Purcell v. Chubb Ltd.

1

GILBERT PURCELL, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CHUBB LTD. and FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 23-122 (RK) (DEA)

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

August 23, 2023

Not For Publication

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Robert Kirsch United States District Judge

THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Defendant Federal Insurance Company's (“Defendant” or “Federal”) motion to transfer this matter to the Northern District of California. (“Fed. Br.,” ECF No. 11). Plaintiff Gilbert Purcell (“Plaintiff' or “Mr. Purcell”) filed a brief in opposition (“Opp. Br.,” ECF No. 27), to which Defendant replied, (“Reply,” ECF No. 28).^[1] The Court has considered the parties' submissions and resolves the matter without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78 and Local Civil Rule 78.1. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion to transfer is GRANTED. As such, Defendant's motion to dismiss is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Defendant may refile its motion upon transfer to the Northern District of California.

I. BACKGROUND

This lawsuit concerns a California homeowner's insurance policy and the alleged premium overcharges by Defendant, a New Jersey insurance company.^[2] Plaintiff Gilbert Purcell is a resident and homeowner in Sausalito, California. (Compl ¶13, ECF No. 1.) In 2011, and each subsequent year thereafter, Mr. Purcell insured his home and certain personal items through an insurance policy underwritten by Federal. (Id.', Fed. Br. at 4.)^[3] Federal is headquartered in Whitehouse Station, New Jersey and has offices across the United States, including San Diego. (Compl. ¶ 9; Fed Br. at 8.)

While Federal provides “property insurance in all fifty states,” (Compl. ¶ 9), it does not directly issue its own insurance policies, (Fed. Br. at 4). Instead, it underwrites the policies, and insurance brokers sell them. In this case, the San Francisco office of the Marsh & McLennan Insurance Agency (“Marsh”) served as the insurance broker who sold the Policy to Mr. Purcell, and Federal's San Diego office underwrote the policy. (Id. at 4-5; Opp. Br. at 23.)

Defendant sells its homeowner insurance policies for one-year terms; thus, each year, Mr. Purcell receives a new policy. (Id. ¶¶ 14-15.) In July 2022, Mr. Purcell received a renewal policy (the “Policy”) for the period August 26, 2022 to August 26, 2023. (Compl. ¶ 15.) The Policy stated Mr. Purcell's 2022 premium would total $35,849, as opposed to the “undiscounted price” of $60,078. (Id.) The Policy listed a number of discounts that reduced Mr. Purcell's total premium. (Id.) However, the Policy specified only the percentage amount of the discount, rather than the monetary figure. (Id.) For example, Mr. Purcell was entitled a discount of “14% for taking steps toward superior protection” and “10% for having a residential sprinkler system.” (Id. (quotation marks omitted).)

These percentages form the foundation of this dispute. Plaintiff alleges that “[w]hen the discounts represented in the [Policy] are applied to the undiscounted ‘cost,' the price of the premium should be thousands of dollars less than the premium charged.” (Id. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff asserts he should have paid no more than $30,616 dollars in premiums, and that Defendant “regularly represent[s] false numeric percentage discounts for its homeowners [szc] insurance policies in order to induce customers to purchase or renew these policies.” (Id. ¶¶ 18-19.) After he received the Policy, Mr. Purcell sought additional information regarding Defendant's premium calculations through his brokers at Marsh. (Id. ¶ 18; Fed. Br. at 5.) The Marsh brokers had numerous conversations with Federal, but Mr. Purcell alleges he never received clarification on Federal's calculations. (Compl. ¶ 18.) The Policy had a renewal date of August 26, 2022, and in order to ensure timely coverage, and Mr. Purcell accepted the Policy prior to obtaining an explanation for the pricing. (Id.)

Thereafter, on January 10, 2023, Plaintiff brought a purported class action against Federal on behalf of both a “National Class” and a “California Subclass.” (Id. ¶¶ 27-30.) Plaintiff seeks to certify a class of those individuals “that purchased or renewed an insurance policy provided by Defendant, directly or through a subsidiary, for which Defendants failed to apply promised discounts.” (Id. ¶¶ 28-29.) Plaintiff asserts violations of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (Count I); unjust enrichment (Count II); breach of contract (Count III); and violations of California's Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) (Count IV).^[4]

On March 14, 2023, Federal moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 13.) Defendant asserts, among other arguments, that “Plaintiff's claims are squarely barred by the filed rate doctrine, which precludes private actions based on challenges to state-approved insurance rates” and that Plaintiff has failed to adequately state its claims. (ECF No. 13-1 at 1-5.) Defendant claims that, as an insurance company in California, it is required by the California Department of Insurance (“DOI”) to submit and receive approval of premium rates and the underlying calculations. (Id. at 5.) Federal contends that the DOI in fact approved the rates that were charged to Mr. Purcell, thereby shielding them from claims under the filed rate doctrine. (Id. at 5-8.) Defendant concurrently filed a Motion to Transfer this dispute to the Northern District of California. •

II. LEGAL STANDARD

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) provides that “[f]or the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented.” A district court has “large discretion” to transfer a case under section 1404(a). Ziemkiewicz v. R+L Carriers, Inc., No. 12-1923, 2013 WL 505798, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 8,2013) (citations omitted). This decision involves “an individualized, fact-intensive consideration of all the relevant factors.” Id. The first step in deciding a motion to transfer requires the Court to “determine whether the alternate venue is one in which the case ‘might have been brought.'” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)); Sondhi, 2021 WL 5356182, at *4 (same). Venue in a civil action is proper in:

(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located;

(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or

(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1)-(3).

The second step in transfer analysis requires the Court to “consider two broad categories of factors identified by the Third Circuit.” Fasano v. Coast Cutlery Co., No. 11-3977, 2012 WL 1715233, at *2 (D.N.J. May 15, 2012); accord In re: Howmedica Osteonics Corp, 867 F.3d 390, 401 (3d Cir. 2017). The private interests include “the plaintiffs forum preference as manifested in the original choice, the defendant's preference, whether the claim arose elsewhere, the convenience of the parties as indicated by their relative physical and financial condition, the convenience of the witnesses, and the location of books and records.” Smec, 2022 WL 5102063, at *5 (citing Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 879 (3d Cir. 1995)). The public factors include “[t]he enforceability of the judgment, the relative administrative difficulty in the fora resulting from court congestion, the local interest in deciding local controversies at home, the public policies of the fora, and the familiarity of the trial judge[] with the applicable state law in diversity cases.” Id. (quoting Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879).

III. DISCUSSION

Federal seeks the Court to transfer this case to the Northern District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). (Fed. Br. at 8.) Specifically, Federal argues that “a substantial part of the events that gave rise to Plaintiff's claims occurred” there. (Id.) In support of its argument, Federal categorizes the dispute at issue as concerning a Northern California homeowner renewing a Policy on his Northern California home that was issued by a Northern California broker with rates approved by the California DOI. (Id. at 1.) Further, Federal argues that California law governs this dispute. (Id. at 2.)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the District of New Jersey is the appropriate forum, as it was his chosen forum and is the district in which Federal's headquarters are located. (Opp. Br. at 6, 14.) In addition, Plaintiff asserts that the events giving rise to this lawsuit “emanate[d] from the District of New Jersey” - namely, that Federal “presented [Mr. Purcell] with a contract that promised specific numeric discounts in exchange for Mr. Purcell purchasing the renewed insurance policy.” (Id. at 15-16.) These representations were made at, and mailed from, Federal's headquarters. (Id.) Plaintiff further argues that the California filed rate doctrine has no bearing on this dispute, and New Jersey law governs most of the alleged claims. (Id. at 8-13.)

A. Venue in the Northern District of California

At the outset, the Court must decide whether venue would be proper in the transferee district. R+L Carriers, 2013 WL 505798, at *2. Venue is proper either in the district “in which any defendant resides” or the “district in which a substantial...