Ramirez v. City of Camden

ALICE M. RAMIREZ, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CAMDEN, NEW JERSEY, CHIEF OF POLICE J. SCOTTTHOMSON, POLICE OFFICER M. M. MATHEWS, POLICE OFFICERJAMES MELTON, CAMDEN POLICE OFFICERS JOHN DOE 1-6, Defendants,

Civil Action No. 13-1502 (JBS/KMW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

July 17, 2015

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:

In this case, Defendants City of Camden, Chief of Police J. Scott Thomson, Police Officer M.M. Mathews, Police Officer James Melton, and Camden Police Officers John Doe 1-6 (hereinafter, "Defendants"), move for reconsideration of the Court's Order, entered March 26, 2015 [Docket Item 24], denying Defendants' motion for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, Defendants' motion will be denied. The Court finds as follows:

1. Plaintiff Alice Ramirez filed the initial Complaint in this action on March 12, 2013, alleging that Defendants Mathews and Melton violated her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they made a warrantless entry into Plaintiff's home in an attempt to arrest her son, Raymond. [Docket Item 1.] Defendants subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment on all counts,arguing that the warrantless entry did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it was made in the course of a "hot pursuit."¹ Specifically, Defendants argued (1) the testimony of Officer Melton and Officer Mathews combined with the police report showed that the officers were in "hot pursuit" of Plaintiff's son, Raymond Ramirez; and (2) the officers were protected by qualified immunity. (Defs. Mot. for Summ. J. [Docket Item 19] at 9-10, 12.) This Court denied summary judgment, concluding that there was a genuine dispute of material fact on the present record whether Raymond was being pursued by the police before the officers entered, and that Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. See (Op. Denying Summ. J. ("Op.") [Docket Item 23] at 10-11.)

2. Defendants now move for reconsideration of the denial of summary judgment. They contend that the Court incorrectly applied the standard under the Fourth Amendment when denying Defendants' motion. (Defs. Mot. for Recons. ("Defs. Br.") [Docket Item 27] at 2-3.) They also assert that the evidencewhen viewed as a whole did not contain any genuine dispute of fact over whether the officers entered Plaintiff's house in "hot pursuit." Id. Plaintiff, in turn, submits that Defendants' motion lacks merit because they "merely disagree with the Court's ruling." (Pl. Opp'n [Docket Item 30] at 2.)

3. Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) provides that a party moving for reconsideration must set forth "concisely the matter or controlling decisions which the party believes" the Court "overlooked" in its prior decision. L. Civ. R. 7.1(i). "As such, a party seeking reconsideration must satisfy a high burden, and must rely on one of three grounds: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence not available previously; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice." Max's Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999); N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reins. Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995)).

4. A motion for reconsideration, however, constitutes an extremely limited procedural vehicle, and does "not provide the parties with an opportunity for a second bite at the apple," Tishcio v. Bontex, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 511, 532 (D.N.J. 1998), nor "may [it] be used to relitigate old matters, [or] to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment." Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller &Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2810.1. Mere disagreement with the Court will not suffice to show that the Court overlooked relevant facts or controlling law, United States v. Compaction Sys. Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 339, 345 (D.N.J. 1999), and should be dealt with through the normal appellate process. S.C. ex rel. C.C. v. Deptford Twp Bd. of Educ., 248 F. Supp. 2d 368, 381 (D.N.J. 2003). Therefore, in order for reconsideration to be warranted, the party seeking reconsideration must specifically rely upon one of the qualifying bases, see L. Civ. R. 7.1(i), and not merely a recapitulation of prior cases and arguments, nor an expression of disagreement with the Court's earlier decision. See Arista Records, Inc. v. Flea World, 356 F. Supp. 2d 411, 416 (D.N.J. 2005).

5. Although Defendants' brief is less than clear, Defendants do not appear to argue that there was "an intervening change in controlling law" or the presence of new, previously unavailable, evidence. Instead, Defendants contend that reconsideration is warranted in order to correct a clear error of law, because the Court did not analyze whether the officers' actions were objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. (See Defs. Br. at 2). Likewise, Defendants contend that the Court failed to use the "reasonable objective police officer"standard in its discussion of qualified immunity. (Id.) The Court finds no merit with either argument.

6. The Court applied the correct Fourth Amendment standard in reviewing Defendants' summary judgment motion, and Defendants have not demonstrated that reconsideration is warranted based on a clear error of law. Defendants cite no cases in support of their argument that "[t]he standard to be applied . . . is what an objective police officer would do under these circumstances." (Id.) However, the Court recites the well-established Fourth Amendment standard here for the sake of completeness.

7. It is a "basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980). Thus, warrants are generally required to search a person's home "unless the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1978). An action is "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer's state of mind, 'as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action.'" Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)).

8. The Court stated the correct Fourth Amendment standard in its opinion. Citing to Brigham, it stated that warrantless searches and seizures were presumptively unreasonable, but that warrantless entries were reasonable under certain circumstances, such as when officers are in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect, where "there is compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant." (Op. at 8-9) (quoting Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978)).

9. The Court was also correct in analyzing Plaintiff's claim under the legal standard applicable on a motion for summary judgment. Defendants argued that the evidence on the record showed that Officers Melton and Mathew entered Plaintiff's home in pursuit of Raymond Ramirez and thus their warrantless entry was objectively reasonable. The Court disagreed, noting that at summary judgment, the evidence must be viewed in light most favorable to the plaintiff, and that summary judgment must be denied if, on the evidence presented, there is a material factual dispute and a reasonable jury could find in the plaintiff's favor. After examining the evidence, including the deposition testimony of Plaintiff and two other witnesses, which contradicted the officers' accounts, the Court held that a reasonable jury could find that Officers Melton and Mathews did not pursue Raymond to Plaintiff's home when they entered. (Op. at 10.) The Court took particular note of the factthat Plaintiff and two other witnesses inside the house, Marisol Babilonia and Maria Vargas, all testified, in sum and substance, that Raymond had been inside the house all afternoon and none of them saw him leave. (Id. at 5-6.) Thus, if those statements are believed, a reasonable fact finder could conclude there was no "hot pursuit" at all.

10. Citing a string of cases, the Court correctly explained that while officers may enter a home while pursuing a suspect without stopping to announce their intentions, a warrantless entry not preceded by an immediate or continuous pursuit falls outside the "hot pursuit" exception and is not objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. (See Op. at 10-11) (citing Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42, n.3 (1976); Hazleton v. Trinidad, 488 Fed. App'x 349, 352 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. Schmidt, 403 F.3d 1009, 1013 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Dawkins, 17 F.3d 399, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Thus, contrary to Defendants' contention, the Court specifically concluded that a rational jury could find on the evidence that Defendants Melton and Mathews violated Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights because under the case law, if they were in the act of hot pursuit of Raymond, their actions were not objectively reasonable. Defendants take no issue with any of thecases cited by the Court, and the Court finds no error of law in the Fourth Amendment analysis that would require reversal.

11. Defendants' second argument, that the Court did not apply the "reasonable objective police officer standard" in its discussion of qualified immunity, is also incorrect. (See Defs. Br. at 2.)) The Court correctly stated that qualified immunity protects government officials from liability as long as their conduct "'does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" (Op. at 12) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) and Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 253 (3d Cir. 2010)). The Court also correctly recited the two-prong qualified immunity test: whether a constitutional violation...