Pueblo v. Haas

999 N.W.2d 433

511 Mich. 345

Carrie PUEBLO, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Rachel HAAS, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 164046

Calendar No. 3

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued April 4, 2023

Decided July 24, 2023

Stephen D. Gorsalitz, J.

Starks Law, PLC (by Reh Starks) for plaintiff.

Butler, Toweson & Payseno—PLLC, Parchment (by George T. Perrett) for defendant.

Miriam J. Aukerman, Jay D. Kaplan, Livonia, and Daniel S. Korobkin for the American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan; Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc., LGBTQA Law Section of the State Bar of Michigan, Affirmations LGBTQ +, and others, amici curiae.

Mark Granzotto, PC, Royal Oak (by Mark Granzotto) for the National Association of Social Workers, including its Michigan chapter, amicus curiae.

Scott Bassett for the Michigan Chapter of American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, amicus curiae.

Anne Argiroff, Farmington Hills, Gail Towne, Kalamazoo, Joshua Pease, Judith A. Curtis, Grosse Pointe, and Rebecca Shiemke for the Family Law Section of the State Bar of Michigan, amicus curiae.

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH

OPINION

Cavanagh, J.

₃₅₀In this case, we determine that the courthouse doors will open to a former partner in a same-sex relationship who was unconstitutionally prohibited from marrying before the decision in Obergefell v Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 135 S Ct 2584, 192 L Ed 2d 609 ₃₅₁(2015), to seek custody of a child with whom the former partner shares no biological relationship.¹ While the decision in this case likely affects few, it is, nonetheless, important for what it represents. Justice does not depend on family composition; all who petition for recognition of their parental rights are entitled to equal treatment under the law. "[B]iological relationships are not [the] exclusive determination of the existence of a family [.] … No one would seriously dispute that a deeply loving and interdependent relationship between an adult and a child in [their] care may exist even in the absence of blood relationship." Smith v Org. of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 843-844, 97 S Ct 2094, 53 L Ed 2d 14 (1977).

[1] Michigan has long recognized the "equitable-parent doctrine" as providing standing to nonbiological fathers as parents when certain criteria are met. Atkinson v Atkinson, 160 Mich App 601, 408 N.W.2d 516 (1987). Because Michigan unconstitutionally prohibited same-sex couples from marrying before Obergefell, we narrowly extend the equitable-parent doctrine as a step toward righting the wrongs done by that unconstitutional prohibition. A person seeking custody who demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the parties would have married before the child’s conception or birth but for Michigan’s unconstitutional marriage ban is entitled to make their case for equitable parenthood to seek custody. We reverse and remand to the trial court to apply the threshold test for standing that we announce today.

₃₅₂I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Two women—plaintiff, Carrie Pueblo, and defendant, Rachel Haas—were in a long-term committed relationship, or domestic partnership, from the early 2000s until the early 2010s. During their relationship, the parties were unable to legally marry in Michigan, which unconstitutionally prohibited same-sex marriage until 2015. See Obergefell, 576 U.S. 644, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 192 L.Ed.2d 609. In their briefs and at oral argument, the parties acknowledged that they participated in a private civil commitment ceremony in June 2007 that was presided over by a priest and involved the exchange of rings and vows to take one another as life partners. Later that year, they decided to use in vitro fertilization to bring a child into the world. Haas conceived and bore the child, JPHP, in November 2008, and shares the child’s biology. Pueblo has no biological connection to JPHP, whose last name is a hyphenation of the parties’ last names. The parties never married, nor was Haas married to another person at the time of JPHP’s conception or birth. Haas is the only parent listed on the child’s birth certificate. Pueblo alleges that both parties acted as parents to JPHP from birth, sharing custody and parenting time even after they separated in the early 2010s. However, Pueblo alleges that Haas demanded that she cease contact with JPHP beginning in 2017 and that Pueblo’s efforts to continue the parent-child relationship were unsuccessful.

In 2020, Pueblo took a legal step toward reunification with JPHP by filing a custody complaint under the Child Custody Act (CCA), MCL 722.21 et seq., seeking joint custody, parenting time, and child support. Haas countered in her answer that Pueblo lacked standing, that the parties never married, and that Pueblo has no biological or adoptive relationship to JPHP. Subsequently,₃₅₃ Haas moved for summary disposition on the basis that Pueblo lacked standing under MCR 2.116(C)(5) and failed to state a claim under MCR 2.116(C)(8).

Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case without prejudice. Upon Haas’s motion for reconsideration, the trial court dismissed the action with prejudice. Pueblo then filed her own motion for reconsideration, arguing that she had standing as a natural parent despite the lack of genetic connection following the recent Court of Appeals decision in LeFever v Matthews, 336 Mich App 651, 971 N.W.2d 672 (2021). She also asserted that the trial court order violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection without surviving heightened scrutiny and that the minor child’s rights were likewise violated. Pueblo further argued that, even if dismissal was warranted, the dismissal should have been without prejudice. The trial court denied reconsideration, rejecting Pueblo’s arguments on both issues. As to the standing issue, the trial court distinguished LeFever because Pueblo neither birthed the child nor shares a biological or genetic connection.

Pueblo appealed in the Court of Appeals. Relevant to this appeal, Pueblo argued that she had standing to seek custody for several reasons. First, that the equitable-parent doctrine should extend to the parties’ equitable marriage. Second, that she was a "natural parent" under the CCA and the interpretation of the term in the closely analogous LeFever case. Finally, that her rights to equal protection and due process, as well as the child’s, were violated by the trial court’s finding that a biological tie was necessary for standing. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that Pueblo was not a parent under the CCA and affirming the ₃₅₄lower court’s dismissal.² Pueblo v Haas, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued December 28, 2021, 2021 WL 6130700 (Docket No. 357577).

Pueblo then sought leave to appeal in this Court. We granted leave to address:

(1) whether, in light of Obergefell v Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 192 L.Ed.2d 609 (2015), the equitable parent doctrine should be extended to provide standing to persons such as the plaintiff, who, at the time of the parties’ same-sex relationship, was not permitted by Michigan law to legally many the defendant, and if so, (2) what the parameters of that extension should be. [Pueblo v Haas, 510 Mich 986, 979 N.W.2d 335 (2022).]

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

[2–6] This case presents questions of law that we review de novo. Questions of statutory interpretation and constitutional issues are reviewed de novo. Hunter v Hunter, 484 Mich. 247, 257, 771 N.W.2d 694 (2009); LeFever, 336 Mich App at 661, 971 N.W.2d 672. Likewise, whether a party has standing to seek custody is reviewed de novo. LeFever, 336 Mich App at 661, 971 N.W.2d 672. A trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo. El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich. 152, 159, 934 N.W.2d 665 (2019). When deciding a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8), a trial court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and the motion may only be granted "when a claim is so clearly unenforceable that no factual development could possibly justify recovery."³ El-Khalil, 504 Mich. at ₃₅₅160, 934 N.W.2d 665. In child custody disputes, trial court orders and judgments are generally entitled to deference on appeal. See MCL 722.28. But reversal is required where the trial court made a "clear legal error on a major issue." Id. "When a court incorrectly chooses, interprets, or applies the law, it commits legal error that the appellate court is bound to correct." Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich. 871, 881, 526 N.W.2d 889 (1994).

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND

[7–10] We are asked to determine whether Pueblo has standing to pursue this custody action. Standing "generally refers to the right of a plaintiff initially to invoke the power of a trial court to adjudicate a claimed injury." Saugatuck Dunes Coastal Alliance v Saugatuck Twp., 509 Mich. 561, 583, 983 N.W.2d 798 (2022) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The purpose of the doctrine is to ensure that a party’s interest in the issue is "sufficient to ‘ensure sincere and vigorous advocacy.’ " Lansing Sch. Ed. Ass’n v Lansing Bd of Ed., 487 Mich. 349, 355, 792 N.W.2d 686 (2010) (citation omitted). Further, in cases involving private rights, a litigant must have "some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title, or interest in the subject matter of the controversy." Bowie v Arder, 441 Mich. 23, 42, 490 N.W.2d 568 (1992) (quotation marks and citation omitted). In child custody matters, "a third party does not have standing to create a ₃₅₆custody dispute … unless the third party is a guardian of the child or has a substantive right of entitlement to custody of the child." Id. at 49, 490 N.W.2d 568.

Michigan’s CCA governs custody, parenting time, and child support issues for minor children; it is the exclusive means to pursue child custody rights. MCL 722.24(1); LeFever, 336 Mich App at 662, 971 N.W.2d 672. The CCA is "equitable in nature and shall be liberally...