Quinnie v. State

382 So.3d 1275

Raphiel Pier QUINNIE

v.STATE of Alabama

CR-21-0374

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

December 16, 2022

Rehearing Denied February 3, 2023

Certiorari Denied March 10, 2023

Alabama Supreme Court SC-2023-0127

Christopher S. Youngpeter, asst. public defender, Mobile County Public Defender’s Office, Mobile, for appellant.

Steve Marshall, att’y gen., and Sara Rogan, asst. att’y gen., for appellee.

McCOOL, Judge.

Raphiel Pier Quinnie appeals his conviction for unlawful possession of a short-barreled shotgun, a violation of § 13A-11-63, Ala. Code 1975. Quinnie was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment for that conviction.

Facts and Procedural History

In May 2016, a Mobile County grand jury indicted Quinnie for murder. Quinnie was arrested for the murder charge on July 12, 2016, and it appears that he was in possession of a short-barreled shotgun at that time (R. 21), which was not the murder weapon. In April 2017, a Mobile County grand jury also indicted Quinnie for unlawful possession of a short-barreled shotgun, and Quinnie was arraigned on that charge on June 27, 2017.

In January 2018, Quinnie was convicted of murder and, on March 1, 2018, was sentenced to life imprisonment. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, Quinnie provided oral notice of appeal, and the State requested that the unlawful-possession-of-a-short-barreled-shotgun charge "be moved to the administrative docket." (CR-17-0573, R. 364.) Quinnie raised no objection to the State’s request (id.), so the circuit court granted the request and "transferred [that charge] to the administrative docket pending appeal [of Quinnie’s murder conviction]." (C. 22.) In April 2019, this Court affirmed Quinnie’s murder conviction, and the Alabama Supreme Court denied certiorari review on July 12, 2019. For all that appears in the record, Quinnie’s unlawful-possession-of-a-short-barreled-shotgun charge remained on the circuit court’s administrative docket until May 2021, when the court sua sponte scheduled a status conference regarding that charge.

On August 24, 2021, Quinnie filed a motion to dismiss the unlawful-possession-of-a-short-barreled-shotgun charge on the basis that the State had violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial. See U.S. Const., Amend. VI.; and Ala. Const., Art. I, § 6. The State filed a response to Quinnie’s motion, arguing that the motion was due to be denied based on an analysis of the four factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). Quinnie then supplemented his motion with a brief in which he also addressed the Barker factors, arguing that the factors weighed in favor of dismissal. The circuit court held a hearing on Quinnie’s motion and, following that hearing, issued an order denying the motion "in light of the Barker factors as applied to the facts of this case." (C. 50.)

On February 8, 2022, Quinnie pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a short-barreled shotgun after reserving his right to appeal the circuit court’s denial of his motion to dismiss.

Discussion

[1] On appeal, Quinnie reasserts his claim that the State violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial. We review this claim de novo because the relevant facts are undisputed and because the only question to be decided is a question of law. Horton v. State, 369 So. 3d 1128, 1131 (Ala. Crim. App. 2022).

" ‘In determining whether a defendant has been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial, we apply the test established by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed. 2d 101 (1972), in which the following four factors are considered: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his or her right to a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant.

" ‘In Ex parte Walker, 928 So. 2d 259, 263 (Ala. 2005), the Alabama Supreme Court stated:

" ‘ " ‘A single factor is not necessarily determinative, because this is a "balancing test, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defense are weighed." ’ Ex parte Clopton, 656 So. 2d [1243] at 1245 [(Ala. 1985)] (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 [92 S.Ct. 2182])." ’

"State v. Jones, 35 So. 3d 644, 646 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009)."

Horton, 369 So. 3d at 1131.

I. Length of the Delay

[2, 3] Under the first Barker factor, the threshold inquiry is whether the length of the delay is "presumptively prejudicial," which, if it is, " ‘triggers’ an examination of the remaining three Barker factors." Horton, 369 So. 3d at 1131. " ‘[A]s the term is used in this threshold context, "presumptive prejudice" does not necessarily indicate a statistical probability of prejudice; it simply marks the point at which courts deem the delay unreasonable enough to trigger the Barker enquiry.’ " Horton, 369 So. 3d at 1131 (quoting Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n.1, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992)).

" ' "In Alabama, ‘[t]he length of delay is measured from the date of the indictment or the date of the issuance of an arrest warrant – whichever is earlier – to the date of the trial.’ Roberson [v. State], 864 So. 2d [379,] 394 [(Ala. Crim. App. 2002)]." ’

"Wilson v. State, 329 So. 3d 71, 77 (Ala. Crim. App. 2020) (quoting Ex parte Walker, 928 So. 2d 259, 263-64 (Ala. 2005)). In a case where the defendant pleads guilty, the ‘trial’ date is the date he or she pleads guilty. See Wilson, 329 So. 3d at 77; and Ex parte Walker, 928 So. 2d 259, 264 (Ala. 2005) (both calculating the length of the delay up to the date the defendant pleaded guilty)."

Horton, 369 So. 3d at 1132.

In this case, Quinnie was arrested in July 2016 but was not indicted until April 2017. Thus, we measure the delay from the date of Quinnie’s arrest to the date he pleaded guilty, i.e., from July 12, 2016, to February 8, 2022, which is a delay of approximately 67 months.¹ The State concedes that this delay is sufficient to trigger an analysis of the remaining Barker factors, and that concession is supported by Alabama caselaw. See Horton, 369 So. 3d at — (holding that a delay of 54 months was sufficient to trigger an analysis of the remaining Barker factors). That fact also means that this factor weighs against the State in our speedy-trial analysis; the degree to which it weighs against the State we discuss below.

II. Reason for the Delay

[4–8] " ‘ "Barker recognizes three categories of reasons for delay: (1) deliberate delay, (2) negligent delay, and (3) justified delay. 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S. Ct. 2182. Courts assign different weight to different reasons for delay. Deliberate delay is ‘weighted heavily’ against the State. 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S. Ct. 2182. Deliberate delay includes an ‘attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense’ or ‘ "to gain some tactical advantage over (defendants) or to harass them." ’ 407 U.S. at 531 & n.32, 92 S. Ct. 2182 (quoting United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 325, 92 S. Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed. 2d 468 (1971)). Negligent delay is weighted less heavily against the State than is deliberate delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S. Ct. 2182; Ex parte Carrell, 565 So. 2d [104,] 108 [(Ala. 1990)]. Justified delay – which includes such occurrences as missing witnesses or delay for which the defendant is primarily responsible – is not weighted against the State. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S. Ct. 2182[.]" ’ "

Horton, 369 So. 3d at 1132 (quoting Wilson v. State, 329 So. 3d 71, 77-78 (Ala. Crim. App. 2020), quoting in turn Ex parte Walker, 928 So. 2d 259, 265 (Ala. 2005)).

In this case, Quinnie argues that the State’s delay in prosecuting him was in part deliberate and in part negligent, but he also concedes that some of the delay was "not specifically attributable to either party." (Quinnie’s brief, p. 17.) According to Quinnie, the delay can be separated into four blocks of time, which he separates and categorizes as follows:

1. The delay that occurred from the date of his arrest to the date of his arraignment was negligent delay by the State.

2. The delay that occurred from the date of his arraignment to the date his murder trial concluded was "not specifically attributable to either party." According to Quinnie, this is so because both he and the State "were primarily focused during this time on preparing for and completing the trial and sentencing in the murder case." (Quinnie’s brief, p. 18.)

3. The delay that occurred from the date his murder trial concluded, when the State requested that this case be placed on the administrative docket, to the date the Alabama Supreme Court denied certiorari review of his murder conviction was deliberate delay by the State.

4. The delay that occurred after the Alabama Supreme Court denied certiorari review of his murder conviction was negligent delay by the State.

[9] We first note that this Court has held that a period of delay " ‘cannot be charged against the [S]tate as needless delay’ " when that period is "spent in clearing up … other pending charges."

Goodson v. State, 588 So. 2d 509, 511 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (quoting Kimberly v. State, 501 So. 2d 534, 536 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986)). See also McGregor v. State, 394 S.W.3d 90, 114 (Tex. App. 2012) ("The fact that the defendant is being prosecuted on other charges constitutes a valid reason for a delay in bringing him to trial on the charged offense at issue."). Here, from the date of Quinnie’s arrest through March 1, 2018, the State was actively prosecuting Quinnie for the more serious and unrelated charge of murder. Thus, none of that delay – a delay of approximately 19 and one-half months – is held against the State.

[10] Next, we disagree with Quinnie’s allegation that the State deliberately delayed this case during the time that the appeal of his murder conviction was pending, i.e., from March 1, 2018, to July 12, 2019. It is time, as Quinnie notes, that this delay occurred as a result of the State’s "volitional act" of requesting that the unlawful-possession-of-a-short-barreled-shot-gun...