Quintanar v. Cnty. of Stanislaus

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EDUARDO QUINTANAR, Jr., Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF STANISLAUS, et al., Defendants.

No. 1:18-cv-01403-DJC-BAM

United States District Court, E.D. California

September 8, 2023

ORDER

HON DANIEL J. CALABRETTA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This action concerns Plaintiff's arrest and prosecution by Defendants in connection with the alleged murder of Korey Kauffman. Plaintiff raises a number of claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California state law based on his arrest and the investigation that preceded it. Presently before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss some of the claims raised in the Third Amended Complaint. (Defs.' Mot. (ECF No. 84).) For the reasons stated below Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. Background

Plaintiff, along with Daljit and Baljit Athwal, two local business owners with whom Plaintiff was friends, were arrested and charged in connection with the murder of Korey Kauffman. The Athwals' arrest was based on the theory that criminal defense attorney Frank Carson had hired them to murder Korey Kauffman. Plaintiff was arrested and charged as an accessory to murder and conspiracy to obstruct justice. These charges were allegedly false, and Plaintiff argues they were based on his refusal to falsely implicate the Athwals in a murder for hire scheme and the fact that he insulted Defendant Bunch on an illegally wiretapped phone. More broadly, Plaintiff claims that the case against himself, the Athwals, Carson, and others was the result of a conspiracy to retaliate against Carson for his actions as a defense attorney. Plaintiff has filed the present suit against both county and city Defendants based on the alleged violations of Plaintiff's federal civil rights as well as violations of California state law.

The Court previously partially granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and dismissed Plaintiff's complaint with leave to amend. After Plaintiff submitted a Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”), Defendants filed the present Motion to Dismiss.^[1]

II. Legal Standard on Motion to Dismiss

A party may move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The motion may be granted if the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or if there are insufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Godecke v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 937 F.3d 1201, 1208 (9th Cir. 2019). The Court assumes all factual allegations are true and construes them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Steinle v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 919 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2019). A complaint must plead “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). However, the Court must “draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Retail Prop. Tr. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 768 F.3d 938, 945 (9th Cir. 2014).

III. Allegations in the Complaint

In the Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff includes dozens of pages of detailed factual allegations which can be summarized as follows: Plaintiff Eduardo Quintanar, Jr. was arrested on August 15, 2015, and accused of involvement in a murder for hire scheme that resulted in the death of Korey Kauffman, who had been reported missing in April 2012.^[2] (TAC at 6.) The arrest was predicated on a theory that attorney Frank Carson had solicited Baljit Athwal, Dalji Athwal, and their employee Robert Woody to murder Kauffman. (Id.) Carson was “reviled by many in law enforcement” as well as the Stanislaus County District Attorney's office (“SCDA”). (Id.) Quintanar was friends with the Athwals but otherwise had no connection to the investigation and did not know Carson. (Id.) When questioned, Quintanar “refused to give a false statement to implicate the Athwals in the murder for hire scheme” and he was later charged as an accessory to murder after he “insulted Defendant [Bunch] in an illegally wiretapped phone call . . . .” (Id.)

On April 4, 2012, shortly after Kauffman's disappearance, Defendant Kirk Bunch filed a report about a conversation with Michael Cooley, Carson's neighbor and purportedly the last person to see Kauffman alive. (Id. at 7.) In Defendant Bunch's report, Cooley “sought to implicate Carson” in Kauffman's death. (Id.) After prosecutors learned of the potential link between Carson and Kauffman's disappearance, the SCDA “[s]uddenly . . . became very interested in this missing person case.” (Id.)

Defendants Harris and Birgit Fladager created a task force to investigate Kauffman's disappearance. (Id.) Defendant Fladager supervised the investigation team which included Defendants Bunch, Jacobson, Cory Brown, and Jon Evers. (Id. at 8.) Defendant Harris was also originally responsible for supervising these defendants but was later replaced by Defendant Marlissa Ferreira after Defendant Harris “was accused of jury tampering and contempt of court in a case he had with Carson as [opposing] counsel.” (Id.)

During the investigation, Plaintiff was never accused by any witness of involvement in a crime. (Id. at 9.) Multiple other suspects were disregarded and exculpatory evidence was not disclosed to the judge who signed Plaintiff's arrest warrants. (Id. at 9-13.) As part of the investigation, Defendants Bunch, Jacobson, and Evers conducted a seven-hour interrogation of Robert Woody after he was recorded saying he had killed Kauffman. (Id. at 13-14.) Defendants Bunch, Jacobson, and Evers informed Woody of the theory involving Carson and Plaintiff and pressured Woody despite him repeatedly denying “any involvement in, or knowledge of, the Kauffman murder . . . .” (Id. at 1 3.) Woody was threatened with the death penalty and life in prison, and told he had an opportunity to implicate others in the murder. (Id at 1314.) During the interrogation, Woody took a 20-minute bathroom break, accompanied by Defendants Bunch and Jacobson. (Id. at 14.) This period was not recorded and when Woody returned, he repeated back part of the theory that Bunch, Jacobson, and Evers had told him previously: “that [Woody's] employers, Baljit Athwal and Daljit Athwal had murdered Kauffman and that they did it because they were asked by Carson to watch over his property for thieves.” (Id.) Defendants Bunch, Jacobson, and Evers conducted several additional interviews with Woody over the next two years during which they reinforced what Woody had told them. (Id. at 1 520.) Woody eventually recanted his confession on April 24, 2014, and passed a polygraph stating that he had nothing to do with Kauffman's murder. (Id. at 20.)

On August 13, 2015, Defendant Brown submitted a Ramey Warrant for Plaintiff's arrest. (Id. at 21.) The preparation of this warrant request was “a ‘group consensus' between [Defendant Brown] and Defendants Fladager, Ferreira, Bunch, Evers, and Jacobson on what charges to seek and what facts to include (and exclude) in the warrant.” (Id.) The ultimate warrant was a 325-page “unorganized, rambling document” that failed to establish probable cause. (Id.) The arrest warrant also contained a number of “fabrications, material omissions[,] and misleading statements.” (Id. at 22-25.)

After Plaintiff's arrest, he was charged with conspiracy to obstruct justice and as an accessory to Kauffman's murder. (Id. at 2.) “A preliminary hearing began on October 13, 2015, and continued for 18 months, one of the longest in California history.” (Id. at 25) The charges against Plaintiff were eventually dismissed on October 24, 2017, by Superior Court Judge Barbara Zuniga “for total lack of evidentiary support.” (Id. at 26.)

IV. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

A. Claims That Plaintiff Concedes Should be Dismissed

As an initial matter, in response to Defendants' motion, Plaintiff concedes two categories of claims should be dismissed.

First, Defendants argue that Plaintiff improperly brought suit against Defendants in their official capacity as the Court previously dismissed these claims as redundant to Plaintiff's claims against Stanislaus County. (Defs.' Mot. at 2-3.) In their opposition, Plaintiff concedes that these official claims are improper and state they were included due to a “drafting error.” (Pl.'s Opp'n (ECF No. 90) at 3.) Plaintiff states these claims are no longer being asserted by the Plaintiff. (Id.) Accordingly, claims against Fladager, Harris, Ferreira, Bunch, Jacobson, and Brown in their official capacities are dismissed.

Second, Defendants argue in their motion that Defendants Fladager and Harris are not proper parties to a Monell municipal liability claim. (Defs.' Mot. at 8.) In the opposition, Plaintiff also concedes this point and voluntarily dismiss the claims against Fladager and Harris based on municipal liability. (Pl.'s Opp'n at 3.) Accordingly, these claims are also dismissed.

B. Timeliness of Plaintiff's Judicial Deception and False Imprisonment and False Arrest Claims against Defendants Fladager, Harris, and Ferreira

In their motion, Defendants argue that two sets of claims are not timely under the requisite statute of limitations: Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment judicial deception claims against Defendants Fladager, Harris, and Ferreira; and Plaintiff's false arrest and false imprisonment claims against these same Defendants. Plaintiff initially contends that his claims are timely under the Heck rule for accrual. To the extent that these claims are not timely or the Heck rule does not apply, Plaintiff argues that statutory and equitable tolling apply. The Court will first determine the date each set of claims was accrued, and then determine whether are subject to tolling.

1. Accrual...