Quiroz v. Empirian Vill. of Md., LLC

SOU MIGUEL QUIROZ, Plaintiff, v. EMPIRIAN VILLAGE OF MARYLAND, LLC, Defendant.

Civil No. 8:21-cv-02638-AAQ

United States District Court, D. Maryland, Southern Division

May 3, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Ajmel A. Quereshi, United States Magistrate Judge

This is a dispute over the end of an employment relationship between Plaintiff Miguel Quiroz (“Plaintiff”) and Defendant Empirian Village of Maryland, LLC (“Empirian”). Mr. Quiroz alleges that Empirian the Maryland based owner of the Franklin Park at Greenbelt Station Apartments, violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17, by retaliating and racially discriminating against him, and intentionally and negligently causing him emotional distress. Defendant seeks to dismiss Plaintiff's racial discrimination and emotional distress claims, but does not challenge Plaintiff's retaliation claim. This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

For the reasons discussed below, Defendant's Motion shall be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

Background

Empirian maintains a residential property known as the Franklin Park at Greenbelt Station Apartments in Greenbelt, Maryland (the “Property”).^[1] (Compl., ECF No. 1, at ¶ 5). Plaintiff was hired as the Turns Supervisor in the maintenance department of the Property in December 2018. (Id.). In this role, Plaintiff was responsible for ensuring vacated apartments met appropriate standards for leasing to new tenants. (Id. at ¶ 6). In April 2020, Brad Anderson, a white man, became the maintenance manager and Plaintiff's direct supervisor. (Id. at ¶ 8). Mr. Anderson reported directly to Gail Comfort Empirian's Vice President of Operations at Franklin Park. (Id. at ¶ 9).

On or about June 29, 2020, Plaintiff alleges he spoke with an unidentified woman (the “Woman”) providing cleaning services at the Property through a third-party contractor. According to Plaintiff, the Woman reported being subject to sexually harassing behavior by Plaintiff's supervisor, Brad Anderson, including being followed around the Property and having been sent unsolicited text messages. (Id. at ¶¶ 10-12).

On the morning of June 30, 2020, Plaintiff reported the Woman's concerns to Mr. Anderson. (Id. at ¶ 15). Later that day, Ms. Comfort - Mr. Anderson's direct supervisor -contacted Plaintiff, ordering him to produce the Woman the following day. (Id. at ¶ 16).

On July 1, 2020, the Woman, Plaintiff and Ms. Comfort met in person. (Id. at ¶ 17). During this meeting, Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Comfort informed him that he had a “history” and therefore should not report issues of sexual harassment. (Id. at ¶ 18). Ms Comfort also allegedly expressed concern regarding the accuracy of the Woman's allegations against Mr. Anderson. (Id. at ¶ 19).

On July 2, 2020, Ms. Comfort terminated Plaintiff's employment with Empirian. (Id. at ¶ 20). Plaintiff alleges that before that day, “Defendant never informed [him] that his job was in jeopardy[.]” (Id. at ¶ 22).

On October 14, 2021, Plaintiff filed the present lawsuit raising the claims described above. On November 12, 2021, Defendant filed the motion to dismiss presently before the Court.

Standard of Review

Fed. R Civ. P. 12(b) provides that a party may move to dismiss claims where there is “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court considers whether a complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The court will consider whether the plaintiff has pled factual content allowing reasonable inferences to be drawn that the defendant is “liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The plaintiff need not plead facts that are probable, but must present facts showcasing more than a “sheer possibility” that the conduct perpetuated by a defendant is unlawful. Id. Indeed, Plaintiff has an obligation to provide more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Pleadings that present “no more than conclusions” will not be “entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

Discussion

Defendant asks the Court to dismiss three of Plaintiff's claims. Although I find that dismissal is proper regarding Plaintiff's claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, Defendant's arguments regarding Plaintiff's claim for racial discrimination are unavailing.

A. Racial Discrimination in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

Count II of Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that Defendant unlawfully discriminated against Plaintiff in his employment on the basis of his race. In order to plead a prima facia case of discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the Plaintiff must allege: (i) membership in a protected class; (ii) satisfactory job performance; (iii) adverse employment action; and (iv) different treatment from similarly situated employees outside the protected class. Coleman v. Maryland Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190(4th Cir. 2010). Defendant asserts that Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead elements (ii) and (iv), namely that Plaintiff was performing his job in a satisfactory manner and that employees outside his protected class, similarly situated, received differential treatment. For the reasons discussed below, I find Defendant's specific arguments challenging these elements to be unavailing.

1. Plaintiff Has Sufficiently Pled Facts from which Satisfactory Job Performance Can Be Inferred.

Plaintiff must plead facts from which the Court can infer that “‘at the time of [his] dismissal, [he] was performing [his] job in a way that met the legitimate expectations of [the defendant].'” Ramseur v. Concentrix CVG Customer Management Group Inc., 467 F.Supp.3d 316, 324 (W.D. N.C. 2020) (quoting Reid v. Dalco Nonwovens, LLC, 154 F.Supp.3d 273, 285 (W.D. N.C. 2016)). Employees are not required to show that they are “perfect or model” employees. Haynes v. Waste Connections, Inc., 922 F.3d 219, 225 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting Warch v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 435 F.3d 510, 515-16 (4th Cir. 2006)).

Plaintiff pleads that he was never informed by Defendant “that his job was in jeopardy prior to his termination...” (ECF No. 1, at ¶ 22). Based on this allegation, a reasonable inference can be made that Plaintiff was performing his job satisfactorily. It is reasonable to infer that if an employee has been performing his job for almost eighteen months without being informed it was at risk, he had been performing satisfactorily. Had his performance been less than satisfactory, it can reasonably be inferred his employer would have informed him of such and the resulting consequences at some point over the course of his eighteen months working there. Courts, drawing similar inferences based on similarly brief allegations, have found that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged satisfactory job performance at the motion to dismiss stage. See Parker v. Children's National Medical Center, Inc., No. ELH-20-3523, 2021 WL 5840949, at *10 (D. Md. Dec. 9, 2021) (finding that where plaintiff asserted that she was “abruptly” fired and defendant “did not identify any particular deficiencies in plaintiffs' job performance” plaintiff had alleged satisfactory job performance); Mason v. Sun Recycling, LLC, No. GLS-18-2060, 2020 WL 1151046, at *1 (D. Md. Mar. 9, 2020) (“While Plaintiff does not affirmatively state that his performance was satisfactory, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Sun Recycling initially fired him ostensibly for throwing the rock, yet it then rehired him roughly two weeks later without explanation. The reasonable inference is that his job performance was satisfactory[.]”); Tafazolli v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, No. PWG-19-321 & PWG-19-1638, 2020 WL 7027456, at *12 (D. Md. Nov. 30, 2020) (finding that Plaintiff had sufficiently pled satisfactory performance where facts alleged were brief).

To require Plaintiff to specifically allege that “he was performing his job in a satisfactory manner”, as Defendant argues (Mem. of Points and Authorities in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 9-1, at 3), would elevate form over substance. See Schwenke v. Ass'n of Writers & Writing Programs, 510 F.Supp.3d 331, 336 (D. Md. 2021) (rejecting Defendant's sole argument for dismissal which gave “‘unlawful pretext' and ‘but for' undue, talismanic qualities by treating the absence of these words as fatal to Plaintiff's claims.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). It would require a plaintiff to use a particular phrase in place of the baseline facts which are directly within his knowledge - in this case, that he was unaware that his job was at risk. In fact, courts have dismissed plaintiffs' claims where they pled precisely what Defendant asks and nothing more. See Johnson v. United Parcel Service, Inc., No. RDB-14-4003, 2015 WL 4040419, at *9 (D. Md. June 30, 2015) (“Although she alleges that, [d]uring all relevant times of the Complaint, Plaintiff performed her duties in a satisfactory manner, ” such conclusory statements do not permit the plaintiff's claim to “rise above speculation.”) (internal citations omitted).

Defendant presents a single case in support of its position. (Def.'s Reply Mem., ECF No. 15, at 2) (citing Sauer v. SKICO, Inc., No. 3:06-CV-470-RLM, 2008 WL 833145, at *6 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 27, 2008)). The case is easily distinguishable in that the plaintiff in that case conceded his failure to follow his employer's “explicit directions.” Id. at *6. Mr. Quiroz has made no such concession here. In addition to these limitations, the case is of limited...