Pruitt v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

SANDRA PRUITT v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., et al.

Civil Action No. DKC 15-1308

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

December 30, 2015

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Presently pending and ready for resolution in this mortgage lending case is an unopposed motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ("Wells Fargo") and HSBC Bank USA, National Association ("HSBC") (collectively, the "Defendants"). (ECF No. 21). The court now rules, no hearing being deemed necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For the following reasons, the motion to dismiss will be granted.

I. Background

A. Factual Background¹

On March 12, 2005, Fidelity & Trust Mortgage, Inc. ("Fidelity") provided a mortgage loan to Plaintiff Sandra Pruitt ("Plaintiff") that was evidenced by a promissory note (the "Note") and secured by a deed of trust (the "Deed of Trust") oncertain real property located at 4210 23rd Place, Temple Hills, Maryland 20748 (the "Property"). (ECF No. 2 ¶¶ 5-8). Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS") acted as a nominee for Fidelity and Fidelity's successors and assigns. (Id. ¶ 7; ECF No. 21-3, at 2). MERS assigned the Deed of Trust to HSBC on May 7, 2012 (the "Assignment"). (ECF Nos. 2 ¶ 7; 21-4, at 2). HSBC owns the Deed of Trust and Wells Fargo services the mortgage on behalf of HSBC. (ECF Nos. 2 ¶¶ 3-4, 7; 21-4).

According to Plaintiff, "[t]he identity of the true holder of the promissory note in May 2012 is unknown" and, "[a]t the time Wells Fargo executed the Assignment, Wells Fargo had not been assigned or transferred any interest in the Note or [Deed of Trust], and did not have any interest in the Note or [Deed of Trust] to assign to HSBC." (ECF No. 2 ¶¶ 11-12). Believing that Wells Fargo does not possess the Note, Plaintiff alleges that she "has conditioned making her payment on proof that Wells Fargo is the present 'holder' of the Note but Wells Fargo has failed to produce such proof." (Id. ¶¶ 13-14).

Plaintiff asserts that Wells Fargo entered the Property and denied Plaintiff's access, thereby preventing her from obtaining rental income. Plaintiff alleges that Wells Fargo changed the locks on the Property and subsequently sent Plaintiff the incorrect key. Plaintiff hired a locksmith to change the locks and resumed receiving rental income from the Property.Plaintiff also avers that Wells Fargo contacted Plaintiff's insurance carrier, Travelers Insurance ("Travelers"), and falsely communicated that the Property was vacant. Thereafter, Travelers allegedly informed Plaintiff that her insurance would be cancelled.

In the unopposed motion to dismiss, Defendants assert that Plaintiff filed a Chapter 13 Voluntary Petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland on April 26, 2012. (ECF Nos. 21-1, at 2; 21-5, at 18); see In re Pruitt, No. 12-17889-WIL (D.Md. 2012). In bankruptcy court, Plaintiff entered into a consent order with Defendants modifying an automatic stay and under which Plaintiff agreed to make monthly payments to Wells Fargo. (ECF Nos. 21-1, at 2; 21-8). According to Defendants, Plaintiff ultimately defaulted on her obligations, which resulted in the dismissal of the bankruptcy proceeding on June 17, 2014. (ECF No. 21-1, at 2; see ECF No. 21-5, at 3).

B. Procedural Background

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this action against Defendants in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County on March 9, 2015. Defendants timely removed the action to this court. (ECF No. 1). The complaint asserts the following claims against Defendants: usury (Count I); unjust enrichment (Count II); trespass (Count IV); tort of intentional interference(Count V); and breach of contract (Count VI). Plaintiff also seeks declaratory relief (Count III). (ECF No. 2).

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on May 14, 2015. (ECF No. 21). The next day, Plaintiff was provided with a Roseboro notice via letter, which advised her of the pendency of the motion to dismiss and her entitlement to respond within seventeen days. (ECF No. 22); see Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 310 (4^th Cir. 1975) (holding that pro se plaintiffs should be advised of their right to file responsive material to a motion for summary judgment). The letter also warned Plaintiff that failure to respond in opposition could result in the dismissal of her case without further notice. To date, Plaintiff has not filed any opposition to the motion to dismiss, and the time for her to do so has long expired. Local Rule 105.2(a). Accordingly, Defendants' motion is unopposed.

II. Standard of Review

The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the sufficiency of the complaint. Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4^th Cir. 2006). A plaintiff's complaint need only satisfy the standard of Rule 8(a), which requires a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). "Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a 'showing,' rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief." Bell Atl. Corp.v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 n.3 (2007). That showing must consist of more than "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" or "naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

At this stage, all well-pleaded allegations in a complaint must be considered as true, Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994), and all factual allegations must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4^th Cir. 1999) (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4^th Cir. 1993)). In evaluating the complaint, unsupported legal allegations need not be accepted. Revene v. Charles Cnty. Comm'rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4^th Cir. 1989). Legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are insufficient, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, as are conclusory factual allegations devoid of any reference to actual events. United Black Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4^th Cir. 1979); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4^th Cir. 2009). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged, but it has not 'show[n] that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). Thus, "[d]etermining whether a complaint states aplausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id.

In reviewing the motion to dismiss, the court may consider allegations in the complaint, matters of public record, and documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are integral to the complaint and authentic. See Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4^th Cir. 2009). Here, the Note, the Deed of Trust, and the Assignment are referenced in the complaint and are integral, as they provide the basis for the parties' rights to the Property. Accordingly, these documents may be considered without converting the motion into one for summary judgment. In addition, facts and documents subject to judicial notice may be considered by a court, without converting the motion under Rule 12(d). Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007); Katyle v. Penn Nat'l Gaming, Inc., 637 F.3d 462, 466 (4^th Cir. 2011). Here, the court may take judicial notice of the bankruptcy proceeding and consider related documentation. Anderson v. FDIC, 918 F.2d 1139, 1141 (4^th Cir. 1990) ("[T]he Bankruptcy Court is considered 'a unit of the district court' under 28 U.S.C. § 151, and we believe a district court should properly take judicial notice of its own records.").

Generally, pro se pleadings are liberally construed and held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, "even a pro se complaint must be dismissed if it does not allege a plausible claim for relief." Forquer v. Schlee, No. RDB-12-969, 2012 WL 6087491, at *3 (D.Md. Dec. 4, 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; O'Neil v. Ponzi, 394 F.App'x. 795, 796 (2^d Cir. 2010)).

III. Analysis

Although Defendants' motion to dismiss is unopposed, the court must review the motion papers to determine whether dismissal is proper. Wheatley v. Cohn, No. GLR-13-3850, 2014 WL 2452606, at *2 (D.Md. May 30, 2014) (citing Stevenson v. City of Seat Pleasant, Md., 743 F.3d 411, 416 n.3 (4^th Cir. 2014)). "When a plaintiff fails to oppose a motion to dismiss, a district court is 'entitled, as authorized, to rule on the . . . motion and dismiss [the] suit on the uncontroverted bases asserted' in the motion." White v. Wal Mart Stores, Inc., No. ELH-13-00031, 2014 WL 1369609, *2 (D.Md. Apr. 4, 2014) (quoting Pueschel v. United States, 369 F.3d 345, 354 (4^th Cir. 2004)). Moreover, a district court has the inherent authority to dismiss a lawsuit sua sponte for failure to prosecute. See Link v.Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629 (1962)); White, 2014 WL 1369609, at *2 ("In light of [the] plaintiff's failure to oppose the [m]otion, I can only assume that [the] plaintiff concedes that her [c]omplaint is deficient for the reasons stated by [the] defendant."). "[T]he district court also has discretion to decline to 'grant a motion to dismiss based on the failure to file a timely opposition when the motion is plainly lacking in merit.'" White, 2014 WL 1369609, at *2 (quoting United States v. Sasscer, Civ. No. Y-97-3026, 2000 WL 1479154, at *2 n.6 (D.Md. Aug. 25, 2000)).

Based on the following analysis, there is no obvious lack of merit in Defendants' motion to dismiss. The allegations contained in Plaintiff's complaint do not give rise to claims for...