Pustilnik v. Battery Park City Auth.

71 Misc.3d 1058

147 N.Y.S.3d 357

Alix PUSTILNIK, Plaintiff,

v.BATTERY PARK CITY AUTHORITY and B.J. Jones, Defendants.

150138/2020

Supreme Court, New York County, New York.

Decided on April 8, 2021

Giskan Solotaroff & Anderson LLP., New York, NY (Jason Solotaroff and Amy E. Robinson of counsel), for plaintiff.

Schoeman Updike Kaufman & Gerber LLP, New York, NY (Beth L. Kaufman and Jeremy Miguel Weintraub of counsel), for defendants.

Gerald Lebovits, J.

This is an employment-discrimination action brought under the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL). Plaintiff, Alix Pustilnik, was formerly general counsel for defendant Battery Park City Authority. She alleges that the Authority and its president, defendant B.J. Jones, terminated her from her position as general counsel due in part to her age, disabilities, and caretaking responsibilities for her elderly parents. Defendants now move under CPLR 3211 to dismiss Pustilnik's complaint. The motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

According to the allegations of the complaint, Pustilnik is an experienced attorney, with a range of both public- and private-sector legal experience. She began serving as general counsel to the Battery Park City Authority in May 2014, when she was 46. (See NYSCEF No. 1 at ¶ 2.)

In September 2017, the Authority's president stepped down and was succeeded by defendant Jones in October 2017. Jones was then 46. Pustilnik alleges that since becoming president, Jones has hired or promoted to senior staff positions six individuals ranging in age from 31 to 44—and that Jones did not promote individuals who were older than he was to senior staff positions. She also alleges that Jones was aware of the ages of senior Authority staff, including herself, through birthday parties and other office interactions.

Pustilnik's father suffered a serious fall in late 2017, suffering injuries that exacerbated his chronic heart condition and which led to his death several weeks later. Over that period, Pustilnik accompanied her father to medical appointments and remained with him during hospital stays. As a result, she was out of the office periodically. She alleges, though, that she worked remotely during her absences from the office.

After Pustilnik's father died, she took two weeks away from the office to attend to her 87-year-old mother, who was also ill at the time. Pustilnik alleges that she was required to assist her mother with making doctor's appointments, maintaining her apartment, and other task. These obligations regularly occupied her time until her termination as general counsel. The complaint alleges that senior Battery Park City Authority officials, including Jones, were aware of Pustilnik's caretaking responsibilities because she spoke extensively about those obligations.

Pustilnik's complaint also describes her own medical issues. Since the late 1990s, Pustilnik has suffered from severe depression. In 2015, she was diagnosed with arthritis, which forced her to miss work periodically. She alleges that the Authority was aware of her arthritis because she used a standing desk to avoid the pain sitting for extended periods caused her and was frequently required to stretch or sometimes lie down in the office or during meetings. Pustilnik also alleges that she specifically told Jones that the arthritis caused her pain and discomfort while at work. Moreover, before her termination, Pustilnik sent emails stating that she would be out of the office for doctor's appointments related to her arthritis.

According to the complaint, the loss of Pustilnik's father aggravated her depression and arthritis, in ways visible to Authority staff members. She alleges, for example, that after witnessing Pustilnik visibly upset over her father during a staff meeting, several of her co-workers asked her whether she was all right or needed help. Pustilnik alleges that she also informed Jones and another senior Authority official that in the wake of her father's death, she was experiencing emotional difficulties that were causing her, among other things, to lose sleep.

She further alleges that in February 2018, Jones and the Authority's then-chairman, informed her that she was being terminated as the Authority's general counsel. She alleges that they affirmatively told her that her performance did not contribute to her dismissal, but instead that she was being fired because the Authority's legal department was downsizing and she was its highest-paid staff member. Pustilnik alleges that her replacement as the Authority's general counsel was then in her mid-40s.

Pustilnik brought an action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the Authority and Jones, challenging her termination under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Americans With Disabilities Act. The district court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. (See Pustilnik v. Battery Park City Auth. , Pustilnik v. Battery Park City Auth. , 2019 WL 6498711, at *3 [S.D. N.Y. Dec. 3, 2019] [Abrams, J.].)

Pustilnik then sued in this court to challenge her termination under the New York City Human Rights Law, relying on very similar allegations to those she raised in the federal action.

Pustilnik contends that her termination was motivated in part by discrimination on the basis of age, disability, and caretaker status. She seeks reinstatement and related injunctive relief, backpay, damages, and attorney fees. Defendants now move to dismiss under CPLR 3211.

DISCUSSION

I. Defendants’ Argument that This Court Lacks Subject-Matter Jurisdiction to Hear NYCHRL Claims Against the Battery Park City Authority and Its Employees

Defendants argue first that the action should be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under CPLR 3211 (a) (2). Defendants argue that the Battery Park City Authority, as a public-benefit corporation, is an instrumentality of New York State. Therefore, they contend, sovereign immunity bars Pustilnik's NYCHRL claims against the Authority (and against Jones in his role as an Authority executive). (See NYSCEF No. 10 at 7-8; NYSCEF No. 17 at 2-5.)

This court's research has not uncovered any prior New York precedent on whether the Battery Park City Authority should be considered a State instrumentality for purposes of claims under the NYCHRL. Considering this question as a matter of first impression, this court concludes that the Authority is not a State instrumentality in this particular statutory context.

A. Whether a Particularized Inquiry is Required to Determine the Authority's Status for Jurisdictional Purposes

As an initial matter, the mere fact that the Battery Park City Authority is a public-benefit corporation does not alone render it a State instrumentality, as defendants contend. (See e.g. John Grace & Co. v. State Univ. Constr. Fund , 44 N.Y.2d 84, 88, 404 N.Y.S.2d 316, 375 N.E.2d 377 [1978] [explaining that "public benefit corporations ... created by the State for the general purpose of performing functions essentially governmental in nature, are not identical to the State or any of its agencies, but rather enjoy, for some purposes, an existence separate and apart from the State, its agencies and political subdivisions"].)

There also is no merit to defendants’ contention that the Battery Park City Authority, in particular, is necessarily a State instrumentality for purposes of the claims brought against it in this action. The Authority relies on the Court of Appeals’ decision in Matter of World Trade Center Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litigation, 30 N.Y.3d 377, 67 N.Y.S.3d 547, 89 N.E.3d 1227 (2017).¹ But the holding of Matter of World Trade Center runs directly counter to the Authority's position here. In that case, the Court carefully distinguished between two types of legal issues: (i) those involving a public-benefit corporation's "outward-facing relations with private parties," in which the question is "whether a statute or common-law rule defining the State's rights or responsibilities vis-à-vis private parties [can] be extended to a public benefit corporation"; and (ii) those involving "a public benefit corporation's inward-facing relations with other state bodies." ( Id. 389-390, 67 N.Y.S.3d 547, 89 N.E.3d 1227 [emphases in original].)

The issue in Matter of World Trade Center was an inward-facing question under this typology—i.e. , whether the Battery Park City Authority, as a public-benefit corporation, had the legal capacity to challenge the constitutionality of a state statute. And the Court of Appeals held that in that context, public-benefit corporations should be treated categorically as State instrumentalities. (See id. at 393, 67 N.Y.S.3d 547, 89 N.E.3d 1227.) The issue in the current action, by contrast, is an outward -facing question: whether a statute prohibiting certain kinds of discriminatory conduct by governmental bodies toward private parties like Pustilnik can properly be extended to a public-benefit corporation like the Authority. For purposes of that inquiry, the Authority is not necessarily a State body. Instead, "a particularized inquiry into the nature of the instrumentality and the statute claimed to be applicable to it is required" to make a determination one way or the other.² ( Id. at 389, 67 N.Y.S.3d 547, 89 N.E.3d 1227, quoting John Grace & Co. , 44 N.Y.2d at 88, 404 N.Y.S.2d 316, 375 N.E.2d 377.)

B. Whether the Authority is a State Body for NYCHRL Purposes under a Particularized Inquiry

To conduct the necessary "particularized inquiry," a court should consider whether a public-benefit corporation should be regarded as a State body for purposes of a given statute in light of the objectives of the statute at issue, the statute's normal operation, and the public policy goals that the corporation was created to achieve. (See John Grace & Co. , 44 N.Y.2d at 88-89, 404 N.Y.S.2d 316, 375 N.E.2d 377 ; accord Matter of Levy v. City Commn. on Human Rights , 85 N.Y.2d 740, 744, 628 N.Y.S.2d 245, 651...