Pyatt v. Fla. Int'l Univ. Bd. of Trs.

JOE NATHAN PYATT, JR, Plaintiff, v. FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY BOARD OF TRUSTEES, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 1:20-cv-24085-BLOOM/Otazo-Reyes

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

November 24, 2020

OMNIBUS ORDER

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant Mayor Carlos Gimenez's ("Mayor Gimenez") Motion to Dismiss Complaint with Prejudice, ECF No. [16] ("Mayor's Motion"), and Defendants Florida International University Board of Trustee ("FIUBOT"), Alexander D. Casas ("Chief Casas"), and Allen Lowe's ("Sgt. Lowe") Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. [18] ("FIU Defendants' Motion") (collectively, "Motions"). Pro se Plaintiff filed a response to the Mayor's Motion, ECF No. [20], and a response to the FIU Defendants' Motion, ECF No. [21]. Mayor Gimenez filed a reply in support of his motion, ECF No. [22] ("Mayor's Reply"), and FIU Defendants filed a reply in support of their motion, ECF No. [26] ("FIU Defendants' Reply").¹ The Court has reviewed the Motions, the supporting and opposing submissions, the record in this case, the applicable law, and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons set forth below, Mayor Gimenez's Motion is granted, and the FIU Defendants' Motion is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

This is the fourth lawsuit brought by Plaintiff, each of which alleges substantially the same allegations at issue in the present case and each of which was previously dismissed.² According to the instant Complaint, ECF No. [1] ("Complaint"), Plaintiff is an alumnus of Florida International University ("FIU"). Id. at ¶ 4. In October 2016, Plaintiff was arrested and charged with assault with a deadly weapon arising from an incident with Donnavin Bulgin. Id. at ¶¶ 13-15. He was suspended from FIU for one year. Id. at ¶¶ 14, 18. Following his suspension, Plaintiff re-enrolled at FIU and graduated in August 2018. Id. at ¶¶ 18-22.

In October 2018, Plaintiff became homeless, and on December 23, 2018, he was given a trespass warning after being found sleeping in the FIU Green Library on a Sunday morning. Id. at ¶¶ 23-28. Plaintiff was instructed to return in January to lift the trespass warning. Id. at ¶ 30. On January 2, 2019, Plaintiff returned to the FIU police department lobby to lift the trespass warning, and he was subsequently arrested by Sgt. Lowe for resisting arrest without violence. Id. at ¶¶ 31-42. One week later, Plaintiff returned to the police department where he spoke with Chief Casas and was advised "to continue to follow the same procedures as before with regards to entering the campus." Id. at ¶¶ 42-45. On March 8, 2019, Plaintiff returned to the FIU campus to retrieve his property and to attend a public speaking seminar. Id. at ¶ 49. While on campus, Plaintiff encountered Sgt. Torres who remarked, "[d]idn't I tell you to never come back to the campus?" and "[a]ren't you suspended? You're not allowed on campus." Id. at ¶¶ 50-52. Plaintiff alleges that he was then arrested by Sgt. Torres for trespass after warning and disorderly conduct. Id. at ¶ 58.

Based on these allegations, Plaintiff now seeks damages in excess of $100,000.00 for alleged violations of his rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at ¶¶ 1-2. The Complaint alleges two counts against "Defendant" for false arrest (Count I) and malicious prosecution (Count II). See ECF No. [1].

A. Mayor Gimenez's Motion

Mayor Gimenez moves for dismissal with prejudice because the Complaint is a shotgun pleading, Mayor Gimenez is an improper party because neither he nor any Miami-Dade County officers were alleged to be involved in the incidents, Mayor Gimenez is entitled to qualified immunity, and Plaintiff's claims fail pursuant to an indemnification clause in the Mutual Aid Agreement, ECF No. [16-3] ("Agreement"), referenced in the Complaint. ECF No. [16]. See also ECF No. [23] (arguing that Mayor Gimenez cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 based on a supervisory liability theory and that amendment is futile).

Plaintiff responds that Mayor Gimenez "is indeed vicariously liable under the Mutual Aid[] Agreement," and that the Agreement does not "explicitly state that the parties engaged in this agreement cannot be liable for the acts of employees whom are not their own." ECF No. [20] at 2-3. Further, he maintains that the Agreement is governed by Fla. Stat. § 23.127, which he states supports liability against Mayor Gimenez. Id. at 4-6. According to Plaintiff, Unincorporated Miami-Dade is the "proper person" for liability purposes under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and thus, because Mayor Gimenez "in his official capacity represent[s] the municipality," Mayor Gimenez "is vicariously liable for the actions of Mr. Lowe and Mr. Torres per the Mutual Aid Agreement governed and dictated by official policies of the municipality." Id. at 6-7. He adds that he "cured" the previous shotgun pleading deficiencies from Pyatt III. Id. at 9. Further, he asserts that although he "does not contest that Mayor Gimenez was acting in his discretionary capacity as Mayor," Mayor Gimenez is not entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 10-12.

B. FIU Defendants' Motion

The FIU Defendants seek dismissal with prejudice because the Complaint "is deficiently pled, fails to comport with the Court's prior rulings, and demonstrates, by Plaintiff's own admissions, that probable cause existed for the January 2019 arrest[.]" ECF No. [18] at 2. They advance several grounds for dismissal. First, the Complaint is a shotgun pleading, and Defendant has failed to cure his prior pleading errors. Id. at 2, 6-7. Second, the claims against FIUBOT are not actionable under § 1983 because it is not a "person" and FIUBOT, as a state agency or instrumentality, has Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. Id. at 2-3, 8. Third, probable cause supports Plaintiff's January 2019 arrest because of the December 2018 trespass warning issued against him and, as such, both counts fail. Id. at 3, 8-11.³ Fourth, Plaintiff fails to set forth any actionable theory of liability against Chief Casas. Id. at 3, 11-12. Fifth, Chief Casas and Sgt. Lowe are entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 4, 12-. Sixth, any official capacity claims brought against Chief Casas and Sgt. Lowe are duplicative of claims against FIUBOT. Id. at 4, 14-15. Finally, any amendment is futile. Id. at 15.

Plaintiff responds that he previously missed the amendment deadline set forth in Pyatt III because he was arrested and that there was no probable cause for his January 2019 arrest because he "was instructed by Mr. Greene to return to the [FIU Police Department] to lift the trespass warning." ECF No. [21] at 1-3. He argues that his Complaint is not a shotgun pleading, id. at 3-4, and he agrees that FIUBOT is not subject to suit under § 1983 but nonetheless claims that it is vicariously liable for the actions of its officers, id. at 4-7. He adds that FIUBOT is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, id. at 14, and that Sgt. Lowe is not entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 16-17. Plaintiff asserts that leave to amend is not futile. Id. at 17-18.

In reply, FIU Defendants contend that Plaintiff's response "is improper as it attempts to amend the Complaint with allegations that are found nowhere in the Complaint," and that the response supports that arguable probable cause existed for his arrests on the face of the Complaint. ECF No. 26] at 2. They reiterate that FIUBOT cannot be sued under § 1983 and the Eleventh Amendment, id. at 2-4, Chief Casas and Sgt. Lowe are entitled to qualified immunity, id. at 4-6, and the Complaint is a shotgun pleading. Id. at 7.

The Motions, accordingly, are ripe for consideration.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion to dismiss

A pleading in a civil action must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although a complaint "does not need detailed factual allegations," it must provide "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that Rule 8(a)(2)'s pleading standard "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-meaccusation"). Nor can a complaint rest on "'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (alteration in original)).

When reviewing a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a court, as a general rule, must accept the plaintiff's allegations as true and evaluate all plausible inferences derived from those facts in favor of the plaintiff. See Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. S. Everglades Restoration Alliance, 304 F.3d 1076, 1084 (11th Cir. 2002); AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Infinity Fin. Grp., LLC, 608 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1353 (S.D. Fla. 2009). However, this tenet does not apply to legal conclusions, and courts "are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Thaeter v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff's Office, 449 F.3d 1342, 1352 (11th Cir. 2006). Moreover, "courts may infer from the factual allegations in the complaint 'obvious alternative explanations,' which suggest lawful conduct rather than the unlawful conduct the plaintiff would ask the court to infer." Am. Dental Ass'n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682).

A court considering a Rule 12(b) motion is generally limited to the facts contained in the complaint and attached exhibits, including documents referred to in the complaint that are central to the claim. See Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 959 (11th Cir. 2009); Maxcess, Inc. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 433 F.3d 1337, 1340 (11th Cir. 2005) ("[A] document outside the four corners of the complaint may still be considered if it is central to the plaintiff's claims and is undisputed in terms of authenticity.") (citing ...