R.N. v. Travis Unified Sch. Dist.

599 F.Supp.3d 973

R.N., a minor, BY AND THROUGH her Guardian ad Litem; Nicole NEFF, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.TRAVIS UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:20-cv-00562-KJM-EFB

United States District Court, E.D. California.

Signed April 25, 2022

Khaldoun Baghdadi, Douglas S. Saeltzer, Valerie Nicole Rose, Walkup, Melodia, Kelly & Schoenberger, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiffs.

Megan M. Symonds, Cody Lee Saal, Edrington, Schirmer & Murphy, LLP, Pleasant Hill, CA, for Defendants Travis Unified School District, Solano County Office of Education, Christopher Mears.

Lynn A. Garcia, Sean M. Speciale, Spinelli Donald & Nott, Sacramento, CA, for Defendant Lilia Gumapas.

ORDER

Kimberly J. Mueller, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the court on two separate defense motions to dismiss claims involving alleged physical and psychological abuse of a minor by a paraeducator at her school. Defendants Travis Unified School District (TUSD), Solano County Office of Education (SCOE) and Special Education Teacher Christopher Mears (Mears) (collectively, District defendants) move to dismiss eight of plaintiffs’ nine claims. District Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (District MPA) at 5, ECF No. 34-1.¹ Defendant Lilia Gumapas moves to dismiss five of plaintiffs’ six claims.² Gumapas Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (Gumapas MPA ISO MTD) at 5, ECF No. 33-1. Plaintiffs minor R.N. and her parents Nicole Neff and Chris Neff (Mr. and Ms. Neff) oppose both motions to dismiss. Pls.’ Opp'n to District MTD (District Opp'n), ECF No. 40; Pls.’ Opp'n to Gumapas MTD (Gumapas Opp'n), ECF No. 39. District defendants have replied. District Reply, ECF No. 42; Gumapas Reply, ECF No. 43. The court submitted the motions without oral argument. See ECF No. 41. For the reasons below, the court denies in part and grants in part defendants’ motions .

I. BACKGROUND

A detailed history of this case and plaintiffs’ fundamental allegations, which remain the same, are set out in the court's December 8, 2020 order dismissing the complaint with leave to amend. See generally Previous Order (Dec. 8, 2020), ECF No. 27. The court thus briefly reviews and summarizes the allegations in the operative second amended complaint here.

Plaintiff R.N., a minor diagnosed with autism, Smith Lemli Optiz Syndrome (SLO), dyspraxia,³ and other intellectual disabilities, attended the Center Elementary School (CES) in Solano County during the 2017–2018 and 2018–2019 school years. SAC ¶¶ 24–25, ECF No. 9. R.N.’s disabilities entitled her to receive special education services and support under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Id. ¶ 24. Defendants Mears and Gumapas served as R.N.’s teacher and paraeducator, respectively. Id. ¶ 25. While R.N. was assigned to Mears’ classroom, plaintiffs allege R.N. "was subjected to ongoing physical and psychological abuse by Gumapas as a form of corporal punishment and/or behavior coercion ...." Id. ¶ 26. This abuse includes incidents occurring on November 14, 2018, wherein Gumapas kicked, grabbed, pushed, dragged, pinned, or pulled R.N., while also verbally assaulting her. Id. ¶ 27.

Following the November 14 incidents, SCOE Principal of Special Education Ilah Feeney (Feeney) reported Gumapas’ misconduct to the Fairfield Police Department (FPD). Id. ¶ 34.⁴ The "police investigation revealed that [school] staff made reports about Gumapas’ misconduct prior to November 14" to school leadership, including reporting Gumapas’ pinching of students, verbally insulting them, kicking a student, pulling students, pinning students into their seats and one to a fence, being "very hands on" or "too physical" with students, holding students by their clothing, patting a student's butt "to get them to stand up," and tapping students on their mouths. Id. ¶¶ 28, 36. Unlike plaintiff's first amended complaint, the second amended complaint alleges this specific misconduct identified in the police report. Id. The complaint also avers Mears and multiple paraeducators in his classroom provided written reports and emails to Feeney documenting Gumapas’ "ongoing mistreatment of students in her care including R.N. ..." Id. ¶ 28. Plaintiffs further allege this misconduct occurred on various dates between September 18 and October 30, 2018, and that at least one other teacher told Mears she "was concerned for the safety of students" under Gumapas’ care. Id. ¶¶ 28, 29.

Ten claims remain in the second amended complaint: (1) violation of Constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; (2) violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA); (3) violation of the federal Rehabilitation Act; (4) negligence; (5) negligent hiring, supervision, or retention of an employee; (6) battery; (7) discrimination in violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act; (8) violation of the mandatory reporting duty; (9) discrimination in violation of the Bane Act; and (10) intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). Id. ¶¶ 64–209. All claims, except for the § 1983 and battery claims, are the subject of at least one pending motion. See District MPA ISO MTD at 2; see also Gumapas MPA ISO MTD at 2.

In December 2020, this court granted defendants’ prior motions to dismiss, with leave to amend all but one claim. See generally Previous Order (Dec. 8, 2020). In the order, the court observed that citations in a future amended complaint to transcripts of body camera footage from the FPD's investigation of Gumapas could cure some deficiencies in the complaint. Id.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may move to dismiss a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." A court may dismiss "based on the lack of cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't , 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

Although a complaint need contain only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), in order to survive a motion to dismiss this short and plain statement "must contain sufficient factual matter ... to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). A complaint must include something more than "an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation" or " ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.’ " Id. (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). Determining whether a complaint will survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Ultimately, the inquiry focuses on the interplay between the factual allegations of the complaint and the dispositive issues of law in the action. See Hishon v. King & Spalding , 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984).

In making this context-specific evaluation, this court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept as true the factual allegations of the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 93–94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007). This rule does not apply to " ‘a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,’ " Papasan v. Allain , 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) quoted in Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, nor to "allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice" or to material attached to or incorporated by reference into the complaint. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors , 266 F.3d 979, 988–89 (9th Cir. 2001).

III. ANALYSIS

A. District Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

District defendants contend the court should dismiss plaintiffs’ case for: (1) failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act; (2) the failure of plaintiffs Nicole and Chris Neff's to allege sufficient facts to state a cause of action against the district for negligence or negligent hiring, supervision, or retention; (3) failure of plaintiffs’ Unruh Civil Rights Act claim as a matter of law; (4) failure to state a claim for relief for a violation of mandatory reporting duty under California Penal Code section 11166 ; (5) failure of plaintiffs’ Bane Act claim to state any facts that the District or its employees threatened, intimidated, coerced or interfered with R.N.’s public education rights; (6) and plaintiffs’ failure to allege facts sufficient to state a claim of IIED against Mears. District MPA ISO MTD at 5–6. Mears also moves to dismiss plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages. Id.

The court addresses each of these arguments in turn.

1. ADA (Second Cause of Action) and Rehabilitation Act (Third Cause of Action): TUSD and SCOE

Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint includes an allegation that the district "failed to comply with the provisions of R.N.’s [individualized education plan] requiring that they provide R.N. with an Augmentative and Alternative Communication device (AAC) to aid her in communicating at school." SAC ¶ 38. R.N.’s inability to communicate "significantly increased her frustration, limited her access to the educational benefits and opportunities she was entitled to, excluded R.N. from participation in and denied her the benefits of available services, programs and activities." Id. Plaintiffs allege the District was "aware for weeks that R.N.’s AAC device was inoperable but they failed to repair it or to provide R.N. with a replacement AAC device that worked." Id. ¶ 104. They further allege R.N.’s frustration manifested "in increased maladaptive behaviors," which caused Gumapas to respond "in anger" and "physically abus[e] R.N." Id.

The District objects to...