Quintanilla v. Suffolk Paving Corp.

NELSON QUINTANILLA, ALEJANDRO AMAYA,ALEX AMIR AREVALO, MAYNOR FAJARDO,WALTER GARCIA, JOSE L. MARTINEZ, PRACELIS MENDEZ,OSMAR W. PAGOADA, JAVIER QUINTANILLA, EDVIN RIVERA, CARLOS ESCALANTE,KEVIN GALEANO, LERLY NOE RODRIGUEZ,JOSE VEGA CASTILLO, JUAN QUINTEROS, and MARCOS TUILIO PEREZ, Plaintiffs, v. SUFFOLK PAVING CORP., SUFFOLK ASPHALT CORP. LOUIS VECCHIA,CHRISTOPHER VECCHIA, HELENE VECCHIA and JOHN DOES 1-5, Defendants.

CV 09-5331 (AKT)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

February 22, 2019

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

A. KATHLEEN TOMLINSON, Magistrate Judge:

In a prior short-form Electronic Order, the Court notified counsel that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was granted, in part, and denied, in part, and that the Court would be issuing a full written decision. This Memorandum Decision and Order constitutes the full written decision.

I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

This wage and hour action is brought by a group of 16 laborers, operating engineers, and/or mechanics currently or formerly employed by the Suffolk Paving Corporation and Suffolk Asphalt Corporation, a paving company based on Long Island. The 16 Plaintiffs, namely, Nelson Quintanilla, Alejandro Amaya, Alex Amir Arevalo, Maynor Fajardo, Walter Garcia, Jose L. Martinez, Pracelis Mendez, Osmar W. Pagoada, Javier Quintanilla, Edvin Rivera, Carlos Escalante, Kevin Galeano, Lerly Noe Rodriguez, Jose Vega Castillo, Juan Quinteros, and Marcos Tulio Perez (collectively, the "Plaintiffs") allege that Defendants Suffolk Paving Corporation and Suffolk Asphalt Corporation, through owners and operators Louis Vecchia, Christopher Vecchia, and Helene Vecchia and John Does 1-5 (collectively, the "Defendants"), failed to pay them their full wages, including overtime compensation, and falsely reported the hours they worked in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and the New York Labor Law ("NYLL"). Several of these Plaintiffs further claim that they complained about these unlawful practices and were consequently retaliated against by being terminated from employment, having their unemployment benefits denied, and being subjected to retaliatory litigation in state court. In addition, Plaintiffs allege that they were not compensated with the prevailing wage on various jobs as mandated by the NYLL. Alternatively, if the Court finds that Defendants did not violate the FLSA/NYLL, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants should be held liable for breach of contract, quantum meruit and unjust enrichment for their unpaid wages.

Defendants have moved for summary judgment pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). In their motion, Defendants argue that: (1) individually-named Defendant Helene Vecchia must be dismissed since she does not meet the definition of "employer" under the FLSA; (2) Plaintiff Alex Amir Arevalo must be dismissed because he was not an "employee" of Defendants under the FLSA; (3) Plaintiffs were paid in accordance with the FLSA and NYLL as reflected in employer records; (4) Defendants' "good faith" opposition to certain Plaintiffs' unemployment insurance applications and the filing of lawsuits to recover unpaid debts did not amount to unlawful retaliation against the Plaintiffs; (5) Plaintiffs lack standing to assert claims forviolations of the New York State prevailing wage; (6) Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim fails to identify the contractual provisions at issue and, in any event, is preempted by the FLSA; and, finally, (7) Plaintiffs' quantum meruit and unjust enrichment claims necessarily fail since the Plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law. Ultimately, Defendants maintain that no material issues of fact exist which would warrant the denial of their motion.

Plaintiffs oppose the motion and contend that there are indeed material issues of fact which remain to be resolved by a finder of fact. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that: (1) Defendant Helene Vecchia is an "employer" within the meaning of the FLSA because she exercised the requisite control over the terms and conditions of Plaintiffs' employment; (2) Plaintiff Alex Arevalo meets the definition of "employee" under the FLSA because he rendered services to the Defendants; (3) Plaintiffs' claims of unlawful retaliation must survive since material issues of fact exist sufficient to deny summary judgment; (4) the Defendants intentionally underreported Plaintiffs' hours resulting in violations of the FLSA and NYLL; (5) Plaintiffs' have standing to sue for violations of the prevailing wage under New York law; and (6) Plaintiffs' common law claims of breach of contract, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment should survive since they are asserted in the alternative to the Plaintiffs' claims under the FLSA and NYLL. In their Reply, Defendants maintain Plaintiffs' opposition demonstrates that "no significant issues of fact exist warranting a trial." As such, Defendants argue that the Court should grant their motion and dismiss this action in its entirety.

The Court has considered the Declaration of Saul D. Zabell, Esq. and Steven Pinks, Esq. in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Zabell/Pinks Decl.") [DE 141], Defendants' Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Material Facts Which are Not in Dispute ("Defs.'Rule 56.1 Stat.") [DE 142], Defendants' Local Rule 56.1(d) Statement of Additional Material Issues of Fact,¹ Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defs.' Mem.") [DE 143], Defendants' Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defs.' Reply"),² Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Pls.' Opp'n") [DE 148], Plaintiffs' Counterstatement of Facts Pursuant to Rule 56.1 ("Pls.' Rule 56.1 Stat.") [DE 149], the Affirmation in Opposition of Ian Wallace ("Wallace Aff.") [DE 150], as well as the applicable law, and hereby GRANTS the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, in part, and DENIES the motion, in part.

II. BACKGROUND FACTS

The following facts are drawn from the pleadings, Defendants' Rule 56.1 Statement and Plaintiffs' Rule 56.1 Counterstatement, the Zabell/Pinks Declaration, the Wallace Affirmation, the Vecchia Affidavit, and the memoranda of law in support of or in opposition to the instant summary judgment motion. The material facts cited below are undisputed unless otherwisenoted. In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court construes the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Beyer v. Cnty. of Nassau, 524 F.3d 160, 163 (2d Cir. 2008); Capobianco v. New York, 422 F.3d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 2001).

A. The Third Amended Complaint

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Suffolk Paving Corporation ("SPC") and Suffolk Asphalt Corporation ("SAC") are Long Island-based paving contractors for private entities and also for the State of New York and the federal government. See Third Amended Complaint ("Compl.") [DE 115] ¶ 14. Defendants SPC and SAC are "related entities" which are "jointly managed by Louis Vecchia and other Defendants" and possess a "common place of business" as well as a "common managerial and ownership structure." Compl. ¶ 16. SAC is "nominally owned" by Christopher Vecchia, notwithstanding the fact that Louis Vecchia "retains ultimate managerial, administrative and financial oversight and control over this entity as well as other entities under his ownership." Id. ¶ 18. The Complaint asserts that "Defendant Louis Vecchia has retained direct and ultimate managerial oversight of Suffolk Paving, Suffolk Asphalt and all entities owned by him in the business of paving, including hiring and firing decisions, labor relations and financial control." Id. ¶ 19. Louis Vecchia is the Chairman and/or Chief Operating Officer of SPC. Id. ¶ 22. Defendant Christopher Vecchia became President of SPC in or around 2006. Id. ¶ 26. According to the Plaintiffs, "Defendant Helene Vecchia has been responsible for making decisions and implementing policies on behalf of Suffolk Paving, Suffolk Asphalt and its related entities that have affected Plaintiffs; had the power to hire and fire Plaintiffs and their co-workers; determined the rate and method by which Plaintiffs were paid; and/or controlled and maintained Plaintiffs' employment records, including time sheets and pay schedules." Id. ¶ 28.

Plaintiffs claim that Defendants have "intentionally vastly underpaid Plaintiffs' wages throughout their employment, which for some Plaintiffs spans an eleven year period." Id. ¶ 31. Plaintiffs' titles and employment dates with SPC, SAC or their related entities are described in Section II.B., infra. According to the Complaint, Plaintiffs did not receive a significant amount of their wages, including overtime compensation. Plaintiff Nelson Quintanilla was hired as a laborer by SPC and/or SAC and/or its related entities³ in 1998 and worked for the Defendants until 2003. Id. ¶ 32. He returned to SPC in or around March 2004 and worked for the Defendants until June 2006. Id. Nelson Quintanilla again returned to SPC in March 2007 and worked there until August 2011 when Plaintiffs allege that he was discharged by Louis Vecchia. Id. Nelson Quintanilla claims that he was not paid "most of his wages, including overtime wages" during his employment with Defendants. Id.

Plaintiff Alex Amir Arevalo was employed as a mechanic for SPC and/or SAC and/or its related entities from February 15, 2006 to August 25, 2009. Id. ¶ 34. Plaintiff Maynor Fajardo worked as an operating engineer from August 21, 1998 until his termination on September 15, 2009. Id. ¶ 35. Plaintiff Walter Garcia was employed as a laborer from March 15, 2001 to August 2003, and from June 2005 until January 2007. Id. ¶ 36. He returned to work in April 2008 and remained until December 17, 2009. Id. Jose Martinez worked as a laborer for SPC from July 6, 2004 to July 15, 2008. Id. ¶ 37. Plaintiff Pracelis Mendez was employed as an operating engineer in 1998 and from 2001 until ...