A. R. v. State Bd. of Educ.

1

A.R., on behalf of a Class of those similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. CONNECTICUT STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant.

No. 3:16-cv-1197 (CSH)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

August 24, 2023

RULING ON AMENDED MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS

CHARLES S. HAIGHT, JR. SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

In this class action brought under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class have succeeded at summary judgment and on appeal. They now seek attorneys' fees and costs. Defendant consents. Pursuant to the IDEA, the Court will determine whether the requested award is appropriate.

I. BACKGROUND

In this class action brought under the IDEA, this Court ultimately granted summary judgment to the named Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class. See A.R. v. Connecticut State Bd. of Educ., No. 3:16-CV-01197 (CSH), 2020 WL 3086032 (D Conn. June 10, 2020), aff'd, 5 F. 4th 155 (2d Cir. 2021). The Court held that Defendant Connecticut State Board of Education violated IDEA when it denied, on the basis of age, a free appropriate public education to disabled students before the age of 22. In an opinion decided on July 8, 2021, the Second Circuit affirmed this Court's summary judgment in Plaintiff's favor. See A.R. v. Connecticut State Bd. of Educ., 5 F.4th 155 (2d Cir. 2021). The Court of Appeals issued its mandate on July 30, 2021. Doc. 95.

Following entry of this Court's order in favor of Plaintiff A.R. and the Plaintiff Class, Plaintiff filed a motion on July 24, 2020 [Doc. 88] for an order directing Defendant to pay Plaintiff $103,872.50 in attorneys' fees and $9,613.32 in litigation costs. Plaintiff based that motion on the fee-shifting provision in IDEA, which grants district courts discretion to “award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs- (I) to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability ....” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i). The briefing and decision of this motion were stayed pending the appeal.

On December 17, 2021, with the Second Circuit having issued its mandate, Plaintiff filed an amended motion [Doc. 100] seeking $139,755 in attorneys' fees and $10,013.16 in litigation costs.^[1]The difference in relief sought is due to “additional attorneys' fees and costs” incurred since the original motion was made, “mostly for successfully defending the appeal of this action.” Doc. 98 ¶ 4. In support of the motion, Plaintiff includes a memorandum of law, the declarations and contemporaneous time entries of four attorneys representing Plaintiff, an accounting of costs, and a declaration by a Connecticut civil rights attorney otherwise uninvolved in this case concerning the reasonableness of the fees requested.^[2]

On February 4, 2022, Defendant filed a response. “In keeping with the Supreme Court's important but oft ignored instruction that ‘[a] request for attorney's fees should not result in a second major litigation[,]'” Doc. 105 at 2 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437) (1983)), Defendant stated that it has no objection to the requested award and agrees that “Plaintiff's counsel have both used local prevailing hourly rates and exercised sound billing judgment.” Id. at 1-2.

Notwithstanding Defendant's consent, the Court will review Plaintiff's requested award for reasonableness under the IDEA.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The IDEA provides that “[i]n any action or proceeding brought under this section, the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs- (I) to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). In doing so, “a district court must ordinarily make two determinations. It must first determine whether the party seeking the award is a prevailing party. If the party is a prevailing party, the court must then determine whether, under the appropriate standard, that party should be awarded attorney's fees.” Mr. L. v. Sloan, 449 F.3d 405, 407 (2d Cir. 2006) (Sotomayor, J.).

A party need not prevail on every issue to be designated a “prevailing” party for this purpose. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (construing 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which provides that in a federal civil rights action, the district court “may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.”); see also I.B. v. New York City Dept. of Educ., 336 F.3d 79, 80 (2d Cir. 2003) (“We interpret the IDEA fee provisions in consonance with those of other civil rights fee-shifting statutes.”). The Second Circuit has held that “to be considered a prevailing party, a plaintiff must not only achieve some material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties, but the change must also be judicially sanctioned.” Ma v. Chertoff, 547 F.3d 342, 344 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted).

When an award is granted under the IDEA, it should include fees incurred in a successful appeal. See G.M. ex rel. R.F. v. New Britain Bd. of Educ., 173 F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Included in the award should be not only the time spent on the administrative proceeding, but the time expended on this suit (including this appeal) as well.”).

Even if a party is a prevailing party, the IDEA enumerates five circumstances in which attorneys' fees are unavailable or must be reduced. An award is unavailable when a written offer of settlement was made, was not accepted within ten days, and the relief eventually obtained was “not more favorable to the parents than the offer of settlement[,]” unless the prevailing parents were “substantially justified in rejecting the settlement offer.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D). An award must be reduced “whenever the court finds that” the parents or their attorney “unreasonably protracted” the case's resolution; that the request “unreasonably exceeds the hourly rate prevailing in the community for similar services by attorneys of reasonably comparable skill, reputation, and experience;” that “the time spent and legal services furnished were excessive considering the nature of the action or proceeding;” or that notice of the parents' attorney's complaint was deficient. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(F). These four scenarios, in which the award should be reduced, do not apply “if the court finds that the [defendant] unreasonably protracted the final resolution of the action or proceeding or there was a violation of this section.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(G).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Attorneys' Fees

Plaintiff requests an award of $139,755 in attorneys' fees. See Pl.'s Am. Mem. at 1, 6, 11.

1. Propriety of a Fee Award

The Court's first task is to determine whether Plaintiff is the prevailing party. Here, that task is a simple one. “‘A plaintiff ‘prevails' when actual relief on the merits of his [or her] claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.'” K.L. v. Warwick Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 584 Fed. App'x 17, 18 (2d Cir. 2014), quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114 (1992).

In my ruling on the Parties' cross motions for summary judgment, I found that the Connecticut State Board of Education's “systemic denial of a free appropriate public education to individuals with disabilities between the ages of 21 and 22 . . . constitutes a gross violation of the IDEA” and granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and demand for injunctive and declaratory relief on behalf of the Plaintiff Class.^[3]2020 WL 3086032, at *16-17. Specifically, that ruling

(a) DECLARES that the Board's current or future refusal to provide Plaintiff A.R. and the members of the Class a free appropriate public education pursuant to the age limitations established by Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-76d(b) and Conn. Agencies Reg.§ 10-76d-1(a)(4) violates the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(1),1407, 1412(11); [and]

(b) ENJOINS the Board from terminating a free appropriate public education as to Plaintiff A.R. and the members of the Class before they reach the age of 22.

Id. at *16. I also ordered that the Board provide compensatory education to members of the Plaintiff Class “to the extent that they have already been denied a free appropriate public education unlawfully.” Id. at *17 (internal quotation marks omitted).

While the provision of compensatory education remained outstanding as of the filing of Plaintiff's amended motion, the other relief already obtained by Plaintiff is sufficient to support a fee award, as the declaratory and injunctive relief granted have “materially alter[ed] the legal re- lationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.” K.L., 584 Fed. App'x at 18. The declaration submitted by Elana Bildner, a staff attorney at the ACLU Foundation of Connecticut who did not represent a party in this case, supports this conclusion. As Attorney Bildner writes: Plaintiff's attorneys “were able to achieve a complete victory in this case, as recently affirmed by the Second Circuit. Their advocacy will have a valuable impact on the availability of special education services for students with disabilities between the ages of 21 and 22 years old in Connecticut.” Bildner Decl. ¶ 6.

The Court agrees. Moreover, this change in the relationship between the parties, as an order of the Court, is “judicially sanctioned,” as required in the Second Circuit. Ma, 547 F.3d at 344. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff is a prevailing party as defined by the IDEA.

The Court's second task is to determine, “whether under the appropriate standard, Plaintiff should be awarded attorney's fees.” Mr. L., 449 F.3d at 407. The IDEA enumerates five circumstances in...