Raines v. State

304 Ga. 582

820 S.E.2d 679

RAINES

v.The STATE.

S18A0725

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: October 22, 2018

Christina Rupp Cribbs, Veronica M. O'Grady, GEORGIA PUBLIC DEFENDER COUNCIL—APPELLATE DIVISION, 104 Marietta Street NW Suite 600, Atlanta, Georgia 30303, for Appellant.

Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Paula Khristian Smith, Elizabeth Haase Brock, Christopher M. Carr, DEPARTMENT OF LAW, 40 Capitol Square, S.W., Atlanta, Georgia 30334, Scott L. Ballard, Benjamin David Coker, Brittany Ashton Fallin, GRIFFIN JUDICIAL CIRCUIT DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Fayette County Justice Center One Center Drive, Fayetteville, Georgia 30214, for Appellee.

Boggs, Justice.

In March 2013, a jury found Dantazias Raines guilty of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the killing of Brandy Guined, as well as three counts of misdemeanor obstruction of a police officer.¹ He was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole plus 40 years to serve consecutively. His amended motion for new trial was denied, and he now appeals, asserting insufficiency of the evidence with respect to venue, corroboration of accomplice testimony, and the misdemeanor obstruction charges. He also asserts that the trial court erred in failing to charge on accomplice corroboration; that the jury improperly considered materials not admitted into evidence; and that his sentence of life without parole is void as a matter of law. We find the evidence sufficient except with respect to venue on the obstruction charges, and find no plain error with respect to the jury instruction or the consideration of evidence by the jury. We therefore affirm in part and reverse in part, vacate Raines’ sentence in part, and remand this case to the trial court for resentencing in light of our subsequent decision in Veal v. State, 298 Ga. 691, 702-703 (5) (d), 784 S.E.2d 403 (2016).

Construed to support the verdict, the evidence showed that in the early morning hours of December 21, 2011, the Thomaston, Georgia police "received a call to Avenue N in reference to a possible shooting involving a taxicab driver." On the way to that location, police saw a vehicle trapped in a fence at a convenience store on Barnesville Street with tires that were spinning "at a high rate of speed." After several attempts, an officer was able to break a window and shut off the ignition before the vehicle broke through the fence. The victim was unconscious behind the wheel. She was transported to Upson Regional Medical Center, where she died of a gunshot wound to the torso. Police found a purse containing over $150 in cash clutched under her right arm.

Earlier, on the evening of December 20, 2011, Raines came to the back door of his friend and neighbor, Marquerious Traylor, and asked him to come outside because he had "a sweet lick to catch." Traylor understood that to mean a robbery or theft to obtain "some dope and some money." Raines asked to use Traylor’s iPod, which was set up to use as a phone. Traylor gave it to him and then went inside to get a jacket. As they walked toward the intersection of Third Street and Avenue N, a taxicab approached. Raines flagged down the cab, entered the rear passenger side, and pulled out a gun. At that point, Traylor ran home. As he ran, he heard a gunshot and a woman’s scream. After he got home, he contacted Raines and asked, "[D]id he shoot the lady. [Raines] said, ‘Hell, yeah.’ "

Later on December 21, Traylor asked Raines why he had shot the victim, and Raines responded that "she tried to grab the gun and he got nervous and shot her." Traylor also recorded on his iPod a conversation with Raines and that recording was played for the jury. Raines’ counsel stated that he had no objection to the playing of the recording.

On the same day, Raines was riding in a car with Reginald Dawson and Terrell Searcy. Searcy testified that Dawson asked him if he had heard about "the cab incident last night." Raines volunteered that at the time he was walking "from his momma’s house ... to his home boy’s house." He told them he was walking down Avenue N when he heard some noise "like somebody was arguing or fighting." When he turned around, he saw a car by the side of the road and someone arguing with the driver. He then heard a gunshot and a woman’s scream. When he got on Barnesville Street, "the same cab flew past him." When asked if Raines "gave any details about the crime that struck you as odd" or if "he appear[ed] to know more than he should have," Searcy responded, "You could say that. I don’t know."

The State called Dawson to testify, but Dawson stated that he did not remember speaking with Raines or what he had told police in his interview. The State then played a portion of his recorded police interview for the jury, in which Dawson—though he could not recall any details—said that Raines told him on the night of the shooting, "I seen something," but added, "I don’t want to talk about it," and later told him and Searcy, "I seen what happened," although Dawson could not recall any details. Dawson told the police investigators that he concluded that "something ain’t right" and Raines "knew something" about the shooting. He also told Raines’ mother, for whom he had romantic feelings, that she needed to talk to Raines. After the recording was played for the jury, Dawson acknowledged that there was a conversation between him, Searcy, and Raines about the murder and that Raines told him he "heard something" about the murder. He acknowledged that his feelings for Raines’ mother made it hard for him to testify and that he talked the situation over with her and told her "she needed to talk to [Raines]."

1. First, Raines contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish venue in Upson County. "[A]ll criminal cases shall be tried in the county where the crime was committed, except cases in the superior courts where the judge is satisfied that an impartial jury cannot be obtained in such county."² Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. VI. And as a general rule, a criminal homicide is considered to have been committed "in the county in which the cause of death was inflicted." OCGA § 17-2-2 (c).

The former rule that "slight evidence" was sufficient to support venue has been essentially abrogated, as it "can never be invoked after a criminal defendant pleads not guilty and is placed on trial." Jones v. State, 272 Ga. 900, 902 (2), 537 S.E.2d 80 (2000).

Consequently, we view the evidence of venue as we do in a challenge to the general sufficiency of the evidence, that is, the evidence of venue is viewed in a light most favorable to supporting the verdicts in order to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime or crimes were committed in the county in which the defendant was indicted.

(Citation omitted.) Pike v. State, 302 Ga. 795, 797 (1), 809 S.E.2d 756 (2018). No witness was ever directly asked to identify the county in which the cause of death was inflicted, or in which the events surrounding the victim’s death occurred.³ But evidence was presented from which the jury could, under an appropriate instruction from the trial court, find beyond a reasonable doubt that venue was properly laid in Upson County.

(a) With respect to the felony counts related to the shooting of the victim, testimony was presented from several witnesses that the cause of death was inflicted on Avenue N. And, as the State points out, "[i]t is undisputed that the entire area in question is located in Thomaston, Georgia." While this alone is insufficient to show venue, see Graham v. State, 275 Ga. 290, 293 (2), 565 S.E.2d 467 (2002), taking the testimony at trial as a whole, sufficient evidence was presented from which a rational finder of fact could conclude that venue was established in Upson County.

One principle that applies is the general presumption that officers do not exceed their authority. See Chapman v. State, 275 Ga. 314, 317-318 (4), 565 S.E.2d 442 (2002). While the crime was investigated primarily by city police officers and the GBI, an agent of the Upson County Narcotics Task Force testified that he was "involved in the investigation of the homicide of Brandy Guined back in 2011." At trial, he testified that he executed an unrelated search warrant in January 2013 and recovered a High Point brand .380 caliber pistol. He identified the pistol, which was tendered as State’s Exhibit 31, contained in an evidence bag labeled "County: Upson." Because his earlier participation in the homicide investigation had made him aware that this particular brand and caliber of firearm had inflicted the victim’s fatal wound, he contacted the GBI and turned the firearm over to them for testing. A firearms examiner testified that it was, indeed, the weapon that fired the projectile recovered from the victim’s body. In addition, State’s Exhibit 30, a sealed package containing the recovered projectile, is labeled both "Upson County" and "County: Upson." It was admitted into evidence and went out with the jury, as did State’s Exhibit 31, the bag containing the firearm and labeled "County: Upson."⁴

Finally, the State examined a GBI agent regarding his discovery of a notebook in the taxicab with the victim’s name on it, which appeared to be a dispatch log containing a list of addresses with the headings "pick-up" and "drop-off," with the last, incomplete entry showing an address on Avenue N. Raines’ counsel objected to the admission of the notebook and any testimony regarding its contents. The prosecutor asserted that he would "lay a further foundation" by having a witness identify the handwriting as the victim’s. See Norris v. State, 289 Ga. 154, 158-159 (3), 709 S.E.2d 792 (2011). But the State never called a witness to identify the handwriting.⁵

The trial court thereafter repeatedly sustained objections to any contents of the notebook being revealed to the jury.

Although these rulings severely limited his testimony, the GBI...