Rainey v. Taylor

PRISCILLA RAINEY, Plaintiff, v. JAYCEON TERRELL TAYLOR, a.k.a. The Game, Defendant.

15 C 6844

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

August 31, 2018

Judge Feinerman

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Priscilla Rainey brought this diversity suit against Jayceon Terrell Taylor, alleging sexual battery. Doc. 1. After a one-week trial, the jury returned a verdict in Rainey's favor in the amount of $7,130,100.00, and judgment was entered. Docs. 139-140. Taylor moves under Civil Rule 59 for a new trial or a remittitur. Docs. 151, 158. The motion is denied.

Background

The complaint, filed in early August 2015, alleged the following. Rainey was cast as one of several female contestants on a VH1 reality television show called She's Got Game, a production essentially patterned on The Bachelor, with Taylor, a rap artist who performs under the stage name "The Game," as the male lead. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 6-7. In May 2015, while the show was filming in the Chicago area, Taylor took Rainey on an off-camera date to Adrianna's Sportsbar in Markham, Illinois. Id. at ¶¶ 8-9. Taylor sexually battered Rainey that night, including by reaching his hand inside her dress to rub her bare vagina and buttocks in front of a crowded room of onlookers. Id. at ¶ 9.

At status hearings in early October 2015 and early November 2015, Rainey's attorney reported on his unsuccessful efforts to serve Taylor. Docs. 10-11. In December 2015, Rainey moved to approve alternative service after five process servers in three States—one of whom tried forty-one times to personally serve Taylor at his home—could not effectuate service. Doc. 17 at ¶¶ 6, 14. The court granted the motion, ruling that if Taylor "does not answer or otherwise plead to the complaint within the required time frame, the court will enter a default under Civil Rule 55(a) and will proceed to a prove-up hearing under Civil Rule 55(b)." Doc. 19. Taylor did not answer or otherwise plead during the required time frame, and so the court entered a Rule 55(a) default on February 1, 2016, stating:

I've given the defendant plenty of opportunity to appear in this case. The plaintiff established that the defendant was evading service, so I issued an order allowing for alternative service, and there were about three belts and two pairs of suspenders in that order. And the alternative service was completed by early in the month of January. And the defendant certainly knows about this case. There's been a lot of chatter about it on social media, and I just can only assume, based on the lack of a response [in court], that the defendant knows about the case, has been served with alternative service with summons and the complaint, and has ... elected not to respond.

Doc. 24.

Taylor's counsel, Andrew Williams of Florida, appeared ten days later, Doc. 26, and shortly thereafter moved to quash service and set aside the default, Doc. 37. On February 24, 2016, the court denied the motion to quash, reasoning that the record "paint[s] a very clear and unmistakable picture of the plaintiff's dogged efforts at service and how she was foiled at effecting service"; but the court vacated the default and set trial for November 14, 2016. Doc. 44. After Taylor answered, the case was referred to the Magistrate Judge, Docs. 48-49, who set a settlement conference for June 16, Doc. 56 ("The parties and their counsel must personally appear for the settlement conference.").

On June 2, Taylor moved to reset the settlement conference. As one ground for the continuance, Taylor stated:

This past Memorial Day Weekend sadly almost 70 people were shot in the city of Chicago. Due to high volume of violence and likelihood of reprisals due to such violence the Defendant has grave concerns for his safety and for those who assist him during his travels due to his celebrity status.

Doc. 60 at ¶¶ 4-5. The next day, the Magistrate Judge cancelled the settlement conference, but cautioned the parties "that their trial date on 11/14/2016 is a firm date that will not be extended." Doc. 62; see also Doc. 63 (Magistrate Judge advising the parties "that the Court previously granted the unopposed motion to reset the settlement conference only because the parties were in agreement that 'a more meaningful and productive Settlement Conference will be possible' if they delay the conference until after certain depositions take place"). At the next status hearing before the District Judge, Doc. 64, the court expressed to Williams great skepticism regarding Taylor's motion:

Unless your client was going to be staying in North Lawndale or East Garfield Park or Englewood, I don't think he was going to have any problem with violence in the Chicago area. Not many people are knocked off in a Town Car from O'Hare to the Four Seasons. So, you know, when I read that, it just struck me as a huge joke, and the only thing you accomplish by doing that is hurting your own credibility and your client's credibility with the court. So, I'd encourage you to keep that stuff to a minimum, if not eliminate it entirely.

On July 5, Taylor moved under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to transfer the case to the Central District of California or the Southern District of Florida. Doc. 67. The court denied the motion for several reasons, including that a transfer would delay trial. Doc. 81. On September 22, Williams orally moved to continue the trial; the court denied the motion "without prejudice to the ... defendant making a more persuasive and compelling showing in writing." Doc. 82. More than three weeks later, on October 14, Taylor renewed his motion to continue the trial. Doc. 88. In denying that motion, Doc. 95, the court stated:

[T]he parties have known since February 24th of the November 14th trial date. And let me say this: Even though the trial date was set eight-and-a-half months [in advance] and there was all this time for discovery, if the defendant had demonstrated that the defendant was diligent in pursuing discovery and that despite his best efforts the nearly nine months of time was not sufficient to take the discovery that was necessary and to prepare for trial, then a continuance might have been in order. But based on the materials that have been submitted, the defendant has not made that showing.

Let me start with a global observation. The defendant has—although defendant has local counsel, really, one attorney has been doing everything, Mr. Williams. And there's ... nothing in theory wrong with proceeding with one attorney doing everything, but there are consequences of that choice. The fact that there was just one attorney doing the work ... is the product of the defendant's own choice of how he was going to handle the case. And it may be that having one attorney assigned to do the substantive work on this case resulted in the defendant understaffing this case legally. And it may be that if the defendant had two or three attorneys working substantively on the case, what needed to get done in the past few months would have gotten done. What can't happen is the defendant [chooses] to have just one attorney handle a matter substantively, have that ... result in an understaffing in the case where one attorney can't get everything done that needs to get done, and then come into court a month before the trial date and say, well, we're behind in discovery; I haven't been able to do everything that I wanted to do, and, therefore, I should get a continuance. ...

With respect to the particular items of discovery that remain outstanding, the record that's in front of me does not establish that the defendant acted with the requisite diligence. ... There's sufficient time, given what needs to be done ... . We have three weeks until trial, which is more than enough time for that discovery to take place and for trial preparation to occur.

The jury trial began, as scheduled, on Monday, November 14. Doc. 130. Taylor was not present that day, but Williams informed the court that although Taylor would not be present for jury selection, he "will be here tomorrow." As Williams explained days later, Taylor did not believe it necessary to appear for the first day of trial because professional basketball star Derrick Rose, as a defendant in his own civil sexual assault case in the Central District of California, did not appear for the first day of his trial. The difference between Rose's and Taylor's circumstances—apart from the fact that Rose had a preplanned obligation the first day of trial, the preseason opener in Houston—is that Rose sought and obtained in advance the judge's permission for missing the first day of trial. See Transcript of Telephonic Status Conference at 20-23, Doe v. Rose, No. 2:15-cv-07503-MWF-JC (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2016) (Dkt. 412) (noting that the conflict was "not a surprise" to the court or plaintiff's counsel and declining to "force [Rose] to miss the game"); Michael McCann, Legal Strategies for Derrick Rose, Accuser Ahead of Rape Civil Trial, Sports Illustrated (Oct. 4, 2016), https://www.si.com/nba/2016/10/04/derrick-rose-rape-trial-civil-lawsuit-knicks-adidas-analysis. By contrast to Rose, Taylor had no professional obligation the first day of trial and, making matters worse, simply took it upon himself to be absent.

When trial resumed on Tuesday, November 15, Williams notified the court that Taylor would not be present that day and made an oral motion for a continuance. Williams represented that Taylor had called an "emergency dental hotline" at approximately 6:00 p.m. on Sunday, November 13 and had undergone emergency "dental surgery" in Los Angeles on November 14. Williams invited the court to call the dental professional who performed Taylor's procedures. During that call, the professional (assuming that is who was on the line, as no one was under oath) stated that he performed "basically more or less a root canal procedure, two of them" on November 14, and that he typically follows up with patients "in a couple of weeks." He also...