Quevedo v. Sullivan

641 F.Supp.3d 620

Carlos C. QUEVEDO, Plaintiff, v. Daniel SULLIVAN, Warden, South Dakota State Penitentiary;and the Attorney General of the State of South Dakota, Defendants.

5:22-CV-05021-RAL

United States District Court, D. South Dakota, Western Division

Signed November 15, 2022

Carlos C. Quevedo, South Dakota State Penitentiary, Sioux Falls, SD, Pro Se.

Paul S. Swedlund, Attorney General of South Dakota, Pierre, SD, for Respondent.

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

ROBERTO A. LANGE, CHIEF JUDGE

Plaintiff Carlos Quevedo ("Quevedo") pled guilty in state court to one count of second-degree murder and received a ninety-year sentence. Quevedo has now filed a petition of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 claiming that his sentence was wrongfully imposed under the Eighth Amendment and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Doc. 1. Defendants Warden Daniel Sullivan of the South Dakota State Penitentiary and the Attorney General of South Dakota ("the State") responded, Doc. 10, and filed two motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim and procedural default, Doc. 11; Doc. 12. For the reasons set forth below, this Court denies Quevedo's § 2254 petition and grants the State's motions to dismiss.

I. Procedural Background

In February 2017, Quevedo was indicted on alternate counts of first-degree murder, first-degree murder while engaged in the perpetration of a robbery, and second-degree murder, as well as first-degree robbery. Doc. 1 at 8; Criminal, 17-242 at 15-16; State v. Quevedo, 947 N.W.2d 402, 404 (S.D. 2020). The charges stemmed from the killing of Kasie Lord while Quevedo and another juvenile were stealing a case of beer from the Loaf 'N Jug in Rapid City, South Dakota. Doc. 11 at 1; Doc. 12 at 1; Doc. 13 at 10; Criminal, 17-242 at 9-10; Quevedo, 947 N.W.2d at 403-04. At the time of the incident, Quevedo was seventeen years and four months old, but ultimately proceeded in adult court. Doc. 1 at 13; Doc. 11 at 1; Doc. 12 at 1; Criminal, 17-242 at 113-14; Quevedo, 947 N.W.2d at 403. In March 2018, after discussions with counsel, Quevedo decided to plead guilty as an adult to second-degree murder and, in exchange, the state would drop the other charges and recommend a term-of-years sentence. Doc. 1 at 8-9; Doc. 1-1 at 4-8; Criminal, 17-242 at 124, 133-34. Quevedo received a sentence of 90 years in prison, Doc. 1 at 9; Quevedo, 947 N.W.2d at 406, making him eligible for parole in March 2061, when he will be 62 years old, S.D. Dep't Corr., Offender Locator, https://doc.sd.gov/adult/lookup/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2022); Quevedo, 947 N.W.2d at 406.

On direct appeal to the Supreme Court of South Dakota, Quevedo raised two issues: Whether the state court's sentence violated categorical Eighth Amendment sentencing restrictions; and whether the state court's sentence was grossly disproportionate to his crime in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Doc. 1 at 9; Quevedo, 947 N.W.2d at 406. See generally Appellant's Brief, Quevedo, 947 N.W.2d 402 (No. 28608), 2019 WL 9512912 (outlining Quevedo's argument on appeal). The Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed the imposed sentence. Doc. 1 at 9; Quevedo, 947 N.W.2d at 411. No ineffective assistance of counsel claim was raised on direct appeal. Doc. 1 at 9; Doc. 1-1 at 18. See generally Quevedo, 947 N.W.2d 402 (discussing Eighth Amendment claims only); Appellant's Brief, supra (same).

In April 2021, Quevedo filed a state habeas corpus action contending that his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated based on the advice his trial counsel provided and failed to provide regarding the plea agreement. Doc. 1-1 at 2-13; Habeas Case, 21-540 at 1. A state judge dismissed Quevedo's habeas petition and refused to issue a certificate of probable cause on July 12, 2021. Doc. 1-1 at 29-40; Habeas Case, 21-540 at 64-75. Quevedo then filed a motion for a certificate of probable cause and an amended motion on July 21 and July 26, 2021, respectively. Doc. 1-1 at 23-26, 41-46. On July 26, 2021, Quevedo filed a "notice of appeal" of the decision denying his petition with the trial court. Doc. 1-1 at 47. The Supreme Court of South Dakota denied the appeal for failure to comply with SDCL § 21-27-18.1.¹ Doc. 1-1 at 49. Quevedo then wrote to state court Judge Craig A. Pfeifle stating that he had not received a decision on his amended motion for probable cause. Doc. 1-1 at 58. Judge Pfeifle informed Quevedo that his motion had been denied. Doc. 1-1 at 59. Quevedo then filed a motion for probable cause with the Supreme Court of South Dakota on December 3, 2021. Doc. 1-1 at 50-56. The court denied and dismissed the motion on December 8, 2021, again for failure to comply with SDCL § 21-27-18.1. Doc. 1-1 at 57. Quevedo sent another letter on December 12, 2021, asking Judge Pfeifle to refile the denial so that he could then file a timely motion for certificate of probable cause. Doc. 1-1 at 61-62. Judge Pfeifle responded and explained that the motion was initially not denied as untimely, but rather because of a failure to comply with SDCL § 21-27-18.1, so refiling would not solve the issue. Doc. 1-1 at 63-64. Quevedo then made a request for reconsideration to which Judge Pfeifle did not respond. Doc. 1-1 at 65-66.

Quevedo filed his § 2254 petition with this Court on February 22, 2022. Doc. 1. He raises three issues: 1) whether the circuit court's sentence violated categorical Eighth Amendment sentencing restrictions; 2) whether the circuit court's sentence was grossly disproportionate to his crime in violation of the Eighth Amendment; and 3) whether he received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. Doc. 1 at 6-7, 13. Quevedo petitions the Court to "vacate [his] conviction and remand for further proceedings." Doc. 1 at 20. The State moved to dismiss, Doc. 11; Doc. 12, to which Quevedo responded, Doc. 13, and the State replied, Doc. 15; Doc. 16. This Court now denies Quevedo's petition for writ of habeas corpus and grants the State's motions to dismiss for the reasons discussed below.

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review Under § 2254

As amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2254 sets limitations "on the power of a federal court to grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a state prisoner." Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011). "Section 2254(a) permits a federal court to entertain only those applications alleging that a person is in state custody 'in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.' Sections 2254(b) and (c) provide that a federal court may not grant such applications unless, with certain exceptions, the applicant has exhausted state remedies." Id. (quoting § 2254).

"If an application includes a claim that has been 'adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings,' " additional restrictions apply. Id. (quoting § 2254(d)). Section 2254(d) provides that an application shall not be granted unless adjudication of such a claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The Supreme Court of the United States has described the § 2254(d) standard as a "highly deferential standard," "difficult to meet," and demanding "that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Cullen, 563 U.S. at 181, 131 S.Ct. 1388 (cleaned up and citations omitted). "A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011). The petitioner in a § 2254 case bears the burden of proof. Cullen, 563 U.S. at 181, 131 S.Ct. 1388. However, because § 2254(d)'s demanding standard of review only applies if the claim was adjudicated on the merits, when the state court did not resolve the claim on the merits, federal courts review the petitioner's claim de novo unless the claim was defaulted. See Worthington v. Roper, 631 F.3d 487, 495 (8th Cir. 2011). This Court analyzes in turn each ground Quevedo raises under § 2254.

B. Grounds for Relief

1. De Facto Life Sentence in Violation of the Eighth Amendment

Quevedo challenges his 90-year sentence based on the Supreme Court ruling in Graham v. Florida, which found that life in prison without parole for non-homicide juvenile offenses violates the Eighth Amendment, 560 U.S. 48, 71-75, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), and Miller v. Alabama, which found "that mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on 'cruel and unusual punishments,' " 567 U.S. 460, 465, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012).

In Graham, a juvenile was sentenced to life imprisonment for armed burglary and 15 years for attempted armed robbery following a conviction for violation of probation. 560 U.S. at 57, 130 S.Ct. 2011. Because Florida had abolished its parole system, Graham had no possible opportunity for early release, except executive clemency. Id. The Supreme Court used the categorical approach in analyzing whether the Constitution permits such sentencing schemes. Id. at 61-62, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (noting that the challenge was not "to a particular defendant's sentence, but [rather] a sentencing practice itself"). The Supreme Court observed that the age of the offender and the nature and circumstances of the crime were important to consider in determining what sentence is...