Rajasekhar v. State of Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities

Dasyam Samuel Rajasekhar v. State of Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities et al.

No. HHBCV185024428S

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of New Britain, New Britain

January 14, 2020

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh): Frazzini, Stephen F., J.T.R.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

STEPHEN F. FRAZZINI JUDGE TRIAL REFEREE

The plaintiff, Dasyam Samuel Rajasekhar, brought this administrative appeal pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183 to challenge the decision of the defendant Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CHRO, or the commission) in response to a discriminatory practices complaint the plaintiff filed against his former employer, the defendant Environmental Data Resources (Environmental Data). The commission dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint of an illegal discriminatory practice based on a finding of no reasonable cause to believe that he had- been discriminated or illegally retaliated against in connection with his former employment by Environmental Data.

The plaintiff’s complaint raises several issues. First, the complaint alleges that the fact finding did not address two issues he raised before the commission. Second, it asserts that the commission "took no action" on a claim of retaliation. The complaint also claims that he "was not afforded any opportunity to prove that the employer’s proffered business reason was neither bona fide and/or is a pretext." In conjunction with this claim, the complaint further asserts that "[o]nly a trial can determine that [Environmental Data’s] proffered reason for firing me is not bona fide reason and is simply a pretext."

The commission contends, in response, that the plaintiff has not met his burden of proof for an administrative appeal, that the commission conducted a thorough investigation of the plaintiff’s claims, and that the decision of the Department on Labor on the plaintiff’s unemployment compensation decision is not binding on the commission. Environmental Data contends the commission’s decision was proper and supported by substantial evidence. Both defendants also argue that the plaintiff’s appeal should be rejected as inadequately briefed. Finally, Environmental Data has filed three special defenses.^[1]

The parties appeared for hearing on the appeal on December 13 2019, the plaintiff participating, at his request, by telephone and the defendants appearing through counsel. After review and consideration of the record and the arguments of the parties, and for the reasons described below, the court concludes that the plaintiff has failed to establish that the commission improperly prejudiced his substantial rights. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed

I PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The record discloses the following relevant facts and procedural history. On September 6, 2016, the plaintiff filed an "Affidavit of Illegal Discriminatory Practice" with the commission. Return of Record (ROR), p. 9-13. The plaintiff claimed that his former employer, Environmental Data Resources, had discriminated against him on the basis of race, religious creed, national origin, and alienage and had also illegally retaliated against him because of prior discrimination complaints. ROR, p. 9. In that affidavit, the plaintiff asserted that he had been employed by Environmental Data Resources as an Aerial Specialist between February 2013 and March 18, 2016. ROR, p. 9; p. 11, 713-5. The complaint further averred as follows:

I believe respondent discriminated against me on March 18, 2016, when I was terminated from employment. I have previously complained to HR director- Susan Hotchkiss, Supervisor- Deborah Sopchak, Manager Kodapalla Vijayarangaswamy and Neil Ashby- Risk Assessment, The complaints involved perceived acts of discrimination such as harassment, hostile environment and discrimination based on race and differences Retaliation.

ROR, p. 11, ¶5. A separate paragraph in the affidavit, which the form specified was to be used "[f]or retaliation claims only" further stated as follows:

I complained about discrimination to Hotchkiss, Ashby on 14-17 of March 201 [sic] and as result of my report: I was terminated, Susan Hotchkiss mentioned that she has taken action before on my complaints of discrimination and that my last compliant [sic]- a detailed e-mail was about a day prior to my termination ...

ROR, p. 11, ¶8. The defendant Environmental Data filed an answer dated October 27, 2016, denying the allegations of discrimination and responding to a "Request from Information" from CHRO. ROR, pp. 211-21.

In an affidavit captioned "Statement of Facts in Support of CHRO Complaint" and dated October 16, 2017, the plaintiff later also claimed to the commission that Environmental Data retaliated against him for having filed the complaint with the commission. ROR, pp. 3-6. In that "Statement of Facts," the plaintiff further asserted that:

He had performed his ‘job well and received a good performance evaluation in October 2015.’ ROR, p. 3, ¶3.

At the time of discharge, he was offered but initially declined a ‘severance package that is standard to EDR.’ ROR, p. 3, ¶4.

[A]lmost four months after discharge, he signed a severance agreement.^[2] ROR, p. 5, ¶17.

He was initially denied unemployment benefits, which were later awarded after a hearing before the Department of Labor; ‘I prevailed and won my unemployment claim ... thus proving that I was fired for no fault of mine. ’ (Underscoring in original.) ROR, pp. 3-4, ¶¶5-7.

After discharge his former employer ‘once again retaliated ... by threatening a lawsuit if I did not withdraw my complaint.’ ROR, p. 5, ¶14.

I believe the only reason I was discharged was an act of retaliation as I complained about what I believed to be discrimination, followed by retaliatory acts and finally discharged. ROR, p. 6, ¶21.

The plaintiff’s complaint was assigned to an investigator; ROR, p. 1; who conducted a multi-day fact-finding conference; ROR, pp. 2, 7, 10; at which the plaintiff participated, by his request, by telephone. ROR, pp. 120, 124. The defendant’s attorney was present. The investigator received documentation from the plaintiff and defendant, and questioned several witnesses under oath. See ROR, p. 38, ¶26; docket entry no. 133, Parties’ Joint Statement Regarding CHRO Fact-Findings.

On August 8, 2018, the commission investigator issued a "Draft Finding of No Reasonable Cause"; ROR, pp. 2; which the investigator forwarded to the plaintiff, with the following invitation for comments:

Transmitted herewith is a draft summary of No Reasonable Cause. Prior to final action, I am providing you with an opportunity to comment. You have fifteen calendar days to provide me with any written comments concerning the draft summary ...

If you do submit comments, they will be reviewed and considered. However, if your comments do not rebut the substance of the summary or present new evidence that requires further investigation, the draft summary will be finalized.

(Underscoring in original.) ROR, p. 43. On August 27, 2018, the investigator issued a final "Finding of No Reasonable Cause." ROR, p. 2.^[3] The investigator made the following factual findings on the merits of the plaintiff’s complaint:

21. Given complainant’s continuous communication issues, inability to work with his team, dissatisfaction with his job and repeated references to finding another job, respondent permitted complainant to voluntarily resign on March 18, 2016.

23. Respondent has provided legitimate business reasons for its actions through testimony or documentation.

24. Complainant has failed to present sufficient evidence to support his claims, through testimony or documentation, that respondent discriminated against him based upon his race, national origin, religion or alienage.

25. Complainant has failed to present sufficient evidence to support his claims, through testimony or documentation, that respondent retaliated against him for previously opposing discrimination of himself and others.

26. Based on this investigator’s review of the case file and the testimonies of Dasyam Samuel Rajarsekhar, complainant, Ranga Kondapally, Respondent Director of Data Services, Susan Hotchkiss, Respondent Vice President of Human Resources and Deborah Sopchak, Respondent Digital Library Manager, the undersigned investigator finds insufficient evidence to substantiate complaint’s allegations that respondent discriminated or retaliated against him.

Determination After reviewing all of the evidence in the Commission’s file, the investigator concludes that there is no reasonable cause for believing that a discriminatory practice has been or is being committed as alleged in the complaint.

ROR, pp. 38-39. On the next day, the plaintiff’s complaint before the commission was dismissed based on the finding of no reasonable cause. ROR, pp. 31-32. This appeal followed.

II STANDARD OF REVIEW

This appeal is brought pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), General Statutes § 4-166, et seq., and is governed by § 4-183.^[4] At the outset, it is important to recognize the standard of review that constrains the court. The scope of judicial review under the UAPA is very restricted. "Judicial review of an administrative decision is a creature of statute." Summit Hydropower Partnership v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, 226 Conn. 792, 799, 629 A.2d 367 (1993). "With regard to questions of fact, it is [not] the function of the trial court ... to retry the case or to substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Goldstar Medical Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Social Services, 288 Conn. 790, 800, 955 A.2d 15 (2008). "[A] plaintiff who...