Puente v. Ariz. State Legislature

64 Arizona Cases Digest 4

506 P.3d 800

PUENTE, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellants,

v.ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE, Defendant/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 20-0710

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1.

FILED February 15, 2022

AS AMENDED February 16, 2022

The People's Law Firm, Phoenix, By Stephen D. Benedetto, Heather A. Hamel, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants

Statecraft PLLC, Phoenix, By Kory A. Langhofer, Thomas J. Basile, Counsel for Defendant/Appellee

Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Campbell delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Judge Maurice Portley¹ joined. Judge Samuel A. Thumma concurred in part and dissented in part.

CAMPBELL, Judge:

¶1 Two Arizona nonprofit corporations and three Arizona residents (collectively, Appellants) appeal from the superior court's order dismissing their complaint against the Arizona State Legislature (the Legislature). Contrary to the superior court's ruling, we conclude that the political-question component of the separation of powers doctrine does not preclude judicial review of Appellants’ claim that certain members of the Legislature violated Arizona's open meeting law (Open Meeting Law), A.R.S. §§ 38-431 to -431.09. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment in favor of the Legislature and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Anticipating that 26 members of the Legislature (collectively, the legislators) would attend a private three-day conference (the Summit) hosted by the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), at which they would collaborate with corporate lobbyists and lawmakers from other states to draft "model bills," Appellants filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Appellants alleged that the 26 members who planned to attend the Summit constituted quorums of certain Arizona legislative committees and asked the superior court to: (1) declare the legislators’ participation in the Summit a violation of the Open Meeting Law; (2) order that all model bills drafted during the Summit and submitted to the Legislature "be subject to the requirements" of the Open Meeting Law; (3) find that all materials documenting the information presented at the Summit constitute public records subject to Arizona's public records laws, A.R.S. §§ 39-101 to -161; and (4) enjoin members constituting any quorum of an Arizona legislative committee from attending any future ALEC Summit or other similar bill-drafting events that do not comply with the Open Meeting Law.

¶3 The Legislature moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting Appellants had failed to serve the proper parties and state a claim for relief. After oral argument, the superior court dismissed the complaint, reasoning it presented a nonjusticiable political question. Appellants timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

¶4 We review the dismissal of a complaint de novo. Coleman v. City of Mesa , 230 Ariz. 352, 355, ¶ 7, 284 P.3d 863, 866 (2012). We accept as true all well-pled factual allegations and reasonable inferences therefrom, Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. , 218 Ariz. 417, 419, ¶ 7, 189 P.3d 344, 346 (2008), and will affirm only if, as a matter of law, Appellants "would not be entitled to relief under any interpretation of the facts." Coleman , 230 Ariz. at 356, ¶ 8, 284 P.3d at 867 (quoting Fid. Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. State Dep't of Ins. , 191 Ariz. 222, 224, ¶ 4, 954 P.2d 580, 582 (1998) ).

I. Political Question Doctrine

¶5 When a challenge to an executive or legislative action involves a "political question," the judiciary may not adjudicate the matter. Kromko v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents , 216 Ariz. 190, 192, ¶ 12, 165 P.3d 168, 170 (2007). This principle flows from the separation of powers doctrine, which recognizes the independence of the coordinate branches of government. Id. (citing Baker v. Carr , 369 U.S. 186, 210-211, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962) ).

¶6 "Nowhere in the United States is [the separation of powers] more explicitly and firmly expressed than in Arizona." Mecham v. Gordon , 156 Ariz. 297, 300, 751 P.2d 957, 960 (1988). In fact, the Arizona Constitution expressly states that the executive, legislative, and judicial branches "shall be separate and distinct, and no one of such departments shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the others." Ariz. Const. art. 3.

¶7 A determination that an issue presents a nonjusticiable political question is not a determination that a specific governmental action is lawful. Forty-Seventh Legislature v. Napolitano , 213 Ariz. 482, 485, ¶ 7, 143 P.3d 1023, 1026 (2006). While a determination on the merits necessarily requires "the exercise of judicial review," a dismissal predicated on the political question doctrine reflects "the abstention from judicial review.’ " Id. (quoting U.S. Dep't of Commerce v. Montana , 503 U.S. 442, 458, 112 S.Ct. 1415, 118 L.Ed.2d 87 (1992) ).

¶8 Deciding whether a matter has been entrusted by the constitution to a particular branch of government requires constitutional interpretation, a task assigned to the judiciary. Baker , 369 U.S. at 211, 82 S.Ct. 691. We review constitutional issues, and the interpretation of statutes, de novo. Fragoso v. Fell , 210 Ariz. 427, 430, 432, ¶¶ 7, 13, 111 P.3d 1027, 1030 (App. 2005).

¶9 A controversy involves a political question when "there is ‘a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.’ " Fogliano v. Brain ex rel. Cnty. of Maricopa , 229 Ariz. 12, 20, ¶ 23, 270 P.3d 839, 847 (App. 2011) (quoting Nixon v. United States , 506 U.S. 224, 228, 113 S.Ct. 732, 122 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993) ); Forty-Seventh Legislature , 213 Ariz. at 485, ¶ 7, 143 P.3d at 1026 (citing Baker , 369 U.S. at 217, 82 S.Ct. 691 ). When presented with a political question, the judiciary must decline review to avoid encroaching on the constitutional powers of a coordinate political branch of government. See Brewer v. Burns , 222 Ariz. 234, 238, ¶ 16, 213 P.3d 671, 675 (2009).

¶10 Here, the Legislature contends that whether a quorum of a legislative committee may meet outside the view of the public is just such a political question. In analyzing that contention, we first consider the relevant constitutional provisions governing the Legislature. Under Article 4, Part 2, Section 8, of the Arizona Constitution, each house of the Legislature "shall" organize itself and "determine its own rules of procedure." A related provision establishes that "[t]he majority of the members of each house shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may meet ... in such manner and under such penalties as each house may prescribe." Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2, § 9.

¶11 Together, these constitutional provisions commit to the houses of the Legislature the power to promulgate and apply their own procedural rules. Importantly, neither provision contains any language limiting the Legislature's authority to self-govern.

¶12 Our determination that the Arizona Constitution assigns the Legislature the power to create its own procedural rules does not, however, end our inquiry. Cf. Fogliano , 229 Ariz. at 20, ¶ 24, 270 P.3d at 847. "The ‘second critical prong of the political question test: whether there exist judicially discoverable and manageable standards,’ overlaps with and informs the first prong." Id . (quoting Kromko , 216 Ariz. at 193, ¶ 14, 165 P.3d at 171 ).

¶13 Without question, no constitutional provision sets forth a standard for evaluating the adequacy or propriety of the rules of procedure either house has adopted. But Appellants’ claims do not require the court to assess whether the Legislature acted reasonably in exercising its constitutional prerogative to enact those rules. See United States v. Ballin , 144 U.S. 1, 5, 12 S.Ct. 507, 36 L.Ed. 321 (1892) (explaining judicial review of legislative rules of procedure or compliance therewith is limited to whether the "rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights"). Appellants do not allege that the Legislature failed to adopt a necessary procedural rule; nor do they ask the court to impose any such rules on the Legislature. Finally, Appellants do not allege the legislators violated any rule either house has adopted for itself. Instead, Appellants seek only to have the legislators comply with the Open Meeting Law, which the Legislature enacted and to which it expressly subjected itself. A.R.S. § 38-431.01(A) ("All meetings of any public body shall be public meetings and all persons so desiring shall be permitted to attend and listen to the deliberations and proceedings. All legal action of public bodies shall occur during a public meeting."); A.R.S. § 38-431(6) (defining "public body" to include "the legislature" "and all standing ... committees" of any public body).

¶14 Pointing to the rules of procedure adopted by each house, the Legislature suggests those rules somehow preempt application of the Open Meeting Law to itself. But the Legislature has not cited, and our review of the procedural rules of each house has not revealed, any rule that conflicts with the Open Meeting Law. Indeed, while each house has promulgated a rule prioritizing the application of legislative rules over statutes, neither has enacted a rule exempting itself from the Open Meeting Law.

¶15 At the same time, as noted, the Legislature did not exempt itself when it enacted the Open Meeting Law. See Fann v. Kemp , 1 CA-SA 21-0141, 2021 WL 3674157, at *3, ¶ 15 (Ariz. App. Aug. 19, 2021) (mem. decision) (emphasizing that the Legislature "could have completely exempted itself" from statutory requirements but chose not to do so). In fact, rather than exempting itself from the statute and retaining the exclusive authority for procedural self-governance entrusted to it by the Arizona Constitution, the Legislature expressly "chose to include itself [and its committees] within the definition of ... public bodies subject" to the open-meeting...