Putman v. Cnty. of Tuscola

1

WILLIAM E. PUTMAN, II, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF TUSCOLA, CORRECTIONAL HEALTHCARE COMPANIES, LLC, JOSEPH NATOLE, M.D., JANE DOE, GLEN SKRENT, ROBERT BAXTER, BRIAN HARRIS, KYLE NORDSTROM, and RYKER MAURER, Defendants.

No. 1:23-cv-10427

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Northern Division

June 10, 2024

Thomas L. Ludington United States District Judge

MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANTS TUSCOLA COUNTY, SHERIFF GLEN SKRENT, UNDERSHERIFF ROBERT BAXTER, LIEUTENANT BRIAN HARRIS, KYLE NORDSTROM, AND RYKER MAURER'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS (ECF NO. 33)

Patricia T. Morris United States Magistrate Judge

I. RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons set forth below, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Defendants Tuscola County, Glen Skrent, Robert Baxter Brian Harris, Kyle Nordstrom, and Ryker Maurer's (the “County Defendants”) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) (ECF No. 33) be GRANTED IN PART.

If the Report and Recommendation is adopted, Plaintiff's (i) official capacity claims will be dismissed as to Defendants Skrent, Baxter, and Harris; (ii) Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims would be dismissed as to Defendant Harris; and (iii) Plaintiff's ADA, RA, and First Amendment Retaliation claims would be dismissed against the County Defendants.

In addition, if the Report is adopted Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Tuscola County, Skrent, Baxter, Nordstrom, and Maurer will remain.

II. REPORT

A. Introduction

Plaintiff William Putman II commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”). (ECF No. 19). He also alleges a state medical malpractice claim associated with the improper medical treatment he received while being housed at the Tuscola County Jail (“TCJ”). (Id.). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the policies and customs practiced by TCJ's staff, including (i) permitting Dr. Natole to disregard his obligation to provide onsite medical care, and (ii) failing to provide Putman with a medical accommodation, ultimately led to him suffering an acute cardiac arrythmia resulting in obstruction of his coronary arteries. (Id. at PageID.31).

B. Factual Background

Prior to Plaintiff's arrival at TCJ to serve his 30-day sentence in jail^[1], his criminal defense attorney advised Defendants, the Tuscola County Prosecutor, and the trial court that Plaintiff suffered from several serious cardiovascular conditions which called for the consistent administration of his prescription heart medication, including metoprolol, clopidogrel, and atorvastatin. (ECF No. 19, PageID.131-32, 139, ¶¶ 2, 27). Following his conviction, Plaintiff submitted a Presentence Investigation Report where he explained that he had a history of congestive heart failure which he treated with very specific medication. (Id. at PageID.138-39, ¶¶ 24-25). His Sentencing Memorandum and treating physician's letter also emphasized his serious medical condition. (Id. at PageID.139, ¶ 26).

Plaintiff informed the jail personnel of his serious condition and medical regimen, which consisted of “several daily prescription medications,” during his intake at TCJ. (Id. at PageID.132, 140, ¶¶ 3, 30). His sons, William Putman III and Blake Putman, M.D., also advised Defendants of the same and, after receiving permission from Defendant Kyle Nordstrom, a corrections officer, they delivered his medication, metoprolol, along with written orders and instructions. (Id. at PageID.132, 140, ¶¶ 28-30).

Following his intake, Plaintiff was transferred to an observation cell. (Id. at PageID.140, ¶ 32). On the evening of October 4, 2022, Plaintiff informed his children by phone that Defendants did not distribute his medication despite his repeated requests. (Id. at PageID.140, ¶ 33). The next morning, Dr. Putman contacted the office of TCJ's Site Medical Director and sole physician, Defendant Joseph Natole, but Defendant Natole “did not take Dr. Putman's call.” (Id. at PageID.141, ¶ 34). That evening Dr. Putman returned to TCJ and advised Defendant Jane Doe of the seriousness of Plaintiff's condition and the importance of him receiving his medication uninterrupted. (Id. at PageID.141, ¶ 35).

Later that evening, Plaintiff was administered an unknown medication contrary to Dr. Putman's prescription and written instructions. (Id. at PageID.141, ¶ 36). Later that night, Plaintiff appeared disorientated during a call with his sons. (Id. at PageID.142, ¶ 39). He stated he had not received his medication and was thirsty. (Id.). After, Plaintiff “complained to Defendants that he was having chest pain, difficulty breathing, nausea, vomiting and swelling in his extremities” but his complaints went unanswered. (Id. at PageID.142, ¶ 40). The next day, Plaintiff's cellmate demanded assistance for Plaintiff and he was rushed by ambulance to McLaren Regional Hospital. (Id. at PageID.143, ¶ 42). At the hospital, testing revealed that he was “suffering from atrial fibrillation with rapid ventricular rates.” (Id.). The doctors recommended Plaintiff receive a transesophageal echocardiogram and cardioversion. (Id.). He was then transferred to the University of Michigan hospital where he underwent several surgeries, and spent an extended period of time recovering before serving the remainder of his sentence. (Id. at PageID.143, ¶¶ 4344).

Plaintiff commenced this action on February 17, 2023, and filed an amended complaint on May 30, 2023. (ECF Nos. 1 and 19). The claims alleged in the amended complaint are outlined in the chart below.

Count

Claim

Defendants

I Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

All Individual Defendants (i.e., Natole, Nurse Doe, Skrent, Baxter, Harris, Nordstrom, and Maurer)

II

Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs, under Monell, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Tuscola County, Skrent, CHC, and Natole

III

Medical Malpractice (State Claim)

CHC, Natole, and Nurse Doe

IV

Violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.), and Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. § 794, et seq.)^[2]

Tuscola County, and Nordstrom

V

First Amendment Retaliation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Tuscola County, Skrent, Baxter, Harris, Maurer, and Nordstrom

Plaintiff seeks economic and non-economic damages, including solatium^[3]damages, and fees and costs associated with litigating this matter. (ECF No. 19, PageID.160).

On February 13, 2024, Defendants Tuscola County, Glen Skrent, Robert Baxter, Brian Harris, Kyle Nordstrom, and Ryker Maurer (“County Defendants”) filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (ECF No. 33). The motion is ready for adjudication.

C. Standard of Review

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), “[a]fter the pleadings are closed-but early enough not to delay trial-a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). A motion for judgment on the pleadings is assessed “using the same standard that applies to a review of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Moderwell v. Cuyahoga Cnty., 997 F.3d 653, 659 (6th Cir. 2021) (citations omitted). “For purposes of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, all well-pleaded material allegations of the pleadings of the opposing party must be taken as true, and the motion may be granted only if the moving party is nevertheless clearly entitled to judgment.” Jackson v. Pro. Radiology Inc., 864 F.3d 463, 466 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting S. Ohio Bank v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 479 F.2d 478, 480 (6th Cir. 1973)). “A Rule 12(c) motion ‘is granted when no material issue of fact exists and the party making the motion is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'” Id. (quoting Paskvan v. City of Cleveland Civil Serv. Comm'n, 946 F.2d 1233, 1235 (6th Cir. 1991)).

D. Analysis

1. County Defendants' Rule 12(c) Motion Should Be Converted Into a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion

Under Rule 12(c), a motion for judgment on the pleadings cannot be filed until the pleadings are “closed.” Although it does not appear that the Sixth Circuit has addressed this issue, several district courts in this circuit have held that pleadings are not closed until each defendant has filed an answer. See, e.g., Outdoor One Commc'n, LLC v. Charter Twp. of Canton, No. 20-10934, 2021 WL 807870, at *1 (E. D. Mich. Mar. 3, 2021) (finding defendant's 12(c) motion premature as defendant had not yet filed an answer to the complaint); Gillespie v. City of Battle Creek, 100 F.Supp.3d 623, 628 (W.D. Mich. 2015); Kowall v. GMAC Mortg., LLC, No. 11-15454, 2012 WL 884851, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 15, 2012); Horen v. Bd. of Educ. of Toledo City Sch. Dist., 594 F.Supp.2d 833, 840 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (“If a case has multiple defendants, all defendants must file an answer before a Rule 12(c) motion can be filed.”).

However, it is not improper for a court to treat a premature, pre-answer Rule 12(c) motion as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) especially since the legal standard applied to a Rule 12(c) motion is the “same standard that applies to a review of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Moderwell, 997 F.3d at 659; Marvaso v. Adams, No. 18-12442, 2019 WL 3003641, at *1 n. 1 (E.D. Mich. July 10, 2019); Collins v. Muskegon Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, No. 1:05-CV-666, 2007 WL 426586, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 1, 2007); Horen, 594 F.Supp.2d at 840. The Undersigned recommends that the Court construe County Defendants' Rule 12(c) motion as a Rule12(b)(6) motion.

2. County Defendants Were Not Required to File Objections to the January 9, 2024 Report and Recommendation

Plaintiff contends that the Court should not consider the County Defendants' 12(b)(6) ...