Public Guardian of L.A. v. D.P.

41 Cal.App.5th 794

254 Cal.Rptr.3d 512

CONSERVATORSHIP OF the Person and ESTATE OF D.P.,

Public Guardian of the County of Los Angeles, Petitioner and Respondent,

v.D.P., Objector and Appellant.

B291525

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 5, California.

Filed October 31, 2019

Certified for Partial Publication.^*

Christopher Lionel Haberman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Objector and Appellant.

No appearance for Petitioner and Respondent.

KIM, J.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Public Guardian of the County of Los Angeles (County) filed a petition under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act) ( Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq. )¹ for reappointment as the conservator of appellant D.P., alleging that he was gravely disabled as the result of a mental disorder. Following a trial at which the jury found D.P. to be gravely disabled, the trial court granted the petition and ordered reappointment of the County as D.P.’s conservator.

On appeal from the reappointment order, D.P. contends, among other things, that the trial court committed prejudicial error by failing to instruct the jury on an element necessary to the gravely disabled finding. In the published portion of this opinion, we hold that the trial court properly instructed the jury using the applicable statutory definition of gravely disabled. In the unpublished portion this opinion, we address and reject D.P.’s other contentions on appeal. We therefore affirm the trial court’s reappointment order.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND^**

III. DISCUSSION

A. The LPS Act: An Overview

"The LPS Act governs the involuntary detention, evaluation, and treatment of persons who, as a result of mental disorder, are dangerous or gravely disabled. (§ 5150 et seq.) The Act authorizes the superior court to appoint a conservator of the person for one who is determined to be gravely disabled (§ 5350 et seq.), so that he or she may receive individualized treatment, supervision, and placement (§ 5350.1). As defined by the Act, a person is ‘gravely disabled’ if, as a result of a mental disorder, the person ‘is unable to provide for his or her basic personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter.’ (§ 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A).) [¶] ... [¶] The procedures for establishing a conservatorship include a number of requirements pertaining to notice, hearing and trial rights, and other matters. Specifically, the petition for appointment of a conservator of the person and the citation for conservatorship must be served upon the proposed conservatee at least 15 days before the scheduled hearing date, and the proposed conservatee must be given notice of the privileges and rights subject to deprivation as part of the conservatorship. (§ 5350; Prob. Code, §§ 1823, 1824.) A hearing must be held within 30 days of the date of the petition, and the court must ‘appoint the public defender or other attorney for the ... proposed conservatee within five days after the date of the petition.’ (§ 5365.) The proposed conservatee ‘shall have the right to demand a court or jury trial on the issue whether he or she is gravely disabled,’ but must do so before or within five days following the hearing on the conservatorship petition. (§ 5350, subd. (d).)" ( Conservatorship of John L . (2010) 48 Cal.4th 131, 142–143, 105 Cal.Rptr.3d 424, 225 P.3d 554 ( John L . ).) "Court or jury trial shall commence within 10 days of the date of the demand." (§ 5350, subd. (d)(2).)

"The party seeking imposition of the conservatorship must prove the proposed conservatee’s grave disability beyond a reasonable doubt, and a jury verdict finding such disability must be unanimous. ( Conservatorship of Roulet (1979) 23 Cal.3d 219, 235, [152 Cal.Rptr. 425, 590 P.2d 1].) An LPS conservatorship automatically terminates after one year, and reappointment of the conservator must be sought by petition. (§ 5361.)" ( John L., supra , 48 Cal.4th at p. 143, 105 Cal.Rptr.3d 424, 225 P.3d 554.)

B. Failure to Commence Jury Trial Within Statutory Time Limit^***

C. Instructional Error: Modified CACI No. 4000

D.P. contends that the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury with the third element of the CACI No. 4000 definition of "gravely disabled," i.e., to prove a proposed conservatee is gravely disabled, it must be shown "[t]hat [the conservatee] is unwilling or unable voluntarily to accept meaningful treatment." According to D.P., the omission of that element reduced the County’s burden of proof to "less than beyond a reasonable doubt."

1. Background

Prior to commencement of trial, D.P.’s counsel objected to the County’s modified version of CACI No. 4000, which read: "The [County] claims that [D.P.] is gravely disabled due to a mental disorder and therefore should be placed in a conservatorship. In a conservatorship, a conservator is appointed to oversee, under the direction of the court, the care of persons who are gravely disabled due to a mental disorder. To succeed on this claim, the [County] must prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following: [¶] 1. That [D.P.] has a mental disorder; and [¶] 2. That [D.P.] is gravely disabled as a result of the mental disorder." The unmodified CACI No. 4000 included a third element in brackets that read: "[3. That [name of respondent ] is unwilling or unable voluntarily to accept meaningful treatment.]" D.P.’s counsel argued that the modified instruction improperly omitted the third element. Counsel also noted, however, that a slightly modified version of that element had been added to the County’s proposed version of CACI No. 4002. Specifically, the last line of the County’s proposed version of CACI No. 4002 was modified to include: "In determining whether [D.P.] is presently gravely disabled, you may consider whether he is able or willing voluntarily to accept meaningful treatment." After a colloquy with counsel, the trial court ruled that it would give the County’s proposed CACI Nos. 4000 and 4002 as modified.

2. Standard of Review/Legal Principles

We review claimed errors in the accuracy or completeness of the jury instructions under the de novo standard of review. ( Conservatorship of P.D . (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1163, 1167, 231 Cal.Rptr.3d 79.) "In considering the accuracy or completeness of a jury instruction, we evaluate it in the context of all of the court’s instructions." ( Caldera v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 31, 44–45, 235 Cal.Rptr.3d 262.)

D.P. cites Conservatorship of Davis (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 313, 177 Cal.Rptr. 369 ( Davis ) and Conservatorship of Walker (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1082, 242 Cal.Rptr. 289 ( Walker ) in support of his position that the trial court erred in failing to include CACI No. 4000 ’s third element, which, as noted, requires an additional finding that a proposed conservatee "is unwilling or unable voluntarily to accept meaningful treatment" before a proposed conservatee is considered gravely disabled. The County disagrees and contends the trial court was not required to instruct the jury on the third element, citing Conservatorship of Symington (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1464, 1467, 257 Cal.Rptr. 860 ( Symington ), in support.⁶

3. Davis

In Davis, supra , 124 Cal.App.3d 313, 177 Cal.Rptr. 369, the trial court in an LPS Act conservatorship proceeding initiated by the County gave the following instruction to the jury: " ‘You are instructed that before you may consider whether [the proposed conservatee] is gravely disabled you must first find that she is, as a result of a mental disorder, unwilling or unable to accept treatment for that mental disorder on a voluntary basis. If you find that [the proposed conservatee] is capable of understanding her need for treatment for any mental disorder she may have and capable of making a meaningful commitment to a plan of treatment of that disorder she is entitled to a verdict of "not gravely disabled." ’ " ( Id. at p. 319, 177 Cal.Rptr. 369.) At trial, the jury found the proposed conservatee not gravely disabled. ( Id. at p. 317, 177 Cal.Rptr. 369.) The County appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in delivering the instruction. ( Id. at p. 320, 177 Cal.Rptr. 369.) The Court of Appeal disagreed, finding no prejudicial error. ( Id. at pp. 329, 331, 177 Cal.Rptr. 369.)

In reaching that conclusion, the court attempted to harmonize the purpose of the LPS Act, which includes safeguarding individual rights, with section 5008, subdivision (h)(1), which defines the term "gravely disabled." ( Davis, supra , 124 Cal.App.3d 313, 322, 177 Cal.Rptr. 369.) The court noted that section 5352 additionally "provides that a petition to establish a conservatorship shall be filed only after a preliminary determination has been made that the person is gravely disabled as a result of mental disorder and is unwilling, or incapable of accepting, treatment voluntarily." ( Davis, supra , 124 Cal.App.3d at p. 322, 177 Cal.Rptr. 369.)

Given the LPS Act’s purpose, the court concluded that "a person sought to be made an LPS conservatee subject to involuntary confinement in a mental institution, is entitled to have a unanimous jury determination of all of the questions involved in the imposition of such a conservatorship ...." ( Id. at p. 329, 177 Cal.Rptr. 369.)

4. Walker

In Walker, supra , 196 Cal.App.3d 1082, 242 Cal.Rptr. 289, the trial court, using the language of the section 5008, subdivision (h)(1) definition, instructed the jury that the term "gravely disabled" means " ‘a condition in which a person, as a result of a mental disorder, is unable to provide for his or her basic personal needs for food, clothing or shelter.’ " ( Walker, supra , 196 Cal.App.3d at p. 1091, 242 Cal.Rptr. 289.) But the trial court further instructed: " ‘If you find that [the proposed conservatee] can survive safely in freedom by himself or with the help of [an] available, willing and responsible family member, friend or other third party and that [the proposed conservatee] is willing and capable of accepting voluntary...