Quezambra v. United Domestic Workers of Am. Afscme Local 3930

445 F.Supp.3d 695

Maria QUEZAMBRA

v.UNITED DOMESTIC WORKERS OF AMERICA AFSCME LOCAL 3930 et al.

Case No. 8:19-cv-00927-JLS-JEM

United States District Court, C.D. California.

Filed June 03, 2020

Karin Moore Sweigart, Mariah Gondeiro, Freedom Foundation, Redwood City, CA, for Maria Quezambra.

Scott A. Kronland, Rebecca C. Lee, Altshuler Berzon LLP, San Francisco, CA, for United Domestic Workers of America AFSCME Local 3930.

Jennifer R. Young, Michael L. Wroniak, Collins Collins Muir and Stewart LLP, Orange, CA, for Orange County.

Lara Haddad, CAAG—Office of the Attorney General California Department of Justice, Los Angeles, CA, for Betty T. Yee, Xavier Becerra.

PROCEEDINGS: (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS

JOSEPHINE L. STATON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court are three Motions to Dismiss: one filed by Defendant United Domestic Workers of America, AFSCME Local 3930 (Union MTD, Doc. 30), one filed by Defendants Xavier Becerra and Betty Yee¹ (Officials MTD, Doc. 31), and one filed by Defendant Orange County² (County MTD, Doc. 36). Plaintiff Maria Quezambra opposed each Motion. (Union MTD Opp., Doc. 46; Officials MTD Opp., Doc. 47; County MTD Opp., Doc. 52.) Defendants replied. (Union MTD Reply, Doc. 55; Officials MTD Reply, Doc. 54; County MTD Reply, Doc. 56.) Having taken the matter under submission and reviewed all papers on file,³ for the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motions, dismisses Quezambra's federal claims, and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her remaining state-law claims.

I. BACKGROUND ⁴

In 2012, Quezambra became an In-Home Supportive Services ("IHSS") provider to care for her disabled daughter. (Compl. ¶ 17, Doc. 1.) Quezambra receives state-provided income for these services and is represented exclusively for collective bargaining purposes by Defendant United Domestic Workers of America, AFSCME Local 3930 (the "Union"). (Id. ¶¶ 18-21.) Under California Welfare & Institutions Code Section 12301.6 and the Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") between UDWA and Defendant Orange County, Defendant Yee is authorized to collect dues on behalf of UDWA. (Id. ¶¶ 22-23.) California Welfare & Institutions Code Section 12301.6(i)(2) directs the state controller to "make any deductions from the wages of [IHSS] personnel ... that are agreed to by [the public authority/employer (Orange County) ] in collective bargaining with the designated representative of [IHSS] personnel ... and transfer the deducted funds as directed in that agreement." In this instance, the MOU operates as the collective bargaining agreement. The iteration of the MOU that was effective until June 30, 2016 states Orange County would "advise the State Controller, as the payroll agent for its IHSS Individual Providers, to deduct all authorized membership dues, fees and/or assessments as required by the Union, or as voluntarily requested by the providers." (2012 MOU Art. 2, Section 2(a), Maldonado Decl. Ex. B, Doc. 30-4.)⁵ The MOU was revised, with the operative version taking effect July 1, 2016, stating that the "Union will advise California Department of Social Services (CDSS) or the designated payroll agent for Providers in the bargaining unit covered by this agreement, to deduct all authorized dues, assessments and/or fees required by the Union. All such dues deductions shall be made in compliance with all applicable laws." (2016 MOU, Maldonado Decl. Ex A, Doc. 30-3.)

Pursuant to the MOU, beginning in 2013, Defendant "Yee deducted money from Ms. Quezambra's [IHSS] wages and remitted it to the Union."⁶ (Compl. ¶ 30.)

Quezambra states that she "never chose to financially support or join the Union," she "does not believe that the Union adequately advocates for her interests," and "she does not support the political, ideological, and social causes for which the Union advocates." (Id. ¶ 31.) She was never solicited to join the Union and never signed a document indicating that she sought to become a union member or pay dues. (Id. ¶ 32.) Quezambra assumed that Union membership was mandatory because the dues deductions began in 2013 without her input. (Id. ) In February 2019, Quezambra discovered that she was required neither to be a member of the Union nor make financial contributions to it. (Id. ¶ 33.) On February 8, 2019, she sent the Union a certified letter "object[ing] to union membership and the payment of any union dues." (Id. ¶ 34.) Then, on March 21, 2019, Quezambra requested that the Union provide her a copy of her signed membership card. (Id. ¶ 39.)

On March 22, 2019, Mat Kostrinsky, a Union official notified Quezambra that a review of her file revealed she "did not properly authorize the dues deductions." (Id. ¶ 41.) Accordingly, the Union would not deduct Union dues from Quezambra's future wages and had "taken steps to discontinue the dues previously deducted retroactive to December 2015 ... consistent with the three-year statute of limitation applicable to claims for dues refunds." (Id. )

Quezambra also alleges that she twice requested that no Union representative come to her home. (Compl. ¶¶ 35, 40.) Nevertheless, "[o]n March 29, 2019 ... the Union sent a representative to Ms. Quezambra's home scaring her disabled daughter and causing anxiety, fear, apprehension, distress, and unhappiness in both Ms. Quezambra and her daughter." (Id. ¶ 43.)

On May 16, 2019, Quezambra filed this action, asserting five claims. She brings three claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violations of the First Amendment arising out of: (1) "Defendants' dues extraction scheme [which lacked] the necessary procedural safeguards;" (2) the deduction of "union dues/fees from Ms. Quezambra's wages pursuant to California State and Welfare and Institutions Code Section 12301.6 [ (i) ](2);" and (3) "the deduction of union/dues fees from Plaintiff's wages pursuant" to the terms of "Article 2 Section 2 and other provisions of the MOU." (Id. ¶¶ 58-73.) Finally, she asserts California common law claims for (4) trespass and (5) the intentional infliction of emotional distress.⁷ (Id. ¶¶ 74-81.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

" Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a court to dismiss a complaint for ‘failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.’ Dismissal of a complaint can be based on either a lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." Alfred v. Walt Disney Co. , 388 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1180 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (citation omitted) (quoting Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ). In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts must accept as true all "well-pleaded factual allegations" in a complaint.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Courts must also draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Daniels-Hall v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n , 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010). Yet, "courts ‘are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.’ " Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (quoting Papasan v. Allain , 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) ).

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). A plaintiff must not merely allege conduct that is conceivable. When "a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Finally, the Court may not dismiss a complaint without leave to amend unless "it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment." Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't , 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks omitted).

III. DISCUSSION ⁸

Each of Quezambra's three Section 1983 claims is premised on the assertion that the deduction of dues from her wages and remission of those dues to the Union, pursuant to the terms of the MOU and California Welfare & Institutions Code § 12301.6(i)(2), violated her First Amendment rights. Specifically, she claims Defendants violated her rights "(a) not to associate with a mandatory representative; (b) not to support, financially or otherwise, petitioning and speech; and (c) against compelled speech." (Compl. ¶ 59.)

However, as explained below, Quezambra's Section 1983 claims fail as a matter of law.

A. The Post-Janus Landscape and Quezambra's Claims

In Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31 , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 201 L.Ed.2d 924 (2018), the Supreme Court overruled Abood v. Detroit Board of Education , 431 U.S. 209, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 52 L.Ed.2d 261 (1977) and its progeny, holding that no form of payment to a union, including both union dues and fair-share agency fees, can be deducted or attempted to be collected from an employee without the employee's affirmative consent. Janus , 138 S. Ct. at 2486. In the wake of Janus , lawsuits have been filed throughout the country by both non-members and members of various unions challenging the constitutionality of wage deductions for union dues and compulsory agency fees. In those cases, plaintiffs have often complained of being forced to subsidize union activities via the payment of compulsory non-member agency fees, or, alternatively, have asserted that, although they agreed to membership in the union, they would not have done so had they...