Ramapo Valley Ambulance Corps. v. Town of Ramapo

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RAMAPO VALLEY AMBULANCE CORPS, INC. et al., Plaintiffs, v. TOWN OF RAMAPO and TOWN OF RAMAPO TOWN BOARD, Defendants.

No. 22-CV-04047 (PMH)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

December 28, 2023

OPINION AND ORDER

PHILIP M. HALPERN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Ramapo Valley Ambulance Corps, Inc., (“RVAC”), Ronald Spiegal, Susan Speigal, William Ciancaruso, Peter Milo, Susan Milo, Adolph Rivera, and Elizabeth Rivera commenced this action against the Town of Ramapo and Town of Ramapo Town Board (together, “Defendants”) on May 17, 2022. (Doc. 1). All plaintiffs except for RVAC voluntarily dismissed their claims against Defendants with prejudice pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1) on June 29, 2022, and were accordingly terminated as plaintiffs in this action. (Doc 10; Doc. 11; Doc. 14; Doc. 16).

On November 15, 2022, RVAC filed its First Amended Complaint with permission of the Court, asserting five claims for relief: (1) violation of procedural due process rights pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) Monell violations; (3) Unfair Business Practices pursuant to state law; (4) violation of equal protection rights pursuant to Fourteenth Amendment; and (5) violation of substantive due process rights pursuant to Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.^[1] (Doc. 26, “FAC”).

Defendants pursuant to the briefing schedule set by the Court, served their motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), supporting memorandum of law, declaration and exhibits attached thereto, on December 8, 2022. (Doc. 31; Doc. 32; Doc. 33, “Def. Br.”). RVAC served its opposition and supporting declaration on March 8, 2023 (Doc. 35, “Opp.”; Doc. 34), and the motion was fully submitted upon the filing of the motion, opposition, and Defendants' reply (Doc. 36, “Reply”) on March 20, 2023.

For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

RVAC is a not-for-profit volunteer ambulance corporation that previously provided emergency medical services in the Town of Ramapo (the “Town”). (FAC ¶¶ 1-3). The Town in 1983 established the Ramapo Ambulance District One (the “Ambulance District”) and contracted with multiple ambulance corporations to provide emergency and related ambulance services to residents within the Ambulance District. (Id. ¶¶ 18, 22-25). On June 17, 1983, the Town entered into a publicly funded contract with RVAC to provide emergency medical and related ambulance services within the Ambulance District. (Id. ¶ 27, Ex. 1). The Town updated and amended its publicly funded contract with RVAC on January 1, 2001. (Id. ¶ 28, Ex. 2) (together with Ex. 1, the “Agreement”). RVAC operated five ambulances and two motorcycle response vehicles which allowed its volunteers to “to provide emergency medical care to more than 40,142 residents, over a 34.5 square mile area by answering approximately 3,000 calls a year.” (Id. ¶ 21).

The Town, in addition to RVAC, contracted with two ambulance corporations (Faist Ambulance Corps (“Faist”) and Spring Hill) and two volunteer ambulance corporations (Hatzolah Ambulance Corps (“Hatzolah”) and Hatzolah New Square Ambulance Corps (“New Square”)) to provide emergency services to separate geographic locations within the Ambulance District. (Id. ¶¶ 47, 52). Each geographic location ranged in size based upon call volume. (Id. ¶ 51). RVAC alleges that each of these ambulance corporations have entered into a “substantial[ly] similar (if not identical) contract with the Town, including payment terms, requirements and provisions which are nearly identical.” (Id. ¶ 48). The Town selects how much to fund each ambulance corporation and then collects directly all insurance proceeds from the ambulance corporations' bills. (Id. ¶ 49). Each ambulance corporation in the Ambulance District is required to submit the same budget forms for funding and go through the same processes, steps and regulations to receive Town funding. (Id. ¶ 51).

RVAC asserts that, despite its diligent performance in its duties, the Town has not been acting diligently and transparently. (Id. ¶ 37). RVAC claims that it has been required to meet and abide by additional standards that the other ambulance corporations are not required to, and that it is monitored, controlled, and directed by the Town where the other organizations are not. (Id. ¶¶ 55, 67). RVAC further asserts that “systematic measures have been taken by the Town since 2019 to force the closure of [RVAC] and the Town has employed certain unwarranted tactics . . . solely against [RVAC].” (Id. ¶ 45). For instance, RVAC alleges that starting in 2020, the Town required it to employ paid crews at all times in order to be dispatched, and imposed reporting requirements in connection therewith. (Id. ¶¶ 75-80, 83-84). Additionally, the Town allegedly refused to fund and pay RVAC but increased funding and support for other ambulance corporations. (Id. ¶¶ 104108). Also, all ambulance corporations except for RVAC were given permission to mark their emergency vehicles with whatever color lights they wanted, regardless of local or state regulations. (Id. ¶ 69).

The Agreement between RVAC and the Town includes a provision that “[t]his agreement shall be automatically renewed for additional terms of one (1) year, unless either party shall notify the other, no later than sixty (60) days prior to the end of the term, of its election not to renew.” (Id., Ex. 2 at p. 5). RVAC asserts that on or about August 16, 2022, the Town terminated its Agreement. (Id. ¶ 62). RVAC contends that this termination was undertaken without cause and with intent to punish RVAC, and was arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory. (Id. ¶¶ 43-44).

This litigation followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

I. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion enables a court to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).^[2] A claim is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The factual allegations pled “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

“When there are well-ple[d] factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Thus, the Court must “take all well-ple[d] factual allegations as true, and all reasonable inferences are drawn and viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Leeds v. Meltz, 85 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1996). The presumption of truth, however, “‘is inapplicable to legal conclusions,' and ‘threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.'” Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Therefore, a plaintiff must provide “more than labels and conclusions” to show entitlement to relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

II. Documents Considered

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “the Court is entitled to consider facts alleged in the complaint and documents attached to it or incorporated in it by reference, documents ‘integral' to the complaint and relied upon in it, and facts of which judicial notice may properly be taken under Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.” Heckman v. Town of Hempstead, 568 Fed.Appx. 41, 43 (2d Cir. 2014); Manley v. Utzinger, No. 10-CV-02210, 2011 WL 2947008, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2011) (“The Court may consider . . . documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and documents possessed by or known to the plaintiff and upon which plaintiff relied in bringing the suit.”).

Here, Plaintiff attaches the following three documents to its FAC: (i) June 1983 contract between RVAC and the Town (FAC, Ex. 1); (ii) January 2001 contract between RVAC and the Town (Id., Ex. 2); and (iii) August 12, 2020 email correspondence with the subject line “Ramapo Valley Ambulance Dispatch MEMO” (Id., Ex. 3). Accordingly, the Court will consider these documents in connection with the instant motion.

ANALYSIS

I. First and Fifth Claims for Relief: Due Process

RVAC's first and fifth claims for relief allege violations of its due process rights. Specifically, RVAC's first claim for relief alleges a violation of its procedural due process rights and its fifth claim for relief alleges a substantive due process violation. The Court analyzes each seriatim.

a. First Claim for Relief: Procedural Due Process Under the Fourteenth Amendment

RVAC's first cause of action alleges a violation of its procedural due process rights. (FAC ¶¶ 109-114). RVAC asserts that the Town's failure to abide by the terms and conditions of the Agreement and ultimate termination of the Agreement without reasonable basis constitutes a violation of its due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. ¶ 112).

The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1. “[T]o present a [procedural] due process claim, a plaintiff must establish (1) that [it] possessed a...