Puryear v. State

ROBERT JOE PURYEAR, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS

No. 02-19-00027-CR

Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth

August 28, 2019

On Appeal from the 78th District Court Wichita County, Texas

Trial Court No. 59,856-B

Before Gabriel, Kerr, and Bassel, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury found appellant Robert Joe Puryear guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 46.04(a)(1). The trial court sentenced Puryear to ten years' confinement. In one point, Puryear asserts that the trial court arbitrarily and capriciously denied his motion to suppress. We affirm.

Evidence

Officers Brayden Little and Mitchell Parker were working together on the evening of January 4, 2018, in a marked patrol car when they saw a Ford pickup truck traveling down Speedway Avenue in Wichita Falls. After running the pickup's license plates through a crime-information database, they learned that the vehicle was not insured, so they made a traffic stop to confirm the lack of insurance.

Officer Little went to the driver's side while Officer Parker went to the passenger's side. Scanning the pickup with a flashlight for safety purposes, Officer Parker spotted a half-opened bag with a green-and-white box containing Remington ammunition.

Meanwhile, Puryear, the driver, told Officer Little that he had just bought the pickup that day, so he did not have insurance covering the pickup. Thinking that perhaps the pickup's seller might still have insurance on the vehicle, Officer Little then spoke with the pickup's registered owner, but she too told Officer Little that the vehicle was uninsured.

Officer Little informed Puryear that city policy required the police to impound uninsured vehicles and that he was going to inventory the pickup; Officer Little then asked Puryear if he had "anything illegal" in his vehicle. Puryear responded, "Not that I know of." Following up with specific examples, Officer Little asked about drugs or guns, and Puryear answered that he was not allowed to have a gun because he was a convicted felon. After Puryear became disgruntled with having his pickup impounded, Officer Little again asked Puryear if he had anything in his vehicle, and Puryear again said, "Not that I know of," and added, "I just bought this truck." This response struck Officer Little as typical of persons who were less than straightforward, so Officer Little asked Officer Parker, who had been on the passenger side, to come to the driver's side and watch Puryear while Officer Little went back to the patrol car's computer to verify the vehicle's insurance status.

When Officer Little again returned to the pickup, Officer Parker relayed that he had seen a box of ammunition and that he too had asked Puryear if he had anything illegal in the car and that Puryear had responded, "If I have a gun in the vehicle, will I get in trouble for it[?]" Being aware of the box of ammunition and hearing Puryear express concern about getting caught with a gun in the vehicle, the two officers removed Puryear from the pickup for their own safety.

Puryear did not give the officers consent to search his pickup. On the video of the stop, one of the officers can be heard saying, "We're getting in the vehicle anyway."

Officer Parker began then the inventory while Officer Little watched Puryear. Officer Parker found a loaded pistol in the unlocked glove compartment and recovered the box of ammunition that he had seen earlier. Officer Parker then arrested Puryear for being a felon unlawfully in possession of a firearm.

In addition to testifying about the events that evening, the officers discussed their police department's policy regarding inventory searches. The department had a written policy requiring officers to impound vehicles for failure to maintain financial responsibility and also requiring officers to inventory any impounded vehicle. Officer Little explained that such a search ensured that drivers could get all their property back and protected the police and tow-truck operators from theft accusations. In conjunction with the inventory search of Puryear's truck, the officers used a "Vehicle Impound Report" form with a section titled "Vehicle Inventory"; Officer Parker completed the form in this case. Precisely how to inventory a vehicle was not set out in a written policy but was taught through field training after officers left the academy.

Contention

In one point, Puryear argues that the inventory search was unlawful because the trial court applied the wrong legal standard after the officers acknowledged—in violation of the proper legal standard—that they did not have and therefore could not have followed any standardized inventory procedure.¹

Standard of Review

We apply a bifurcated standard of review to a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). In reviewing the trial court's decision, we do not engage in our own factual review. Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Best v. State, 118 S.W.3d 857, 861 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). The trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given their testimony. Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24-25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Therefore, we defer almost totally to the trial court's rulings on (1) questions of historical fact, even if the trial court determined those facts on a basis other than evaluating credibility and demeanor, and (2) application-of-law-to-fact questions that turn on evaluating credibility and demeanor. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673; Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 101, 108-09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 652-53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). But when application-of-law-to-fact questions do not turn on the witnesses' credibility and demeanor, we review the trial court's rulings on those questions de novo. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673; Estrada v. State, 154 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Johnson, 68 S.W.3d at 652-53.

Stated another way, when reviewing the trial court's ruling on a suppression motion, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling. Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 24; State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). When the trial court makes explicit fact findings, we determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, supports those findings. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d at 818-19. We then review the trial court's legal ruling de novo unless its explicit fact findings that are supported by the record are also dispositive of the legal ruling. Id. at 818.

Even if the trial court gave the wrong reason for its ruling, we must uphold the ruling if it is both supported by the record and correct under any applicable legal theory. State v. Stevens, 235 S.W.3d 736, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Armendariz v. State, 123 S.W.3d 401, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).

Applicable Law

The Fourth Amendment permits officers to inventory an automobile when lawfully impounding it. Moskey v. State, 333 S.W.3d 696, 700 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 375-76, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 3100 (1976); Benavides v. State, 600 S.W.2d 809, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980); Garza v. State, 137 S.W.3d 878, 882 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. ref'd)). Inventory searches protect (1) the vehicle owner's property while the vehicle is impounded, (2) the police against disputes over lost or stolen property, and (3) the police from potential danger. Id. (citing Opperman, 428 U.S. at369, 96 S. Ct. at 3097; Garza, 137 S.W.3d at 882). Officers must conduct inventory searches in good faith and in accordance with reasonable standardized police procedure. Id. (citing Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374, 107 S. Ct. 738, 742 (1987); Rothenberg v. State, 176 S.W.3d 53, 57 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. ref'd); Garza, 137 S.W.3d at 882)). The search must be designed to inventory the vehicle's contents and may not be used as a "ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence." Id. (quoting Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4, 110 S. Ct. 1632, 1635 (1990); citing Richards v. State, 150 S.W.3d 762, 771 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref'd) (en banc)).

Either established routine or standardized criteria must regulate the opening of closed containers during an inventory search. Richards, 150 S.W.3d at 771 (citing Wells, 495 U.S. at 4, 110 S. Ct. at 1635; Moberg v. State, 810 S.W.2d 190, 195 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (quoting Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372-73, 375-76, 107 S. Ct. at 741-42, 743)). The opening and inventorying of easily accessible containers serves both to protect the owner's property and to insure against false claims. Id. (citing Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647-48, 103 S. Ct. 2605, 2610 (1983) (holding that opening and inventorying a shoulder bag was reasonable despite the possible alternative of securing the bag as a whole)).²

The State shoulders the burden of establishing that the police conducted a lawful inventory search. Moskey, 333 S.W.3d at 700. The State satisfies this burden by showing that (1) an inventory policy exists and (2) the officers followed the policy. Id. (citing Moberg, 810 S.W.2d at 195).

Discussion

Puryear contends that the trial court applied the wrong standard. When ruling against Puryear, the trial court said,

The defense has really focused its attention on the fact of wanting there to be a procedure for how the inventory shall be conducted. The Court finds that any procedure [or any specific instruction about how to conduct the inventory] that . . . , would not take the place of requiring that the search be reasonable. The only purpose of the instruction would be to give the police some guidance in conducting their inventory, but even if

...