Raines v. State

309 Ga. 258

845 S.E.2d 613

RAINES

v.The STATE.

S20A0181

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: June 29, 2020

Atteeyah Eshe Hollie, Mark Aaron Loudon-Brown, Southern Center for Human Rights, 83 Poplar Street, NW, Atlanta, Georgia 30303, for Appellant.

Benjamin David Coker, Griffin Judicial Circuit District Attorney's Office, P.O. Box 871, Thomaston, Georgia 30286, Brittany Ashton Fallin, Griffin Judicial Circuit District Attorney's Office, P.O. Box 57, Griffin, Georgia 30224, Christopher M. Carr, Paula Khristian Smith, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Department of Law, 40 Capitol Square, S.W., Atlanta, Georgia 30334, Scott L. Ballard, Griffin Judicial Circuit District Attorney's Office, Fayette County Justice Center One Center Drive, Fayetteville, Georgia 30214, Elizabeth Haase Brock, DeKalb County District Attorney's Office, 556 North McDonough Street, ste 700, Decatur, Georgia 30030, for Appellee.

Warren, Justice.

In 2013, after being convicted of malice murder and other crimes, Dantazias Raines was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole ("LWOP") for malice murder. Raines was 17 years old at the time of the crimes.¹ In Raines v. State , 304 Ga. 582, 820 S.E.2d 679 (2018), we affirmed Raines's convictions and sentences in part, reversed Raines's convictions for misdemeanor obstruction of a police officer, and vacated his sentence in part. We also remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing in accordance with the requirements of Veal v. State , 298 Ga. 691, 702-703, 784 S.E.2d 403 (2016), which relied heavily on Montgomery v. Louisiana , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 718, 733-736, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016), to hold that "as a matter of federal constitutional law, [ ] whether a juvenile may receive a sentence of life without parole depends on ‘a specific determination that he is irreparably corrupt. ’ " White v. State , 307 Ga. 601, 607 n.7, 837 S.E.2d 838 (2020) (quoting Veal v. State , 298 Ga. at 702, 784 S.E.2d 403 (emphasis in original)). On remand, Raines filed a motion for a jury to make the requisite determination under Veal . The trial court denied his motion and certified its order for immediate review. We granted Raines's application for interlocutory appeal to consider the following question:

Does a defendant facing a sentence of life without parole for an offense committed when he was a juvenile have a constitutional right to have a jury (as opposed to a judge) make the requisite determination of whether he is "irreparably corrupt" or "permanently incorrigible"?

Pointing to the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Raines argues that a jury—not a judge—is required to make the determination of whether he is "irreparably corrupt" or "permanently incorrigible" before imposing a sentence of LWOP. The State responds that, given Georgia's statutory scheme for imposing the death penalty—and in particular, because a Georgia jury that finds beyond a reasonable doubt the facts necessary to return a guilty verdict for malice murder is not required to find additional facts for a defendant to be eligible for LWOP² —a defendant does not have a right under the Sixth Amendment for a jury to make the "specific determination" Veal requires for a sentence of LWOP to be imposed when that defendant was a juvenile at the time he committed the alleged crimes.

Although the main thrust of Raines's argument stems from the Sixth Amendment, it is made against the backdrop of United States Supreme Court precedent interpreting the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. As such, a complete analysis of Raines's claim requires review of U.S. Supreme Court precedent interpreting both the Sixth and Eighth Amendments. After reviewing the relevant precedents of the U.S. Supreme Court, as well as Georgia statutory law and our own Court's precedent, we hold that a defendant who is convicted of committing murder when he was a juvenile does not have a federal constitutional right to have a jury determine, in accordance with Veal and the Sixth Amendment, whether he is irreparably corrupt or permanently incorrigible such that he may be sentenced to LWOP, and we therefore affirm.³

1. Legal Background

(a) Recent United States Supreme Court Precedent Regarding the Eighth Amendment and Juvenile LWOP.

In Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 465, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), the Supreme Court held that "mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’ " As a result, the Court required "a sentencer ... to take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison," and it specifically noted that "a judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles." Id. at 480, 489, 132 S.Ct. 2455. Four years later, in Montgomery v. Louisiana , ––– U.S. at ––––, 136 S.Ct. at 734, 736, the Supreme Court held that Miller announced a new substantive rule of constitutional law that must be given retroactive effect in state collateral review proceedings. In so doing, the Court emphasized that Miller ’s rationale was one of proportionality; because Miller concluded that "the sentence of life without parole is disproportionate for the vast majority of juvenile offenders," Montgomery , ––– U.S. at ––––, 136 S.Ct. at 736, sentencing a juvenile to LWOP is "excessive for all but ‘ "the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption," ’ " id. at ––––, 136 S.Ct. at 734 (quoting Miller , 567 U.S. at 479-480, 132 S.Ct. 2455 ).⁴

(b) Recent Georgia Supreme Court Precedent Interpreting Miller and Montgomery.

The same year Montgomery was decided, in Veal v. State , 298 Ga. 691, 784 S.E.2d 403, our Court held that, under the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Montgomery , Miller announced a rule of substantive constitutional law and that an LWOP sentence imposed on a juvenile in violation of that rule was void. See Veal , 298 Ga. at 701, 784 S.E.2d 403. We further concluded that, to ensure principles of proportionality were satisfied under the Eighth Amendment ("as interpreted in Miller and as refined by Montgomery "), a trial court must make a "distinct determination" that the defendant is an "exceptionally rare" juvenile who is "irreparably corrupt " or "whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility " before sentencing a juvenile convicted of murder to life without parole. Veal , 298 Ga. at 701-703, 784 S.E.2d 403 (emphasis in original). See also Veal v. State , 303 Ga. 18, 19-20, 810 S.E.2d 127 (2018) (declining to extend this rule beyond the holdings of Miller and Montgomery to aggregate life-with-the-possibility-of-parole sentences for juveniles convicted of multiple offenses).

(c) Recent United States Supreme Court Sixth Amendment Precedent: Apprendi and Its Progeny.

In Apprendi v. New Jersey , the Supreme Court held that under the Sixth Amendment, "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (emphasis added). Its holding reflected the historical "principles undergirding the requirements of trying to a jury all facts necessary to constitute a statutory offense, and proving those facts beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 483-484, 120 S.Ct. 2348. The Court has reiterated that central tenet through a litany of Sixth Amendment cases including Ring v. Arizona , 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002) ; Blakely v. Washington , 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004) ; United States v. Booker , 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) ; Cunningham v. California , 549 U.S. 270, 127 S.Ct. 856, 166 L.Ed.2d 856 (2007) ; Oregon v. Ice , 555 U.S. 160, 129 S.Ct. 711, 172 L.Ed.2d 517 (2009) ; Southern Union Co. v. United States , 567 U.S. 343, 132 S.Ct. 2344, 183 L.Ed.2d 318 (2012) ; Alleyne v. United States , 570 U.S. 99, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013) ; Hurst v. Florida , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016) ; and United States v. Haymond , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S.Ct. 2369, 204 L.Ed.2d 897 (2019).

For example, in Ring v. Arizona , the Court held that an Arizona statute that required trial judges to make a finding of at least one aggravating circumstance to impose the death penalty violated the Sixth Amendment. See 536 U.S. at 609, 122 S.Ct. 2428. In so doing, it repeated that "[i]f a State makes an increase in a defendant's authorized punishment contingent on the finding of fact, that fact—no matter how the State labels it—must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 602, 122 S.Ct. 2428 (citing Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 482-483, 120 S.Ct. 2348 ). Moreover, it explained that a "defendant may not be exposed ... to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone." Id. at 602, 122 S.Ct. 2428 (quoting Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 483, 120 S.Ct. 2348 ; punctuation omitted). Because the Arizona statute required an aggravating circumstance to be found and allowed the death penalty to be imposed only upon a finding of at least one such circumstance, the statutory aggravating factors "operate[d] as ‘the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense’ " and the Sixth Amendment required a jury—not a judge—to make the finding. Id. at 609, 122 S.Ct. 2428 (quoting Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 494 n.19, 120 S.Ct. 2348 ). See also Hurst , ––– U.S. at ––––, 136 S.Ct. at 620, 624 (extending Ring to invalidate Florida's capital sentencing scheme, where under Florida statutory law, "the maximum sentence a capital felon [could] receive on the basis of the conviction alone [was] life imprisonment," and under the Florida...