Puana v. Kealoha

1

GERARD K. PUANA, RICKY L. C HARTSELL, AS TRUSTEE OF THE FLORENCE M. PUANA TRUST, Plaintiffs, v. KATHERINE P. KEALOHA, LOUIS M. KEALOHA, MINH-HUNG NGUYEN, MINH-HUNG "BOBBY" NGUYEN, DANIEL SELLERS, NIALL SILVA, WALTER CALISTRO, DRU AKAGI, JOHN AND/OR JANE DOES 1-50, DEREK WAYNE HAHN, Defendants.

Civ. No. 16-00659 LEK-WRP

United States District Court, D. Hawaii

January 25, 2023

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Leslie E. Kobayashi, United States District Judge.

Before the Court is Defendant City and County of Honolulu's (“the City”) Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”), filed on September 28, 2022. [Dkt no. 371.] On November 25, 2022, Plaintiffs Gerard K. Puana (“Puana”) and Ricky L. Hartsell as Trustee of the Florence M. Puana Trust (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed their memorandum in opposition. [Dkt. no. 393.] The City filed its reply on December 2, 2022. [Dkt. no. 405.] The Motion came on for hearing on December 16, 2022. [Minutes, filed 12/16/22 (dkt no. 413).] The Motion is hereby denied for the reasons set forth below.

BACKGROUND

The parties are familiar with the facts of the case and therefore, the Court does not repeat them in detail here. Relevant to the Motion, Plaintiffs allege the City is liable for malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for former Chief of Police Louis Kealoha's (“Louis”) conduct (“Count I”). [Third Amended Complaint for Damages, filed 5/13/22 (dkt. no. 307) at ¶¶ 185-192.] The Motion seeks summary judgment as to certain elements of Plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claim against the City stemming from Louis's conduct.^[1]

DISCUSSION

The City only seeks summary judgment as to the City's liability based on Louis's conduct on the grounds that Louis's orders did not constitute Honolulu Police Department's (“HPD”) policy and his actions were self-serving. See Motion, Mem. in Supp. at 5 11. The Court concludes as a matter of law that Louis had final policymaking authority in the area where the alleged constitutional violation occurred. Further, the Court finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Louis's actions constituted as policies. The parties did not address or brief the issues as to whether: (1) Louis deprived Puana of his constitutional rights; and (2) such a deprivation was intentional. The Court, therefore, does not rule on those issues but assumes, for purposes of the instant Motion only, that Louis intentionally deprived Puana of his constitutional rights.

A. Relevant Law

The United States Supreme Court has relied on four principles when determining whether a single decision may be sufficient to establish an unconstitutional municipal policy:

First, . . . municipalities may be held liable under § 1983 only for acts for which the municipality itself is actually responsible, “that is, acts which the municipality has officially sanctioned or ordered.” [Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469,] 480 [(1986)]. Second, only those municipal officials who have “final policymaking authority” may by their actions subject the government to § 1983 liability. Id., at 483 (plurality opinion). Third, whether a particular official has “final policymaking authority” is a question of state law. Ibid. (plurality opinion). Fourth, the challenged action must have been taken pursuant to a policy adopted by the official or officials responsible under state law for making policy in that area of the city's business. Id., at 482483, and n.12 (plurality opinion).

City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123 (1988) (emphases in Praprotnik). The determination of whether the person who committed the constitutional violation had final policymaking authority must be decided by the court “as a matter of state law and before the case may be submitted to the jury[.]” Webb v. Sloan, 330 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).

The Supreme Court has also stated:

As our § 1983 municipal liability jurisprudence illustrates, however, it is not enough for a § 1983 plaintiff merely to identify conduct properly attributable to the municipality. The plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the “moving force” behind the injury alleged. That is, a plaintiff must show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.

Where a plaintiff claims that a particular municipal action itself violates federal law, or directs an employee to do so, resolving these issues of fault and causation is straightforward. Section 1983 itself “contains no state-of-mind requirement independent of that necessary to state a violation” of the underlying federal right. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986). In any § 1983 suit, however, the plaintiff must establish the state of mind required to prove the underlying violation. Accordingly, proof that a municipality's legislative body or authorized decisionmaker has intentionally deprived a plaintiff of a federally protected right necessarily establishes that the municipality acted culpably. Similarly, the conclusion that the action taken or directed by the municipality or its authorized decisionmaker itself violates federal law will also determine that the municipal action was the moving force behind the injury of which the plaintiff complains. ....

. . . To the extent that we have recognized a cause of action under § 1983 based on a single decision attributable to a municipality, we have done so only where the evidence that the municipality had acted and that the plaintiff had suffered a deprivation of federal rights also proved fault and causation. For example, Owen v. Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980), and Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981), involved formal decisions of municipal legislative bodies. In Owen, the city council allegedly censured and discharged an employee without a hearing. 445 U.S., at 627-629, 633, and n.13. In Fact Concerts, the city council canceled a license permitting a concert following a dispute over the performance's content. 453 U.S., at 252. Neither decision reflected implementation of a generally applicable rule. But we did not question that each decision, duly promulgated by city lawmakers, could trigger municipal liability if the decision itself were found to be unconstitutional. Because fault and causation were obvious in each case, proof that the municipality's decision was unconstitutional would suffice to establish that the municipality itself was liable for the plaintiff's constitutional injury.

Similarly, Pembaur v. Cincinnati concerned a decision by a county prosecutor, acting as the county's final decisionmaker, 475 U.S., at 485, to direct county deputies to forcibly enter petitioner's place of business to serve capiases upon third parties. Relying on Owen and Newport, we concluded that a final decisionmaker's adoption of a course of action “tailored to a particular situation and not intended to control decisions in later situations” may, in some circumstances, give rise to municipal liability under § 1983. 475 U.S., at 481. In Pembaur, it was not disputed that the prosecutor had specifically directed the action resulting in the deprivation of petitioner's rights. The conclusion that the decision was that of a final municipal decisionmaker and was therefore properly attributable to the municipality established municipal liability. No questions of fault or causation arose.

Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 40406 (1997) (emphases in Brown).

B. Whether Louis Possessed Final Policymaking Authority

The Court must first identify the actions Plaintiffs assert were constitutional violations and determine whether Louis was the final policymaker in the area of those alleged violations. The parties admit that Louis “authorized or approved [HPD Criminal Intelligence Unit's (‘CIU')] surveillance of [Puana] in an effort to frame [him].” [The City's Separate and Concise Statement of Facts, filed 9/28/22 (dkt. no. 373) (“City's CSOF”), at ¶ 34; Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendant City and County of Honolulu's Concise Statement of Material Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (“Plaintiffs' Responsive CSOF”), filed 11/25/22 (dkt. no. 394), at ¶ 34 (admitting City's CSOF ¶ 34).] Louis also “diverted law enforcement attention from legitimate police work to serve [Louis]'s personal avarice.” [City's CSOF at ¶ 37; Plaintiffs' Responsive CSOF at ¶ 37.] “In 2020, then-HPD Chief of Police Susan Ballard (‘Ballard') submitted a declaration relating to [Louis]'s sentencing in a criminal matter.” [City's CSOF at ¶ 38; Plaintiffs' Responsive CSOF at ¶ 38.] “Ballard declared to the Court that prolonged surveillance, particularly of non-violent theft offense, diverts resources and significantly disrupts HPD's operations, particularly in District 6 in Waikiki.” [City's CSOF at ¶ 39; Plaintiffs' Responsive CSOF at ¶ 39.] “The surveillance of Puana resulted in significant loss of resources to HPD.” [City's CSOF at ¶ 42; Plaintiffs' Responsive CSOF at ¶ 42.]

The Court must therefore determine whether Louis's authorization and approval of CIU's surveillance of Puana and diversion of resources to presumably frame Puana in the mailbox theft fell under Louis's final policymaker authority. This Court previously outlined the relevant Hawai'i law and City charter provisions as it relates to the chief of police:

Under Haw. Rev. Stat. § 52D-3, “[t]he chief of police shall have the powers and duties as prescribed by law, the respective county charter, and as provided by this chapter.” Section 6-1601 of the Revised Charter of the City and County of

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