Quintero v. Covello

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DANIEL RODRIGUEZ QUINTERO, Petitioner, v. PATRICK COVELLO, Warden, Respondent.^[1]

No. 22cv1625 RSH (MSB)

United States District Court, S.D. California

September 17, 2024

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Hon Robert S. Huie United States District Judge

Daniel Rodriguez Quintero (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his judgment of conviction in San Diego County Superior Court. ECF No. 1. In the sole claim in the Petition, Petitioner contends the trial court violated and obstructed his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation when it denied Petitioner's request for advisory counsel to assist him in proceeding pro per. Id. at 4, 32-50, 81-97.^[2] Respondent has filed a Response and also lodged portions of the state court record. ECF Nos. 12, 13, 22, 24. Petitioner has filed a Traverse.^[3] ECF No. 18. For the reasons below, the Court denies the Petition and denies a Certificate of Appealability.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. State Trial Court Proceedings

By an Indictment filed on October 16, 2018 in San Diego County Superior Court case number SCS303737, Petitioner was charged with the following: one count of murder in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 187(a), along with two special circumstance allegations, the first, that the murder was committed during the commission and attempted commission of kidnapping within the meaning of Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17) and the second, that the murder was intentional and involved the infliction of torture within the meaning of Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(18) (count one); one count of kidnap for ransom, reward or extortion in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 209(a) with an additional allegation that the victim suffered bodily harm and death within the meaning of Cal. Penal Code § 209(a) (count two); and one count of torture in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 206 with the allegation that Petitioner inflicted great bodily injury within the meaning of Cal. Penal Code § 12022.7. ECF No. 13-1 at 9-10.

On June 29, 2020, after a jury trial, a San Diego County jury found Petitioner guilty of all three charged counts, found true both special circumstance allegations as to count one, and found true both the bodily harm allegation as to count two and the great bodily injury allegation as to count three. ECF No. 13-2 at 184-86. On September 16, 2020, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to life in prison without the possibility of parole on counts one and two, life with the possibility of parole on count three, and stayed the sentences on the special circumstance allegations. Id. at 118.

B. Appeal and Petition for Review

Petitioner appealed his judgment of conviction to the California Court of Appeal, challenging the trial court's denial of his request for advisory counsel (the sole claim presented in the instant Petition) and additionally requesting the removal of any unpaid portion of a recently vacated administrative fee from his judgment. ECF No. 13-9. On May 11, 2022, the California Court of Appeal modified the judgment to vacate any unpaid portion of the administrative fee and affirmed the judgment of conviction in all other respects. ECF No. 13-11. Petitioner thereafter filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court again challenging the trial court's denial of his request for advisory counsel (the claim presented here), which on August 10, 2022, the California Supreme Court denied in a decision that stated: “The petition for review is denied.” ECF Nos. 13-12; 13-13.

C. Federal Habeas Petition

On October 17, 2022, Petitioner filed a federal habeas Petition in the Eastern District of California, which on October 19, 2022, was ordered to be transferred to this District. ECF Nos. 1, 4. On May 12, 2023, Respondent filed an Answer and lodged portions of the state court record. ECF Nos. 12, 13. On August 18, 2023, Petitioner filed a Traverse. ECF No. 18. On March 8, 2024, and March 12, 2024, in response to the assigned Magistrate Judge's Order requiring supplemental lodgments, Respondent lodged additional portions of the state court record [ECF Nos. 22, 24], and on July 19, 2024, the assigned Magistrate Judge ordered the Clerk to file under seal a Marsden hearing transcript provided by the California Court of Appeal [ECF Nos. 25, 26]. On August 9, 2024, the assigned Magistrate Judge granted in part Petitioner's request to file additional materials under seal, ordering additional Marsden hearing transcripts to be filed under seal. ECF Nos. 27-31.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“The statutory authority of federal courts to issue habeas corpus relief for persons in state custody is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 97 (2011). Under 28 USCS § 2254(d), a federal habeas petitioner cannot obtain federal habeas relief on a claim that the state court adjudicated on the merits unless the petitioner is first able to show that the state court adjudication: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or “(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Id. at 9798 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2)).

A decision is “contrary to” clearly established law if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000). A decision involves an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law if “the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle . . . but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.” Id.; Bruce v. Terhune, 376 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 2004). With respect to section 2254(d), “[t]he question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable-a substantially higher threshold.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 410). “State-court factual findings, moreover, are presumed correct; the petitioner has the burden of rebutting the presumption by ‘clear and convincing evidence.'” Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338-39 (2006) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)).

“A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 101 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).

“If this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be. As amended by AEDPA, § 2254(d) stops short of imposing a complete bar on federal court relitigation of claims already rejected in state proceedings. It preserves authority to issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with [the Supreme] Court's precedents.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 102 (citation omitted).

Additionally, even in a situation where section 2254(d) is satisfied or does not apply, a reviewing habeas court must still determine whether the petitioner has established a federal constitutional violation. See Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119 (2007) (§ 2254(d) “sets forth a precondition to the grant of habeas relief . . . not an entitlement to it.”); see also Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735-36 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). By statute, federal courts “shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added).

In a federal habeas action, “[t]he petitioner carries the burden of proof.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011), citing Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002) (per curiam). Even so, “[p]risoner pro se pleadings are given the benefit of liberal construction.” Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)).

III. ANALYSIS

Petitioner raises a single ground in his Petition, Claim 1, contending the trial court violated and obstructed his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation when it denied his request for advisory counsel to assist him in proceeding pro per.^[4]

A. State Appellate Court Decision

Petitioner previously raised Claim 1 in a petition for review filed in the California Supreme Court, which that court denied without a statement of reasoning or citation to authority. See ECF Nos. 13-12, 13-13. Petitioner also previously presented Claim 1 to the California Court of Appeal on direct appeal, which that court denied in a reasoned opinion. See ECF Nos. 13-9, 13-11. The Court “looks through” the California Supreme Court's silent denial to the reasoned opinion issued by the California Court of Appeal as to this claim. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991) (“The essence of unexplained orders is that they say nothing. We think that a presumption which gives them no effect- which simply ‘looks through' them to the last reasoned decision-most nearly reflects the role they are ordinarily intended to play.”) (footnote omitted).^[5]

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