Quinones v. Cnty. of Camden

ACHABE QUINONES, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF CAMDEN, DETECTIVES MATTHEW DIDOMENCIO COULTER, FESI, AND THE CURRENTLY UKNOWN AND UNNAMED CITY OF CAMDEN POLICE OFFICERS, Defendants.

Civ. No. 20-cv-3341(NLH/AMD)

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

February 10, 2023

APPEARANCES:

ANTHONY ARECHAVALA, ESQ.

LAW OFFICE OF ANTHONY ARECHAVALA, ESQ.

On behalf of Plaintiff Achabe Quinones

CHRISTOPHER J. O'CONNELL, ESQ.

SWEENY & SHEEHAN, P.C.

On behalf of Defendants County of Camden, Detectives Matthew DiDomencio, Andrew Coulter, and Robert Fesi

OPINION

NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.

Presently before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (ECF 29). For the reasons expressed below, the motion will be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is Achabe Quinones (“Plaintiff”), an individual. Defendants are Detective Matthew DiDomenico (“DiDomenico”), Detective Andrew Coulter (“Coulter”), Detective Robert Fesi (“Fesi”), and the County of Camden (collectively, “Defendants”). (Amended Complaint, ECF 6 at ¶ 3; Answer, ECF 7 at ¶ 3).

On March 28, 2018, Plaintiff was driving in Camden in a silver Infiniti owned by his sister. (ECF 6 at ¶ 4; Statement of Facts, ECF 36 at ¶¶ 1, 18; Response to Statement of Facts, ECF 38 at ¶¶ 1, 4). While driving he picked up an old friend Michael Gray (“Gray”). (Id.). They stopped at a McDonalds and bought food. (ECF 6 at ¶ 5). Around the same time and at the same McDonalds, the police were in the process of arresting Derrick Stephens (“Stephens”) for drug distribution having purchased drugs from him on several prior occasions and arranging to meet him at the McDonalds for another purchase and to arrest him. (ECF 36 at ¶¶ 16-18).

Fesi, and other officers running an undercover drug investigation, had communicated by voice and text with Stephens and, before that, with another suspected drug dealer, Jamal Parker (“Parker”) over a particular cellphone (collectively the “Parker/Stephens cellphone”). (Id. at ¶¶ 12-17). The investigation, spanning several weeks, had determined that while Parker used the “Parker/Stephens” cellphone first to conduct drug sales he later turned it over to Stephens to continue the sales to the Fesi-led undercover operation. (Id.). However, when Stephens was arrested, he had neither drugs nor the Parker/Stephens cellphone in his possession or in his car despite the fact the police had communicated with him right before his arrest. (ECF 29-5 at 17).

After leaving the McDonalds and proceeding a short distance, Defendants Coulter and Fesi stopped Plaintiff's car. (ECF 6 at ¶ 6). Plaintiff and his passenger, Gray, were asked to exit the vehicle. (Id.). Coulter and Fesi then searched both Plaintiff and Gray as well as the vehicle. (Id. at ¶ 7). Through this search, Coulter and Fesi discovered illegal narcotics in Gray's underwear and later, after a search warrant was obtained, $2,520 in the car's center console. (Id. at ¶ 8; ECF 36 at ¶¶ 20-21; ECF 38 at ¶¶ 20-21). Nothing was discovered on Plaintiff's person. (ECF 6 at ¶ 8).

Here, the versions of events between Plaintiff and Defendants take their first major diversion. The police report reciting the events of the investigation and arrests, prepared and dated in mid-April soon after the arrests, states that Coulter and Fesi discovered a cellphone in Plaintiff's car which the detectives called suspecting it was the Parker/Stephens cellphone. (ECF 29-5 at 19). According to the police report, a flip phone rang in the Infiniti when the police called the Parker/Stephens cellphone number and when it rang it displayed the name used by the detectives during the undercover operation. (Id.). To support this assertion, Defendants supply a call log showing a police call to the Parker/Stephens cell number shortly after Plaintiff's Infiniti was stopped. (ECF 29-7 at 3).

The police report further asserts that the flip phone was seized when Gray and Plaintiff were arrested. (ECF 29-5 at 19). Defendants allege that they were communicating with Gray via the Parker/Stephens by text and notably by voice to arrange a purchase of narcotics, and that Gray indicated in a voice call that he was in an “Infinity” sharing his concern with Defendant Fesi, acting undercover, about the police activity at the McDonalds. (Id. at 17-19; ECF 29-6 at 4). From this the Defendants contend that Plaintiff, in the same car with Gray, must have heard Gray's side of the conversation and had to know he was driving a drug dealer arranging for delivery of drugs. (ECF 29-1 at 11; ECF 36 at ¶ 18). Defendants point to the presence of Parker/Stephens cellphone in Plaintiff's car, and the implications that followed from that, as support for probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. (ECF 6 at ¶ 13; ECF 29-1 at 15-17; ECF 36 at ¶ 22).

Plaintiff alleges that Gray denies that he was communicating about a drug transaction while in the car with Plaintiff. (ECF 38 at ¶ 19). Plaintiff claims that the alleged cellphone was not in the car, nor was it ringing during the stop and search. (Id. at ¶ 22). He further asserts that Gray told him he needed a ride to a lawyer's office to pay a friend's legal bill and that he was merely giving a friend an innocent ride unaware that Gray was dealing drugs and the other goings-on at the McDonalds regarding Stephens. (Id. at ¶ 1).

Coulter and Fesi arrested both Gray and Plaintiff. (ECF 6 at ¶ 8). Plaintiff was charged with two third degree drug offenses for possession and possession with the intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense heroin in violation of N.J.S. 2C:35-10 A(1) and N.J.S. 2C:35-5B(3). (Id. at ¶ 14).

Plaintiff was held in jail for approximately 10 hours and released on his own recognizance. (Id. at ¶ 16). All charges against him were dismissed in May 2019. (Id. at ¶ 20).

Plaintiff was working as a firefighter when he was arrested, and was suspended pending the outcome of the criminal case. (Id. at ¶ 17). Plaintiff lost his salary and benefits during this time. (Id. at ¶ 18). Plaintiff paid legal costs and fees in retaining criminal counsel. (Id. at ¶ 19).

Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint on July 23, 2020, alleging (1) a false arrest and false imprisonment 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, (2) a malicious prosecution § 1983 claim, and a Monell claim. (ECF 6). Defendants filed an Answer on August 7, 2020. (ECF 7). On February 10, 2022 Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF 29). Plaintiff filed a response on March 17, 2022. (ECF 31). Defendants filed a reply on April 4, 2022. (ECF 34). On April 6, 2022, Defendants filed their Statement of Facts. (ECF 36). On April 26, 2022, Plaintiff filed his response to the Statement of Facts. (ECF 38).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate where the Court is satisfied that the materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations, admissions, or interrogatory answers, demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that given the undisputed facts the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).

A dispute about a material fact is “genuine” “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is “material” if, under the governing substantive law, a disputed fact may affect the outcome of the suit. Id. In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court may not make credibility determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence. Id. at 255. Instead, the non-moving party's evidence “is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id.

Initially, the moving party has the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party has met this burden, the burden shifts and the nonmoving party must identify specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. To withstand a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must identify specific facts and affirmative evidence that contradict those offered by the moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57. A party opposing summary judgment must do more than just rest upon mere allegations, general denials, or vague statements. Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2001).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

B. Probable Cause

Plaintiff asserts claims of false arrest and false imprisonment as well as malicious prosecution in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF 6 at ¶¶ 24-29). Defendants argue that they had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, and therefore his § 1983 claims must be dismissed. (ECF 29-1 at 17-18).

Section 1983 provides that “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution police may only make an arrest “upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “Probable cause exists if there is a ‘fair probability' that the person committed the crime at issue.” Wilson...