Pub. Land/Water Access Ass'n, Inc. v. Jones

381 Mont. 267

358 P.3d 899

2015 MT 299

PUBLIC LAND/WATER ACCESS ASSOCIATION, INC., Plaintiff, Appellee and Cross–Appellant.

v.Roger JONES, Defendant, Appellant and Cross–Appellee.

No. DA 14–0650.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs Aug. 12, 2015.

Decided Oct. 15, 2015.

For Appellant: John E. Bloomquist, Rachel A. Kinkie, Bloomquist Law Firm, P.C., Helena, Montana.

For Appellee: J. Devlan Geddes, Benjamin J. Alke, Goetz, Baldwin & Geddes, P.C., Bozeman, Montana.

Opinion

Justice PATRICIA COTTER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 In 2000, Roger Jones purchased approximately 4,900 acres of property in Teton County, Montana, known as Boadle Ranch. Since acquiring the property, Jones has prohibited public use of the two main roads transecting Boadle Ranch. Public Lands/Water Access Association (PLWA), a Montana non-profit membership organization dedicated to promoting access to public-owned lands, has consistently sought to regain access to these roads for public use. This is the fifth time the parties have been before us.¹ To date, PLWA has been successful in the courts but Jones has not yet removed the gates barricading entrance to the property. In this current case, Jones appeals the Ninth Judicial District Court's grant of supplementary relief to PLWA. PLWA cross-appeals the District Court's denial of its motion for reasonable attorney fees and costs. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.

ISSUES

¶ 2 Restated, Jones's dispositive issues on appeal are:

¶ 3 Did the District Court err in awarding money damages as supplemental declaratory relief under § 27–8–313, MCA ?

¶ 4 Did the District Court err in failing to consider ownership of the railroad car bridge or its suitability as a bridge in fashioning relief, in violation of PLWA IV?

¶ 5 PLWA's issue on cross-appeal is:

¶ 6 Did the District Court err by not awarding PLWA reasonable attorney fees and costs, in addition to the amount necessary to rebuild the bridge?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 7 Boadle Ranch is an approximately 4,900 acre parcel in Teton County, Montana. Two roads transect Boadle Ranch—Boadle Road and Canal Road. Boadle Road enters Boadle Ranch at the east boundary of the property and travels west where historically it crossed the Sun River Slope Canal (Slope Canal) via Boadle Bridge and intersected with Canal Road. Canal Road runs northwest to Pishkun Reservoir and southeast through the property and onto neighboring land. These roads have been used by the public since the early 1900s.

¶ 8 In late July 2000, Roger Jones contracted to purchase Boadle Ranch from Robert Stephens, Jr. As part of the purchase agreement, Jones required Stephens to install gates at the east entrance of the property and at the bridge crossing Slope Canal. He also had Stephens post signs prohibiting the public from using Boadle Road and Boadle Bridge. Jones retained the gates and signs after he acquired ownership of the property.

¶ 9 In December 2000, PLWA filed suit against Jones seeking: (1) a declaration that Boadle Road was a county or public road and (2) an injunction enjoining Jones from interfering with the public's right to use the road. PLWA I, ¶ 9. While this suit was underway, a wildfire destroyed Boadle Bridge and Jones replaced the bridge with a personally-owned flatbed railcar. PLWA IV, ¶ 4. The district court held that the historical use of Boadle Road established a public prescriptive easement. PLWA I, ¶ 33. On appeal, Jones argued inter alia that the new bridge was his property and he could control access to it. We affirmed the district court's ruling and held that the easement established on Boadle Road included the new Boadle Bridge. We stated “the public has a right to access the bridge and the land under the bridge without interference from Jones.” PLWA I, ¶¶ 31 and 35.

¶ 10 In 2006, PLWA sought a declaration that Canal Road was also a public road for the same reasons Boadle Road was public. The district court ruled in favor of Jones but we reversed and remanded. PLWA II, ¶¶ 7 and 23. On remand, the district court held that Canal Road was a public road and Jones was prohibited from blocking the portions of both Boadle and Canal Roads that traversed his property. Jones appealed. In our non-cite opinion, PLWA III, issued on September 20, 2011, we affirmed the district court. PLWA III, ¶ 8.

¶ 11 However, earlier in September 2011, before our ruling in PLWA III was issued, Jones removed the railcar bridge from its Boadle Road location, destroyed the abutments and support columns, and reinstalled the railcar bridge approximately one-quarter mile away on a private road to which the public had no access. This action allowed Jones to cross the Slope Canal to access the western portion of his property but precluded that public traveling Boadle and Canal Roads from doing so.¶ 12 As a consequence of Jones's removing the bridge, PLWA sued Jones in November 2011 claiming tortious interference with a public easement and public nuisance with actual malice. It also petitioned the district court for supplemental relief under § 27–8–313, MCA, of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA). It claimed Jones violated our ruling in PLWA I by removing the railcar bridge and sought declaratory relief and punitive damages. The district court denied PLWA's petition for supplemental relief and dismissed its complaint against Jones. The court stated that Jones owned the bridge and had no obligation to facilitate public access across Slope Canal. PLWA appealed.

¶ 13 In PLWA IV, we reversed the district court's ruling and remanded the case. We observed that in PLWA I, ¶ 31, we ruled that Boadle Bridge fell within the scope of the public prescriptive easement and that Jones could not interfere with the public's right to access the bridge. PLWA IV, ¶¶ 10 and 11. We explained that our ruling in that case as it pertained to Boadle Bridge was “law of the case” regardless of whether Jones built or owns the current bridge and, as such, our holding must be adhered to throughout the case's subsequent progress. PLWA IV, ¶ 12.

¶ 14 On remand, the District Court conducted a three-day jury trial in June 2014 on PLWA's tort suit against Jones. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of PLWA, finding Jones liable for both tortious interference with an easement and public nuisance. It awarded PLWA $375,000 in damages to restore Boadle Bridge at its original location, $25,000 in loss of bridge use damages, and $10,000 in punitive damages upon finding that Jones had acted with actual malice. The District Court accepted the jury's verdict, finding that it was supported by the evidence presented at trial.

¶ 15 On September 11, 2014, the District Court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law and order on PLWA's request for supplementary declaratory relief. The court adopted the jury's verdict as supplemental declaratory relief but incorporated several variations in its order. First, it awarded the $375,000 to PLWA as a restoration award but instructed that PLWA could subtract its costs and attorney fees from the award and use the remaining amount “to restore” the bridge at the Boadle Road location. Second, it allowed PLWA to provide the restoration award—less fees and costs—to other entities “for construction of a new Boadle Bridge.” And, lastly, it awarded PLWA, as did the jury, $35,000 for loss of bridge use and punitive damages, instructing that this sanction be used for future bridge repair and maintenance. Jones appeals this order, and PLWA cross-appeals the portion of the judgment pertaining to its fees.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 16 We review a district court's factual findings to determine if they are clearly erroneous. A finding of fact may be clearly erroneous if it is not supported by substantial evidence in the record; if the district court misapprehended the evidence; or when our review of the record leaves this Court with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. We review a court's conclusions of law for correctness. Brimstone Mining, Inc. v. Glaus, 2003 MT 236, ¶ 20, 317 Mont. 236, 77 P.3d 175.

¶ 17 The grant of attorney fees pursuant to § 27–8–313, MCA, of the UDJA, is within the discretionary province of the district court. We therefore review a court's decision to award such fees for an abuse of discretion. Renville v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2004 MT 366, ¶ 20, 324 Mont. 509, 105 P.3d 280 (citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

¶ 18 Did the District Court err in awarding money damages as supplemental declaratory relief under § 27–8–313, MCA ?

¶ 19 PLWA sought both tort damages and declaratory relief under the UDJA. Section 27–8–313, MCA, of the UDJA, provides:

Further relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted whenever necessary or proper. The application therefor shall be by petition to a court having jurisdiction to grant the relief. If the application be deemed sufficient, the court shall, on reasonable notice, require any adverse party whose rights have been adjudicated by a declaratory judgment or decree to show cause why further relief should not be granted forthwith.

¶ 20 As noted above, the District Court relied upon the jury's verdict in granting PLWA's request for supplemental relief under § 27–8–313, MCA. Jones argues that the court's grant of supplemental relief based upon the verdict was an abuse of discretion because the verdict itself was improper. He claims that PLWA requested “restoration” damages but the court failed to instruct the jury as to the meaning of “restore.” Moreover, the court submitted a verdict form to the jury referencing costs of “restoring” the bridge, which Jones maintains confused the jury and resulted in an inappropriate and excessive award.

¶ 21 Jones cites multiple cases addressing restoration damages, including McEwen v. MCR, LLC, 2012 MT 319, 368 Mont. 38, 291 P.3d 1253, and Lampi v. Speed, 2011 MT 231, 362 Mont. 122, 261 P.3d 1000. Premised on these cases, he argues that a...