Quinn v. Cardenas

256 Ariz. 77

535 P.3d 921

Timera QUINN, Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

v.Julio CARDENAS, Defendant/Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 22-0398

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1.

Filed August 1, 2023

Bradley & Associates, Goodyear, By Percival R. Bradley, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Appellee

Jones Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C., Phoenix, By John T. Masterson, Michele Molinario, Justin M. Ackerman, Derek R. Graffious, Counsel for Defendant/Appellee/Cross-Appellant

Judge Michael S. Catlett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.

CATLETT, Judge:

¶1 Following a minor traffic accident, Timera Quinn ("Quinn") and Julio Cardenas ("Cardenas") got into an altercation. What made this conflict different is that, unbeknownst to Quinn, Cardenas was an off-duty City of Phoenix Police Officer. The altercation quickly escalated until Cardenas pulled his service weapon, revealed his status as a police officer, and detained Quinn while on-duty officers arrived.

¶2 Quinn brought four claims against Cardenas in superior court: a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (for excessive force), and three state law claims for assault, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. After Cardenas removed the case to federal court, that court granted summary judgment for Cardenas on the § 1983 claim. The federal district court remanded the three state-law claims to state court.

¶3 The primary issue we answer is whether, on remand, a federal court's final judgment binds the superior court in any way. And if so, whether a final judgment is binding under preclusion principles (issue and claim preclusion) or, instead, the law of the case principles.

¶4 We hold that a federal court's final judgment is, upon remand, binding on the superior court under preclusion principles. We also conclude the federal court's final judgment granting Cardenas qualified immunity is, under the issue preclusion doctrine, fatal to her state law claims for assault and false imprisonment. We, therefore, affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶5 Quinn and Cardenas were involved in a traffic accident on the evening of May 14, 2017. The record is unclear how the accident came about or who caused it, but those matters are immaterial. What we do know is that Cardenas, who was off-duty, pulled off the interstate. Quinn, who was accompanied by two male passengers, drove behind him. At some point, their vehicles collided.

¶6 Cardenas then drove to a nearby gas station; Quinn followed. There, Quinn's male passengers exited the vehicle and one of them discussed the collision with Cardenas. Quinn's passengers returned to the vehicle, and Quinn began driving away before the parties exchanged identification or insurance information. Cardenas began running after Quinn's vehicle, causing Quinn to turn around and park. Quinn exited her vehicle and confronted Cardenas about who caused the accident and who failed to remain at the scene. At some point during the discussion, Quinn's two male passengers also exited.

¶7 Cardenas then utilized an "impact push" against Quinn. Using his two hands against her upper chest, Cardenas pushed Quinn while taking a step back. Quinn still did not know Cardenas was a police officer. So Quinn responded, pushing Cardenas. Cardenas then revealed his occupation; he drew his service weapon, announced he was a police officer, and ordered Quinn to return to her vehicle. Quinn complied. Eventually, on-duty police arrived and took control.

¶8 Quinn sued Cardenas in the superior court under § 1983 for allegedly violating her Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. Quinn also asserted state law tort claims for assault, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Cardenas removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, where it was assigned to the Hon. Michael T. Liburdi. The parties completed fact and expert discovery, after which Cardenas moved for summary judgment on all claims. The federal court granted Cardenas’ motion concerning Quinn's § 1983 claim on qualified immunity grounds. Having disposed of the lone federal claim, the court remanded Quinn's state law claims back to the superior court. Quinn did not appeal the federal court's order and judgment.

¶9 On remand, Cardenas moved for summary judgment on the remaining tort claims, arguing in part that the federal judgment precluded re-litigation of the federal court's qualified immunity decision. The court granted the motion on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim based on evidentiary shortcomings, but it otherwise denied the motion.¹

¶10 A different superior court judge rotated onto the case. Shortly before trial, the parties filed a joint pretrial statement, with Cardenas again raising issue preclusion arguments. But this time, Cardenas’ arguments focused on the federal court's factual findings and how they might impact jury instructions. The court ordered Quinn to address Cardenas’ preclusion arguments. After oral argument, the court concluded that because there was a final federal judgment involving the same parties and the same issues, issue preclusion prohibited Quinn from moving forward with her assault and false imprisonment claims.

¶11 Quinn timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-2101.

DISCUSSION

I. Summary Judgment Timing

¶12 Before addressing the meat of the appeal, we address two preliminaries. First, Quinn asserts that the superior court's ruling stemmed from an untimely renewed motion for summary judgment tucked into Cardenas’ joint pretrial statement. Cardenas responds that the court raised the summary judgment issue on its own under Rule 56(f). We review whether the superior court properly heard a motion, even an untimely one, for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Vincent , 147 Ariz. 6, 9, 708 P.2d 97, 100 (App. 1985).

¶13 Under Rule 56(f)(3), "[a]fter giving notice and a reasonable time to respond, the court may: ... consider summary judgment on its own after identifying for the parties material facts that may not be genuinely in dispute." After unsuccessfully moving for summary judgment on two of Quinn's claims, Cardenas, in the joint pretrial statement, again addressed the federal court's order and judgment and their impact on the surviving claims. The superior court held a status conference where this issue was discussed, and the court allowed Quinn to file a brief explaining why the surviving claims should be tried. While Quinn's brief is not part of the record because Quinn emailed it directly to opposing counsel and the court without ever filing it, Quinn concedes she complied with the court's order by providing a brief.² The court then held oral argument and ultimately concluded that the federal judgment precluded the state tort claims. Because the parties were given notice and an opportunity to respond, the superior court's judgment was procedurally permitted under Rule 56(f).

¶14 Additionally, trial courts serve an important function as gatekeepers to ensure only meritorious claims and defenses reach a jury. See, e.g. , Booth v. State , 207 Ariz. 61, 68 ¶ 20, 83 P.3d 61, 68 (App. 2004) ; Sign Here Petitions LLC v. Chavez , 243 Ariz. 99, 102 ¶ 1, 402 P.3d 457, 460 (App. 2017). Indeed, a superior court has the authority to "eliminate nonmeritorious claims or defenses" at a scheduling conference. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 16(d)(9). And courts must also "manage a civil action" with the objectives to (1) manage the court's calendar to eliminate unnecessary trial settings; (2) adhere to "applicable standards for timely resolution of civil actions"; and (3) conserve the parties’ resources. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 16(A) ; see also Ariz. R. Civ. P. 1. The court did not abuse its discretion in disposing of claims it thought were non-meritorious in lieu of conducting an unnecessary jury trial.

II. Horizontal Appeal

¶15 Second, Quinn contends Cardenas asked Judge Astrowsky for an impermissible "horizontal appeal" of Judge McCoy's earlier decision denying summary judgment. "We review the superior court's reconsideration of an earlier ruling for an abuse of discretion." Humphrey v. State , 249 Ariz. 57, 67 ¶ 36, 466 P.3d 368, 378 (App. 2020).

¶16 We refer to a request for "a second trial judge to reconsider the decision of the first trial judge in the same matter, even though no new circumstances have arisen in the interim and no other reason justifies reconsideration" as a "horizontal appeal." Powell-Cerkoney v. TCR-Mont. Ranch Joint Venture, II , 176 Ariz. 275, 278–79, 860 P.2d 1328, 1331–32 (App. 1993). A court cannot turn away a horizontal appeal simply to "justify [its] refusal to reconsider a ruling when an error in the first decision renders it manifestly erroneous or unjust[.]" Id. at 279, 860 P.2d at 1332. In such circumstances, "a second judge does not abuse his discretion by agreeing to reconsider an earlier decision." Id. ; Humphrey , 249 Ariz. at 68 ¶ 39, 466 P.3d at 379.

¶17 Cardenas argues the superior court did not violate the horizontal appeal doctrine because Judge Astrowsky was permitted to revisit a prior ruling if it was "palpably erroneous." Because summary judgment should have been granted earlier based on issue preclusion, he argues, any decision holding otherwise was erroneous.

¶18 We agree that Quinn's horizontal appeal argument ultimately turns on the correctness of Judge Astrowsky's final preclusion ruling. As an appellate court, we primarily review the content of final judgments. The horizontal appeal argument does not really get Quinn anything her challenges to the final judgment would not already get her—once final judgment is entered, the horizontal appeal argument largely collapses into the merits of the appeal. Think about it—if Judge Astrowsky correctly decided the preclusion issue (reflected in the final judgment), Quinn's horizontal appeal argument (along with the...