise tortious communications that [the plaintiff] claims were made by [the] defendants to various nongovernmental individuals or entities with some role in the overall fate of the project. ... According to [the plaintiff], [the] defendants (1) spread false information about the development plans to neighbors, in an effort to mobilize opposition to the project ... (2) [contacted] [the plaintiff's] ‘lending institutions with the goal of controlling the debt that secured [the plaintiff's] property’ ... and (3) contact[ed] or interfere[d] with [the plaintiff's] current or prospective tenant relationships. ...

"[The underlying] lawsuit was commenced by [the plaintiff] in 2016. The operative complaint contains seven counts, all of which relate in some way to [the] defendants’ alleged campaign to impede [the plaintiff's] project by wrongful means. ... Four counts of the complaint are brought solely against Ahuja personally—the first count, for common-law vexatious litigation; the second count, for vexatious litigation under General Statutes § 52-568, the third count, for abuse of process, and the fourth count, which alleges that the conduct underlying the first three counts violates [CUTPA]. Two other counts are directed solely at ... Holdings (the fifth count, for aiding and abetting Ahuja's wrongful conduct as alleged in the first four counts; and the sixth count, for a violation of CUTPA). The seventh count alleges tortious interference with contractual and business relations against both defendants.

"[The defendants] ... moved for summary judgment on all...