Rafiy v. Cnty. of Nassau

PHILIP M. RAFIY, M.D., individually, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF NASSAU, et al., Defendants.

15-CV-6497(SJF)(GRB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

December 20, 2019

ORDER

FEUERSTEIN, District Judge:

Pending before the Court are the objections of plaintiff Philip M. Rafiy, M.D. ("plaintiff") to so much of the Report and Recommendation of the Honorable Gary R. Brown, United States Magistrate Judge, dated November 13, 2019 ("the Report"), as recommends granting the branches of defendants' motion seeking summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dismissing plaintiff's (i) municipal liability claims against the County of Nassau ("the County"); (ii) official capacity claims against defendants Kathleen Rice ("Rice"), Andrew Weiss ("ADA Weiss") Diane Peress ("ADA Peress") and William Walsh ("Walsh") as barred by the Eleventh Amendment; and (iii) federal claims against the County Defendants¹ on the basis, inter alia, (A) that plaintiff failed to establish a cognizable constitutional violation, and (B) that the County Defendants are shielded by the doctrines of absolute and qualified immunity. For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff's objections are overruled and the Report is accepted in its entirety.

I. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

Any party may serve and file written objections to a report and recommendation of a magistrate judge on a dispositive matter within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Any portion of such a report and recommendation to which a timely objection has been made is reviewed de novo. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). The court, however, is not required to review the factual findings or legal conclusions of the magistrate judge as to which no proper objections are interposed. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150, 106 S. Ct. 466, 88 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1985). To accept the report and recommendation of a magistrate judge to which no specific, timely objection has been made, the district judge need only be satisfied that there is no clear error apparent on the face of the record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); Spence v. Superintendent, Great Meadow Corr. Facility, 219 F.3d 162, 174 (2d Cir. 2000) (a court may review a report to which no timely objection has been interposed to determine whether the magistrate judge committed "plain error.")

However, general objections, or "objections that are merely perfunctory responses argued in an attempt to engage the district court in a rehashing of the same arguments set forth in the original papers will not suffice to invoke de novo review." Owusu v. New York State Ins., 655 F. Supp. 2d 308, 312-13 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (quotations, alterations and citation omitted); see also Trivedi v. New York State Unified Court Sys. Office of Court Admin., 818 F. Supp. 2d 712, 726 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff'd sub nom Seck v. Office of Court Admin., 582 F. App'x 47 (2d Cir. Nov. 6, 2014) ("[W]hen a party makes only conclusory or general objections [] the Court will review the Report strictly for clear error.[] Objections to a Report must be specific and clearly aimed atparticular findings in the magistrate judge's proposal." (quotations, alterations and citation omitted)). Any portion of a report and recommendation to which no specific timely objection is made, or to which only general, conclusory or perfunctory objections are made, is reviewed only for clear error. Owusu, 655 F. Supp. 2d at 312-13; see also Bassett v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 93 F. Supp. 3d 95, 100-01 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).

Whether or not proper objections have been filed, the district judge may, after review, accept, reject, or modify any of the magistrate judge's findings or recommendations. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

B. Plaintiff's Objections

Initially, plaintiff's general objections to the Report, and request that the Report "be set aside" in its entirety, (Plaintiff's Objections to the Report ["Plf. Obj."] at 10), are insufficient to invoke de novo review. See, e.g. Colvin v. Berryhill, 734 F. App'x 756, 758 (2d Cir. May 18, 2018) (summary order); Benitez v. Parmer, 654 F. App'x 502, 503 (2d Cir. June 30, 2016) (summary order). Accordingly, except for the specific objections set forth below, the remainder of the Report is reviewed only for clear error.²

Plaintiff contends, inter alia, that Magistrate Judge Brown erred: (i) in purportedly misapplying the legal standard for summary judgment, accepting the County Defendants' "Rule 56 Statement as the facts of the matter" and "failing to apply the facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff," (Plf. Obj. at 3); (ii) in "concluding that Plaintiff has merely asserted claims predicated on 'negligent prosecution' as opposed to intentional failures[,]" in light of evidence "establishingthe presentation of redacted medical documents (having nothing to do with HIPAA), failure to review, assess and apply exculpatory material and the inexplicable presentation of material at Grand Jury that was wholly incomplete[,]" which "demonstrates a genuine dispute as to material fact," (id. at 2; see also Id. at 4 [asserting that Magistrate Judge Brown ignored: "Plaintiff's Rule 56 Counterstatement of Fact demonstrating that there was uncontested testimony and documentary evidence indicating that [the County Defendants] submitted incomplete records and redacted/altered medical reports[;] . . . [and] that in their self-serving affidavits, neither ADA Weiss nor ADA Lavine affirmed that that [sic] they actually reviewed, discussed or analyzed the exculpatory documentation delivered by defense counsel"]); (iii) in "mak[ing] short shrift of Plaintiff's contention that [the County Defendants'] witness at Grand Jury (United Healthcare) lacked standing to testify that a refund check was enclosed in an envelope with a postmark date later than that of the check, . . . [and] determin[ing] that the refund envelope check date is 'accepted as admitted fact [sic] for [the] purposes of this motion[,]'"³ (id. at 4 [quoting Report at 7]); (iv) in finding, for purposes of absolute immunity, that plaintiff "fail[ed] to identify any actions by the ADAs Weiss and Peress that were in any way investigative or administrative[,] . . . [which] runs counter to his prior finding . . . that '[the Economic Crimes Bureau's] investigation continued through the time of trial' and that 'ADA Weiss, during the course of the investigation, gathered' additional evidence[,]" (id. at 2-3 [quoting Report at 4]; see also Id. at 6); (v) in "fail[ing] to recognize that the actions of a prosecutor are not absolutely immune merely because they are performed by a prosecutor[,] . . . [and] to adequately address [the County Defendants'] failure to procure, review and/or comprehend exculpatory material, IME Reports, medical records and correspondence revealing that its prosecution was not warranted[,]" (id. at 7; see alsoId. at 9), and, in effect, finding relevant the "fact that the patient/witness coercion [by Investigator Walsh] apparently failed," (id. at 7; see also Id. at 9 [asserting that "[W]hile the [Report] made a cursory dismissal of the [County Defendants'] attempt to coerce patient/witnesses, . . . it did so in conclusory fashion"]); (vi) with respect to qualified immunity, in "fail[ing] to note Plaintiff's Counter-statement of Material Fact [sic] and instead choos[ing] to accept [the County Defendants'] filing as inalienable[,] . . . [and] fail[ing] to assess Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),"⁴ (id. at 3; see also Id. at 8 [asserting that the Report "failed to apply the findings in Brady[,] which is a clear violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights and is expressed in the present matter[,] . . . [and] makes short shrift of these issues"]); (vii) in "fail[ing] to address case law confirming that [where] a municipal official 'has final authority over significant matters involving the exercise of discretion,' his choices represent government policy[,]'" (id. at 5 [quoting Gronowski v. Spencer, 424 F.3d 285, 296 (2d Cir. 2005)]), and "fail[ing] to recognize that the ADAs in this matter were acting as policy makers for the purposes of the prosecution[,]" (id. at 5; see also Id. at 6 [asserting that Magistrate Judge Brown "failed to address that ADA Peress, the Chief of the Economic Crimes [sic] and ADA Weiss, the Deputy Chief of the Economic Crimes Bureau . . . were acting as policymakers. . ."]); and (viii) in "conclud[ing] that Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) is inapplicable merely because it dealt with injunctive relief instead of monetary damages," (id. at 9), and that its claims against the individual defendants in their official capacity are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. (Id. at 9-10).

Upon consideration of plaintiff's objections and the County Defendants' responses thereto, and de novo review of the findings and conclusions in the Report to which plaintiffspecifically objects, as well as all motion papers and the entire record, plaintiff's objections are overruled and those branches of the Report to which plaintiff specifically objected are accepted in their entirety.

1. Summary Judgment Standard and Constitutional Violation

Magistrate Judge Brown properly disregarded any assertion in the parties' statements pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1 of the Local Rules of the United States District Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York ("Local Civil Rule 56.1"), that was not supported pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Local Civil Rule 56.1(d) ("Each statement by the movant or opponent pursuant to Rule 56.1(a) and (b), including each statement controverting any statement of material fact, must be followed by citation to evidence which would be admissible, set forth as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)."); New World Sols., Inc. v. NameMedia Inc., 150 F. Supp. 3d 287, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) ("[I]f a party fails to...