Pruitt v. Hansen & Adkins, Inc.

681 F.Supp.3d 1242

Michael G. PRUITT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. HANSEN & ADKINS, INC., et al., Defendants.

CIVIL CASE NO. 2:23-cv-167-ECM

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division

Signed July 12, 2023

Patrick Lamont Hays, Jr., The Hays Law Firm, LLC, Greenville, AL, for Plaintiffs.

Brandi Branton Frederick, Richard Wayne Lewis, Joseph Edward Bishop Stewart, Austill Lewis Pipkin & Maddox PC, Birmingham, AL, William Eugene Pipkin, Jr., Austill, Lewis & Pipkin, Mobile, AL, for Defendants Hansen & Adkins, Inc., Hansen & Adkins Auto Transport, Inc., Royal Truck Leasing LLC, Hansen & Adkins Auto Logistics, Inc., James B. Woodfork.

Jannea Suzanne Rogers, Blake T. Richardson, Adams & Reese LLP, Mobile, AL, for Defendant Mamuye Ayane Takelu.

Scott Burnett Smith, Hunter Wade Pearce, Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP, Huntsville, AL, Charles Andrew Stewart, III, Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP, Montgomery, AL, for Defendant Samsara, Inc.

James MacDonald Russell, Jr., Greenville, AL, John Calhoun Morrow, Burr & Forman LLP, Birmingham, AL, for Defendant Volvo Group North America, LLC.

Joel Hartley Pearson, Ball, Ball, Matthews & Novak, Montgomery, AL, for Defendant MoLo Solutions, Inc.

Dennis Oscar Vann, Jr., Thomas Lee Oliver, II, William Charles Johnson, Carr Allison, Birmingham, AL, for Defendant Arcbest Corporation.

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

EMILY C. MARKS, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

Now pending before the Court is the Plaintiffs' motion to remand. (Doc. 26). On February 27, 2023, the Plaintiffs sued various defendants in the Circuit Court of Butler County, Alabama, for claims stemming from a traffic accident. (Doc. 26-2 at 4-39). Relevant to this motion, the Plaintiffs sued Defendant MoLo Solutions, LLC ("MoLo"), for negligently or wantonly hiring a tractor-trailer operator to haul freight for its clients (Count XIV) and for vicarious liability (Count XV). MoLo removed the case to this Court, asserting federal-question jurisdiction and supplemental jurisdiction. (Doc. 1). MoLo argues this Court has federal jurisdiction because the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 ("FAAAA"), 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1), completely preempts state-law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers. (Id. at 9-10). The Plaintiffs moved to remand the case back to state court. (Doc. 26). After careful consideration of the motion, briefs, and applicable law, the Court finds that this case is due to be remanded back to state court.¹

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Though a plaintiff is the master of his claim, his power is not plenary. Instead, a defendant may remove from state court to federal court any "action[ ] that originally could have been filed" in that federal court. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441). Federal courts, however, are courts of limited jurisdiction—they possess only the power authorized by the Constitution and statute. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). Courts should presume that a case lies outside this limited jurisdiction, with the party asserting federal jurisdiction bearing the burden of establishing the contrary. Id. When a plaintiff properly moves to remand a removed case, any questions or doubts as to jurisdiction are to be resolved in favor of returning the matter to state court. Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994). Finally, a court must evaluate its jurisdiction as of the time of removal. Ehlen Floor Covering, Inc. v. Lamb, 660 F.3d 1283, 1287 (11th Cir. 2011).

III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This matter arises from a tragic vehicular accident that occurred on July 19, 2021. The adult Plaintiffs in this case attempted to rescue children from a van that caught on fire as a result of this accident. Unable to do so, all Plaintiffs, including the minor children, witnessed the fire engulf the van and kill its eight minor occupants. The accident occurred when a tractor-trailer driven by Mamuye Takelu ("Takelu") crashed into the back of a vehicle driven by Candice Gulley ("Gulley"), who was transporting the eight minors. Takelu was driving a tractor-trailer owned by Asmat Investment, LLC ("Asmat"), and he was hauling a load under MoLo's motor carrier authority. MoLo arranged to have the load hauled by Takelu on the day of the accident. All eight minors in Gulley's vehicle died as a result of the accident. The Plaintiffs, who allegedly witnessed the fire, filed this lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Butler County, Alabama.

In their complaint filed in state court, among claims against other defendants, the Plaintiffs sued MoLo for negligently hiring Takelu and Asmat to haul freight (Count XIV) and for vicarious liability as the motor carrier for the driver allegedly causing the accident (Count XV). These claims, along with all other claims in the complaint, were brought under state law. MoLo removed the case, arguing that this Court has federal-question jurisdiction and supplemental jurisdiction because the Plaintiffs' claims against it are completely preempted by § 14501(c)(1) of the FAAAA. The Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that even if the claims are subject to ordinary preemption under § 14501(c)(1), as a federal defense, ordinary preemption does not confer federal-question jurisdiction. The parties also dispute whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to recover attorney's fees and costs incurred in responding to MoLo's removal of the case.

IV. DISCUSSION²

A. Complete Preemption

MoLo contends that this Court has jurisdiction because the FAAAA completely preempted all state-law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers. MoLo argues, the Court has federal-question jurisdiction, which requires that the action "aris[e] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In deciding whether a federal question exists, courts apply the well-pleaded complaint rule, which looks only to the face of the complaint rather than to any defense asserted by the defendant. See Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425.

The Plaintiffs do not raise any federal issues on the face of the complaint. However, an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule is the "complete preemption" doctrine. Id. at 393, 107 S.Ct. 2425. Complete preemption occurs in the rare instance that Congress so "completely preempt[s] a particular area that any civil complaint . . . is necessarily federal in character." Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63, 67, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987). Complete preemption is jurisdictional in nature and focuses on whether Congress intended to make a plaintiff's cause of action federal and removable even though the complaint only pleads state-law claims. Cotton v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 402 F.3d 1267, 1281 (11th Cir. 2005).

MoLo argues that the Plaintiffs' claims are completely preempted under the FAAAA because the claims against MoLo regarding its hiring of Takelu and Asmat directly relate to its service as a freight broker for the transportation of property. The FAAAA provides that "a State . . . may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . or any motor private carrier, broker, or freight forwarder with respect to the transportation of property." 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). MoLo asks the Court to interpret the phrase "rate, route, or service" broadly to completely preempt state-law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers. (Doc. 29 at 21).

However, MoLo focuses much of its argument on the contention that § 14501(c)(1) of the FAAAA preempts the state-law negligence claims against it under ordinary preemption principles. An ordinary preemption defense cannot provide grounds for removal. See Cmty. State Bank v. Strong, 651 F.3d 1241, 1261 n.16 (11th Cir. 2011). Complete preemption is a jurisdictional doctrine, and thus "is distinct from 'ordinary' or 'defensive' preemption," which "allows a defendant to defeat a plaintiff's state-law claim on the merits by asserting the supremacy of federal law as an affirmative defense." Id. Ordinary preemption, however, does not create federal jurisdiction. See id. In other words, "a case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense, including the defense of pre-emption, even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff's complaint, and even if both parties concede that the federal defense is the only question truly at issue." Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393, 107 S.Ct. 2425. A state-law claim may be subject to ordinary preemption by a federal statute "but not completely preempted for jurisdictional purposes." Ammedie v. Sallie Mae, Inc., 485 F. App'x 399, 402 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Cotton, 402 F.3d at 1281).

Therefore, the cases upon which MoLo relies concerning ordinary preemption do not support its complete preemption argument. See, e.g., Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass'n, 552 U.S. 364, 128 S.Ct. 989, 169 L.Ed.2d 933 (2008); Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 569 U.S. 641, 133 S.Ct. 2096, 186 L.Ed.2d 177 (2013); Smith v. Comair, Inc., 134 F.3d 254 (4th Cir. 1998); McCarter v. Ziyar Express, Inc., 2023 WL 144844 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 10, 2023); Ga. Nut Co. v. C.H. Robinson Co., 2017 WL 4864857 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2017); Deerskin Trading Post, Inc. v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., 972 F. Supp. 665 (N.D. Ga. 1997). Likewise, the cases cited by MoLo that ruled on ordinary preemption at the motion to dismiss stage are not informative on the jurisdictional question before the Court. See, e.g., Volkova v. C.H. Robinson Co., 2018 WL 741441 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 7, 2018); Krauss v. Iris USA, Inc., 2018 WL 2063839 (E.D. Pa. May 3, 2018); Krauss v. Iris USA, Inc., 2018 WL 3632107 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 2018); Creagan v. Wal-Mart Transp., LLC, 354 F. Supp. 3d 808 (N.D. Ohio 20...