Rainwater v. Oklahoma ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla.

SUSAN RAINWATER, Plaintiff, v. THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA EX REL.THE BOARD OF REGENTS OFTHE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA, ET AL., Defendants.

No. CIV-19-382-R

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

January 30, 2020

AMENDED ORDER

Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants, the State of Oklahoma, ex rel the Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma and Jason Sanders, Christina Bennett, David Johnson, and Edwin Ibay, in both their individual and official capacities. (Doc. No. 26) Plaintiff responded in opposition to the motion (Doc. No. 27) and Defendants filed a Reply in support of the motion (Doc. No. 28). Upon consideration of the parties' submissions, the Court finds as follows.

Plaintiff Rainwater seeks relief under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act "ADA," 42 U.S.C. § 12131, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state law against the State, ex rel. the Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma and certain of its employees, related to her dismissal from the Master's in Health Administration ("MHA") program allegedly because of poor performance. She contends that she was denied accommodation by the MHA program, specifically by Defendant Assistant Professor Christina Bennett, that would have enabled her to successfully complete the required coursework. Plaintiff names as Defendants the Board of Regents, Jason Sanders, Vice President and Provost of the Oklahoma Health Sciences Center, Professor Bennett, David Johnson, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, and Edwin Ibay, current director of the MHA program. With the exception of Mr. Ibay, who is named solely in his official capacity, the individual Defendants are sued both individually and in their official capacities.¹

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain enough facts that, when accepted as true, "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008). A claim has facial plausibility when the court can draw "the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In § 1983 cases, it is particularly important "that the complaint make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom, to provide each individual with fair notice as to the basis of the claims against him or her." See Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1249-50; see also Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1104 (10th Cir. 2009).

Defendants Sanders, Johnson, and Ibay in their official capacities seek the dismissal of Plaintiff's ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, asserting that because the Board is also a Defendant, the claims are redundant. Plaintiff asserts the official capacity claims are notredundant because she seeks declaratory and injunctive relief and the University, via the Board, may assert Eleventh Amendment immunity in the future.² At this juncture, and despite Plaintiff's arguments to the contrary, the Court finds no basis for retaining the redundant claims against the individual defendants sued in their official capacities. Suits against employees in their official capacities operate as a suit against the employer itself. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) ("Official-capacity suits ... generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent. ... It is not a suit against the official personally, for the real party in interest is the entity." (quotation marks and citations omitted)). Although plaintiff may name supervisors in their official capacities or as alter egos of the employer, the Tenth Circuit has suggested that such a practice is "is superfluous where, as here, the employer is already subject to suit directly in its own name." Lewis v. Four B Corp., 211 F. App'x 663, 665 n.2 (10th Cir. 2005) (unpublished); see Park v. TD Ameritrade Trust Co., Inc., No. 10-cv-02599-BNB, 2010 WL 4608225, at *1 (D. Colo. 2010) ("Because Plaintiff has sued her employer, a suit against Defendants Moglia and Bradley in their official capacities under Title VII and the ADA is superfluous."). In the event the Board asserts Eleventh Amendment immunity as to Plaintiff's ADA or Rehabilitation Act claim, Plaintiff may seek leave to amend to re-introduce her official capacity claims to this suit.

Defendants all seek dismissal on the basis that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for the violation of her constitutional rights as asserted in her Second and Third Causes ofAction.³ First, Defendants contend that Plaintiff cannot proceed with her § 1983 claims in light of her claims under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. In support of their argument, Defendants rely on Rancho Palos Verdes, v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113 (2005); Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 11145, 1156 (9^th Cir. 2002); Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999 (8^th Cir. 1999), Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta, 112 F.3d 1522 (11^th Cir. 1997), Lollar v. Baker, 196 F.3d 603 (5^th Cir. 1999), and Williams v. Penn Human Relations Comm'n, 870 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2017). In each of these cases the court was presented with a plaintiff seeking to vindicate federal statutory rights against a state actor via the § 1983 vehicle. Those courts were not presented with the issue herein, which is whether Plaintiff can proceed on a parallel § 1983 claim alleging violation of her constitutional, rather than statutory rights, in light of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. See e.g. Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee, 555 U.S. 246 (2009)(considering whether Title IX precludes an action under § 1983 for alleged gender discrimination and drawing a distinction between § 1983 claims premised on statutory violations and those premised on constitutional violations);. Bullington v. Bedford Cty., Tennessee, 905 F.3d 467, 471 (6th Cir. 2018)(citing Fitzgerald and noting "the Supreme Court recently outlined how to determine whether a statutory scheme precludes a parallel remedy under § 1983). The Court noted that the issue is whether Congress intended a statute's remedial scheme to be exclusive.

In those cases in which the § 1983 claim is based on a statutory right, "evidence of such congressional intent may be found directly in the statute creating the right, or inferred from the statute's creation of a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement under § 1983." Id. at 120, 125 S.Ct. 1453 (internal quotation marks omitted). In cases in which the § 1983 claim alleges a constitutional violation, lack of congressional intent may be inferred from a comparison of the rights and protections of the statute and those existing under the Constitution. Where the contours of such rights and protections diverge in significant ways, it is not likely that Congress intended to displace § 1983 suits enforcing constitutional rights. Our conclusions regarding congressional intent can be confirmed by a statute's context. Id., at 127, 125 S.Ct. 1453 (BREYER, J., concurring) ("[C]ontext, not just literal text, will often lead a court to Congress' intent in respect to a particular statute").

In determining whether a subsequent statute precludes the enforcement of a federal right under § 1983, we have placed primary emphasis on the nature and extent of that statute's remedial scheme. See Sea Clammers, supra at 20, 101 S.Ct. 2615 ("When the remedial devices provided in a particular Act are sufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under § 1983.").

Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 252-53. The Court thereafter concluded that the plaintiff's equal protection claim under § 1983 was not precluded by her Title IX claim premised on the same facts.

Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act are coextensive with one another and the remedies thereunder are linked to those set forth in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 29 U.S.C. § 794-794a(2)("The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.) (and in subsection (e)(3) of section 706 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5), applied to claims of discrimination in compensation) shall be available to any person aggrieved by any act or failure to act by any recipient of Federal assistance or Federal provider of such assistanceunder section 794 of this title.").⁴ Additionally, the remedial scheme of Title VI is nearly identical to that set forth in Title IX. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694-95 (1979)(Congress modeled Title IX after Title VI).

[B]ecause the remedial scheme under Title IX and Title VI are nearly identical and because the Supreme Court has instructed that a Title IX claim can be vindicated under § 1983, this Court has no trouble concluding that the same analysis applies to Title VI, and by extension the Rehabilitation Act. Applying that analysis leads to the inevitable conclusion that the Rehabilitation [Act] scheme is not "comprehensive" and does not preclude a parallel § 1983 claim.

Stahura-Uhl v. Iroquois Central School Dist., 836 F. Supp. 2d 132 (W.D.N.Y. 2011). The undersigned agrees with the conclusion reached by the Western District of New York in Stahura-Uhl, which by extension applies to Plaintiff's claims under Title II of the ADA. The Court finds Defendants are not entitled to dismissal of Plaintiff's § 1983 claims on the basis that parallel proceedings are precluded.

Defendants alternatively argue that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to sustain a substantive due process claim and that the individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.⁵ Qualified immunity protects government officials, in their individual capacities, from liability for civil damages if their conduct "does not violate clearly established statutory or...