Procurement, LLC v. Nicholas Ahuja, Executor of Estate of Gurpreet Ahuja

Procurement, LLC v. Nicholas Ahuja, Executor of the Estate of Gurpreet Ahuja et al.

No. FBTCV165031388

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Fairfield, Bridgeport

May 3, 2018

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh): Ecker, Steven D., J.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE #178.00

Steven D. Ecker, Judge

Procurement LLC (" Procurement" ) and Ahuja Holdings, LLC (" Holdings" ) are competing real estate developers. Procurement alleges in this lawsuit that Holdings and an individual named Gurpreet Ahuja (" Ahuja" ) engaged in a protracted course of groundless legal proceedings and related wrongful acts intended to cripple plaintiff’s ability to proceed with a development project involving the construction of a large child-care center and approximately twenty residential units on High Ridge Road in Stamford, Connecticut (" the Project" ). Efforts by Procurement to obtain the necessary zoning approvals from the relevant municipal zoning authorities began almost a decade ago. According to Procurement, those efforts were opposed every step of the way by Ahuja, now deceased,^[1] who owned neighboring property. Procurement claims that Ahuja was in fact a " straw" objector acting at the behest of Holdings, an entity controlled by Ahuja’s son, Nicholas Ahuja, and her former husband, Ajay Ahuja. This lawsuit alleges that Ahuja’s groundless legal obstructionism was motivated by her desire to further her family’s business interests rather than any legitimate concerns about zoning or land use.

Presently before the court is defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. For the reasons set forth in this memorandum, the motion is granted in defendants’ favor on the First through Sixth Counts of the operative complaint. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine immunizes defendants from liability for acts undertaken by them in connection with the underlying administrative and judicial zoning-related proceedings, which are the subject of the first six counts. Summary judgment is denied on the Seventh Count of the complaint, however, because that claim relates to defendants’ non-petitioning activity directed at Procurement’s lenders and tenants, conduct that is not protected under Noerr-Pennington .

Background Facts and Proceedings

The current litigation arises out of a series of interrelated administrative and judicial proceedings over the past seven-plus years involving Procurement’s High Ridge Road Project. For ease of reference, the court will describe the allegedly wrongful activity at issue using two basic categories. The first includes three distinct, though related, administrative and judicial proceedings, each involving defendants’ opposition to a particular zoning application made by plaintiff in connection with its High Ridge Road Project. The second category of alleged wrongdoing involves what Procurement calls defendants’ " non-petitioning activity," which relates to defendants’ interactions with non-governmental participants in the Project- neighbors, lenders, and actual or prospective tenants. Each of these activities is summarized below.

The " First Application"

The initial round of administrative and judicial proceedings arose out of a set of applications submitted by Procurement to the Stamford Zoning Board (Board) in April 2010. These included an application for special exception approval, and an application for approval of site and architectural plans each of which related to Procurement’s intention to develop a two-story building consisting of a day-care center and nine residential units on the subject property (" First Application" ). The Board held hearings on the First Application in December 2010, and voted on January 10, 2011 to deny the application for a special exception. Procurement timely appealed the denial to the superior court.

Ahuja’s formal involvement in the First Application did not come until over a year later, on February 22, 2012, when she filed a motion to intervene in the appeal pending in the superior court. The motion described her status as a statutorily aggrieved landowner pursuant to General Statutes § 8-8, based on the fact that she owned property within 100 feet of the subject property. Ahuja alleged that her participation as an intervenor had become necessary because there was no longer true adversity between plaintiff (Procurement) and defendant (the Board) due to the Board’s recent action on a second modified zoning application made by Procurement, which the Board had approved while the appeal of the decision in the First Application was pending. (The " Second Application" is described in greater detail below.)^[2] Ahuja argued that Procurement and the Board were now essentially on the same side, and would settle the appeal unless the court permitted her to intervene in support of the Board’s denial of the special exception sought in the First Application.

Ahuja’s motion to intervene was denied by the court (Adams, J.), on May 30, 2012. See Procurement, LLC v. City of Stamford Zoning Board, No. FST-CV- 11-6008292, " Memorandum of Decision Re: Motion to Intervene" (Entry #122.00 " Intervention MOD" ) . The Intervention MOD weighed the various factors relevant to permissive intervention and determined that a majority of those considerations counseled denial of Ahuja’s motion to intervene. The existence of Ahuja’s then-pending appeal from the Board’s approval of the Second Application (see below at pp. 5-6) gave Judge Adams pause, because it was possible that intervention might not lead to more efficient proceedings in light of that appeal, see Intervention MOD at 5, but Judge Adams ultimately chose to exercise his discretion to deny intervention. To ensure that Ahuja’s interests would be protected, Judge Adams ordered the parties to provide three weeks’ notice to Ahuja in the event of a settlement, which would allow her to participate in any hearing for judicial approval of the settlement under General Statutes § 8-8(n). There is no suggestion anywhere in the Intervention MOD, express or implied, that Ahuja’s motion to intervene was frivolous, vexatious or otherwise objectively unreasonable.

Ahuja sought appellate review of Judge Adams’ intervention order by filing a timely petition for certification pursuant to General Statutes § 8-8(o) and Practice Book § 81-1. Certification was granted by the Appellate Court on October 24, 2012. A game of litigation chess followed. Procurement (which had opposed Ahuja’s motion to intervene) filed a motion in the superior court case to implead Ahuja as a party defendant on May 25, 2013. Ahuja (who had sought to intervene) initially objected to Procurement’s motion to implead The Board also objected. Judge Berger granted the motion to implead on August 23, 2013. Ahuja withdrew its appeal in the Appellate Court on October 4, 2013, and the superior court case proceeded on the merits. Ahuja’s trial brief, filed on October 15, 2013, adopted the Board’s trial brief in its entirety and added less than two pages of additional argument. Judge Berger held a merits hearing on December 6, 2013, and issued a decision on February 14, 2014. See Procurement, LLC v. City of Stamford Zoning Board, No. LND-HHD-CV-116035946, Memorandum of Decision 2/14/14 (" Berger MOD 2/14/14" ) . Judge Berger found that the Board’s decision denying a special exception was not supported by substantial evidence, and therefore sustained Procurement’s appeal in connection with the First Application.

The Second Application

In late July 2011, after the Board’s denial of the First Application and while the appeal of that denial was pending in the superior court, Procurement filed a second application for a special permit with the Board. The Second Application sought to develop a day-care center and twenty-two residential units at the subject property, an increase from the nine units proposed in the First Application. A series of five public hearings on the Second Application were held by the Board in the latter part of 2011 (September 26, 2011; October 6, 2011; October 11, 2011; October 26, 2011; and November 10, 2011). The Board voted to approve the Second Application on December 12, 2011.

Ahuja appealed the Board’s decision. See Gurpreet Ahuja v. Zoning Board of the City of Stamford and Procurement, LLC. ^[3] The matter was fully briefed and argued in the superior court. On January 4, 2013, Judge Berger issued a memorandum of decision denying the appeal (" Berger MOD 1/4/13" ). Ahuja filed a petition for certification from that decision, which was denied by the Appellate Court on July 24, 2013.

The Third Application

On September 17, 2014, Procurement filed another zoning application, which requested modification of certain conditions imposed by the Board in its approval of the Second Application. More particularly, Procurement sought to increase the number of residential units from seventeen to nineteen units; increase the amount of available parking by three additional spaces; open an entrance exit on Bradley Place without the obligation to install a traffic signal; and change the form of residential ownership from condominiums to apartments. After public hearings, the Board approved the Third Application on November 17, 2014. Ahuja appealed the Board’s decision to the superior court on or about December 2, 2014. Procurement moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it was not returned to court within the time required by General Statutes § 52-46a. The motion to dismiss was granted on July 6, 2015. No appeal was taken.

The " Non-Petitioning" Activity

Procurement also alleges that defendants engaged in wrongful conduct outside of the immediate context of the legal proceedings described above....