Q.W. v. Lucas Cnty. Children Servs.

682 F.Supp.3d 671

ESTATE OF Q.W. et al., Plaintiffs, v. LUCAS COUNTY CHILDREN SERVICES et al., Defendants.

Case No. 3:22-CV-00671-JGC

United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Western Division

Filed July 17, 2023

Anthony J. Richardson, II, Law Office of Anthony J. Richardson II, Toledo, OH, Hassanayn Joseph, Joseph Law, Toledo, OH, for Plaintiffs Estate of Q.W., Jamie Redmond, Quenton Whitsell.

Gregory E. O'Brien, Cavitch Familo & Durkin, Cleveland, OH, for Plaintiff Scottsdale Surplus Lines Insurance Company.

Jeffery M. Smith, RCO Law, Toledo, OH, Joseph P. Dawson, Ritter, Robinson, McCready & James, Toledo, OH, Peter N. Lavalette, Robison, Curphey & O'Connell, Toledo, OH, for Defendant Dana Mikonowicz.

Peter N. Lavalette, Robison, Curphey & O'Connell, Toledo, OH, Jeffery M. Smith, RCO Law, Toledo, OH, for Defendant Entity Operating as Dana Mikonowicz Day Care.

ORDER

James G. Carr, Senior United States District Judge

This is a § 1983 civil rights and wrongful death case following the tragic death of an infant boy. Plaintiffs Jamie Redmond and Quenton Whitsell are the parents of the decedent, Q.C.W.¹ Plaintiffs bring this action against Lucas County Children Services ("LCCS") and its employees, including Robin Reese, Katrina Jones, Nicholas Good, Danielle Stroble, Donna Brown, Laura Rubley, and unknown Doe Defendants One through Five. Plaintiffs have also sued Rochelle Nix, Decedent's foster parent, along with Dana Mikonowicz, a day care operator.

The Complaint contains several claims, all arising from LCCS's removing Q.C.W. from his parents' custody and Q.C.W.'s subsequent death while attending Mikonowicz's day care. These claims include (1) Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process violations; (2) violations of the Ohio Constitution; (3) Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process violations; (4) violations of Ohio statutory duties for child services agencies; (5) wrongful death; (6) survival; (7) negligent hiring, supervision, or retention; (8) bad faith; and (9) willful conduct.

Pending are LCCS's and Rochelle Nix's respective Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Docs. 10, 13). Plaintiffs have submitted an omnibus response in opposition. (Doc. 17). Defendants have submitted separate reply briefs. (Docs. 19, 20).

For the reasons below, I grant both Motions.

Background

Plaintiff Redmond gave birth on November 15, 2019 to her second son, Q.C.W. (Doc. 1, ¶ 39). At the time, Redmond was living in a domestic violence shelter because she was a recent domestic abuse victim. (Id. ¶¶ 35-38). Redmond planned to bring Q.C.W. home with her from the hospital to live in the domestic violence shelter. (Id. ¶¶ 40-42).

Shortly after Q.C.W.'s birth, Defendant LCCS employee Katrina Jones informed Redmond that it was against LCCS policy for a parent to take custody of a child while residing at a domestic violence shelter (Id. ¶ 43). Jones further advised Redmond that LCCS could not place Q.C.W. in the custody of his father, Plaintiff Whitsell, due to Whitsell's criminal record. (Id. ¶ 47).

1. Custody Proceedings in the Ohio Court of Common Pleas

On November 20, 2019, the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas held an ex parte shelter care hearing before a magistrate. (Doc. 9-2, pgID 212). Plaintiffs Redmond and Whitsell did not attend. Plaintiffs allege that LCCS failed to give them notice of this hearing. (Doc. 1, ¶ 49).

At the hearing, counsel for LCCS told the court that Redmond had a current open case with LCCS regarding the safety and custody of her first son, where Redmond had "not yet progressed in services enough for the child to remain in her care . . . ." (Doc. 9-2, pgID 212). LCCS also told the court about Whitsell's criminal history and the history of domestic violence between him and Redmond.

The court found:

1. "that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the child[ ] is/are in immediate danger and the removal from the home is needed to prevent immediate or threatened physical or emotional harm[;]"

2. "that LCCS has . . . made Reasonable Efforts to prevent the placement and removal of the child[ ][from the home and/or make it possible for the child[ ] to remain in the home[;]"

3. that "continued residence of the child[ ] in or return to the home would be contrary to the child['s] best interest and welfare[;]" and

4. "that reasonable grounds have been made to notify the parent(s) . . . that the child[ ] may be placed in shelter care and the reasons for placing the child[ ] in shelter care."

(Id.). The magistrate then ordered LCCS to take Q.C.W. "into shelter care custody at once." (Id.).

Shortly after, LCCS placed Q.C.W. in the custody of a licensed foster parent, Defendant Rochelle Nix, as ordered by the court. (See id., pgID 208). LCCS entered into a foster care agreement with Nix on November 20, 2019. (Id., pgID 222). An LCCS case worker and a supervisor also approved an alternative care agreement with Nix on November 25, 2019. The alternative care agreement allowed Nix to take Q.C.W. to Defendant Mikonowicz's day care on weekdays while Nix was presumably working. (Id., pgID 225).

On November 20, 2019, within 24 hours of the ex parte hearing, the same magistrate held a contested shelter care hearing. (See id., pgID 216). Plaintiff Redmond was not present, but her appointed counsel was. (Id.). Plaintiff Whitsell was present and represented by counsel. (Id.). A guardian ad litem represented Q.C.W.'s interests. (Id.) The court reiterated its findings from the day prior and awarded temporary interim custody of Q.C.W. to LCCS, pending a final adjudication and disposition. (Id.). The court also ordered supervised visitation by Plaintiffs. (Id., pgID 217).

A subsequent hearing for adjudication and disposition occurred on February 19, 2020. (Id., pgID 213). Both Plaintiffs Redmond and Whitsell attended this hearing. (Id.). The magistrate explained Plaintiffs rights to them; the Plaintiffs waived them and consented to a finding of "dependency" for Q.C.W. (Id.). Plaintiffs also stipulated to the complaint filed by LCCS. (Id.). The court then decided that it was in the best interest of Q.C.W. to remain in the temporary custody of LCCS. (Id.)

A judge reviewed and adopted the magistrate's decision in a judgement entry. (Doc. 9-2, pgID 219). The judge also set subsequent review hearings for May and November 2020. (Id., pgID 220).

2. Day Care Incidents

On February 21, 2020, Defendant Mikonowicz and Q.C.W. were in an auto accident. (Doc. 1 ¶ 77). Mikonowicz was driving, and Q.C.W. was in a rear-facing car seat in the back seat. (Doc. 17-7, pgID 624). The Toledo Fire Department reported to the scene, but Mikonowicz said she would go to the hospital on her own to have Q.C.W. treated for possible injuries. (Doc. 1, ¶ 94). She did not do so and instead took Q.C.W. to her day care. (Id. ¶ 84).

Defendant Nix took Q.C.W. to the emergency room the next day, on February 22, 2020, at LCCS's request. (Doc. 9-3, pgID 277-78). The examining nurse practitioner noted that Q.C.W. did not have any cuts or bruises and that he was alert, oriented, and responding appropriately. (Id., pgID 278-79). The nurse discharged Q.C.W. about 25 minutes after his arrival and instructed Nix to schedule a follow-up with Q.C.W.'s doctor for the following week. (Id., pgID 279-80). Nix did not schedule this appointment until several weeks later. (Doc. 1, ¶ 106).

On March 19, 2020, Q.C.W. died while left in a baby swing at Mikonowicz's day care. (Doc. 1, ¶ 126).

The coroner's office performed an autopsy the next day, concluding that Q.C.W.'s cause of death was Sudden Unexpected Infant Death ("SUID"). (Doc. 9-4, pgID 287). The examining forensic pathologist also noted there was no evidence of abuse or neglect. (Id., pgID 288).

The Ohio Department of Job and Family Services ("ODJFS") also investigated the incident the next day. (Doc. 1, ¶ 134; Doc. 17-9, pgID 634). ODJFS's report recommended suspension of Mikonowicz's childcare license because Q.C.W. died while in her custody and her day care program created a serious safety risk. (Doc. 1, ¶ 135-36; Doc. 17-9, pgID 634).

Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that "[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c).

In addition to the pleadings, courts may consider any documents referenced in the complaint that are central to the dispute. United Food & Com. Workers, Loc. 1995 v. Kroger Co., 51 F.4th 197, 202 (6th Cir. 2022) (citing Bassett v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008)).

While I apply federal pleadings standards, I apply Ohio state law when analyzing the substantive state-law issues raised by the parties. See Penton Media, Inc. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 245 F. App'x 495, 499 (6th Cir. 2007).

The same pleadings standard applies to a Rule 12(c) motion as to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. E.g., Bates v. Green Farms Condo. Ass'n, 958 F.3d 470, 480 (6th Cir. 2020). Thus, I evaluate a Rule 12(c) motion under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Bates, supra, 958 F.3d at 480.

"To survive a Rule 12(c) motion, the 'complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Engler v. Arnold, 862 F.3d 571, 575 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Iqbal, supra, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937) (internal quotation marks omitted). I construe the complaint "in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[s]," and all reasonable inferences are drawn in their favor. Mills v. Barnard, 869 F.3d 473, 479 (6th Cir. 2017).

Detailed factual allegations are not required under Rule 8(a) ("A pleading . . . must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]"), but the complaint must create more...