Profita v. Puckett

TAYLOR PROFITA, Plaintiff, v. CHRIS PUCKETT, in his capacity as an individual,and JOHN AND JANE DOES 1 THROUGH 100in their capacities as individuals, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 15-cv-01237-DME-CBS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

April 25, 2017

RECOMMENDATIONS AND ORDERS ON PENDING MOTIONS

Magistrate Judge Shaffer

This matter comes before the court for consideration of the following motions: (1) Defendant Chris Puckett's Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. # 93), and (2) Plaintiff Taylor Profita's Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. # 95). These motions were referred to this Magistrate Judge for findings of fact and recommendations pursuant to a memorandum dated February 6, 2017, and both are fully briefed.¹ The court has carefully considered the parties'briefs and attached exhibits, and the entire case file. I also have spent considerable time conducting my own legal research. For the sake of simplicity, these Recommendations will address the summary judgment motions in the order in which they were filed.

Also pending before the court are the following referred motions: (3) Plaintiff Profita's Motion to Quash Subpoenas (doc. #81); (4) Plaintiff Profita's Motion for Immediate Recusal of Magistrate Judge (doc. # 127); and (5) Plaintiff Profita's Motion to Stay Proceedings Related to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. #127). Plaintiff's Motion to Quash addresses subpoenas directed to health care providers who have treated Mr. Profita in the past. After this motion was fully briefed, I elected to defer my ruling pending the disposition of the parties'motions for summary judgment. I concluded that it would be wholly inappropriate to burden non-parties with the obligations of discovery if the requested information might prove to be wholly superfluous. Mr. Profita and defense counsel agreed with that assessment during a discovery conference on February 10, 2017. See doc. #101.

Plaintiff's motion to recuse and motion to stay proceedings were referred to this court in an Order (doc. # 135) issued by the district court on April 20, 2017. For reasons that will be explained below, I do not believe these two motions require further briefing.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Mr. Profita, a former student at the University of Colorado School of Medicine, filed his pro se Complaint² on June 11, 2015, alleging three claims for relief: (1) "false police report and false report of a lawful exclusion of Profita from the Anschutz Medical Campus;" (2) "the unlawful issuance of an allegedly exclusionary order issued in violation of Profita's Due Process rights;" and (3) "the unlawful prohibition of Profita from contact with public employees and officials from the University of Colorado and the University of Colorado School of Medicine." In sum, Plaintiff asserts that he has property and liberty interests and rights "to be present on campus" and "in working with, interacting and corresponding [with] public officials, colleagues and staff at the Anschutz Medical Campus, the University of Colorado School of Medicine and affiliated programs." Mr. Profita contends that the "unlawful issuance of an exclusionary order and the arbitrary prohibition of conduct" deprived him of the aforementioned constitutional rights without due process. The Complaint names as defendants Chris Puckett in his individualcapacity, and John and Jane Does 1 through 100 in their individual capacities.³ Defendant Puckett filed an Answer (doc. #14) on July 27, 2015. After the close of discovery on December 16, 2016, the parties filed the motions for summary judgment that are the subject of this Recommendation.

ANALYSIS

I. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

"Pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court may grant summary judgment where the [materials in the record, including] . . . depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the . . . moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Montgomery v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 637 F. Supp. 2d 934, 939 (D. Colo. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

The burden of persuasion under Rule 56 requires the moving party to "point to those portions of the record that demonstrate an absence of a genuine issue of material fact, given the relevant substantive law." Thomas v. Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 968 F.2d 1022, 1024 (10th Cir. 1992) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)). A fact is"material" if under the substantive law it could have an effect on the outcome of the lawsuit. EEOC v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d 1184, 1190 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). While the moving party bears the initial burden of showing that there is an absence of any issues of material fact, Hicks v. City of Watonga, 942 F.2d 737, 743 (10th Cir. 1991), the movant need not negate the non-movant's claim. See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Weisman, 27 F.3d 500, 503 (10th Cir. 1994); Universal Money Ctrs., Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 22 F.3d 1527, 1529 (10th Cir. 1994). Once the moving party points to an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's claim, the non-moving party may not rest upon his pleadings, but must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial as to the elements essential to the non-moving party's case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). See also Kannady v. City of Kiowa, 590 F.3d 1161, 1169 (10th Cir. 2010).

To defeat a defendant's properly supported motion for summary judgment, there must be evidence upon which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) ("Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'"). Conclusory allegations alone will not create a genuine issue of material fact necessitating trial. Dobson v. City & Cty. of Denver, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1083 (D. Colo. 1999), aff'd, 13 F. App'x 842 (10th Cir. 2001). Cf. Nichols v. Hurley, 921 F.2d 1101, 1113 (10th Cir. 1990), rehearing denied (Jan. 29, 1991) ("conclusory allegations without specific supporting facts have no probative value"). Similarly, evidence that is not significantly probative and immaterial factual disputes will not defeat a motion for summary judgment. Ayon v. Gourley, 47F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1252 (D. Colo. 1998), aff'd, 185 F.3d 873 (10th Cir. 1999). The demonstration of "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts" is not sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Forman v. Richmond Police Dep't, 104 F.3d 950, 957 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586).

After construing the factual record and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Kidd v. Taos Ski Valley, Inc., 88 F.3d 848, 851 (10th Cir. 1996), rehearing denied (Sep. 5, 1996), the court ultimately must determine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52. "The very purpose of a summary judgment action is to determine whether trial is necessary." White v. York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 360 (10th Cir. 1995).

In addressing the pending motions and related briefs, I recognize that "a pro se litigant's pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)). "The Haines rule applies to all proceedings involving a pro se litigant, including . . . summary judgment proceedings." Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110 n. 3 (citations omitted). "[S]uch liberal construction is intended merely to overlook technical formatting errors and other defects in Plaintiff's use of legal terminology and proper English." Smith v. Krieger, 643 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1279 (D. Colo. 2009) (citation omitted). The court cannot be a pro se litigant's advocate. Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n. 1 (10th Cir. 2008).

A. The Undisputed Facts

In addressing a motion for summary judgment, the court's initial focus must be on those facts that "cannot be or [are] genuinely disputed" as evidenced by citations to "particular parts of materials in the record." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). After carefully reviewing the exhibits proffered by the parties in connection with briefing the competing motions for summary judgment, the following facts and/or events appear to be undisputed.⁴

In 2012, Mr. Profita was a third-year medical student at the University of Colorado School of Medicine. In August 2012, he commenced a pro se civil action in the District Court for Adams County, Colorado asserting claims against the University of Colorado School of Medicine for breach of contract and promissory estoppel, and requesting permanent injunctive relief.⁵ By the time Mr. Profita's case proceeded to a three-day bench trial on May 6-8, 2013, he had been dismissed from the School of Medicine based upon failing grades in his "Hospitalized Adult Care" clinical rotation and Women's Care rotation.⁶ On May 14, 2013, the Adams CountyDistrict Court entered judgment "in favor of the defendant University of Colorado School of Medicine and against plaintiff Taylor Profita."⁷ See Exhibit C (doc. #93-3), attached to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.⁸ In particular, the Adams County District Court found that Mr. Profita had not established all of the essential elements of his breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims. The court further found that "[r]estoring Mr. Profita to medical school would adversely affect the public...