Ramirez v. Palmer Twp., CIVIL ACTION NO. 16–5021

292 F.Supp.3d 609

Martin RAMIREZ

v.PALMER TOWNSHIP, et al.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 16–5021

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed February 26, 2018

David Deratzian, Hahalis & Kounoupis, PC, Bethlehem, PA, for Martin Ramirez.

Andrew B. Adair, Deasey Mahoney Valentini North, Ltd., Media, PA, Rufus A. Jennings, Deasey, Mahoney & Valentini, Ltd., Philadelphia, PA, for Palmer Township, et al.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SCHMEHL, District JudgePlaintiff brought this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, claiming that defendant Palmer Township's decision not to retain Plaintiff as a police officer past his one-year probationary period was based on his race and national origin. Plaintiff has also asserted claims against Palmer Township under Title VII and the PHRA for retaliation, hostile work environment and negligence. In addition, Plaintiff claims all defendants discriminated against him on the basis of his race in violation 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Plaintiff has also asserted a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging all the defendants violated the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by terminating his employment without due process of law. Finally, Plaintiff claims the individual defendants aided and abetted discrimination and retaliation under the PHRA. Presently before the Court is defendants' motion for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, the motion is granted.

Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "A motion for summary judgment will not be defeated by ‘the mere existence’ of some disputed facts, but will be denied when there is a genuine issue of material fact." Am. Eagle Outfitters v. Lyle & Scott Ltd., 584 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ). A fact is "material" if proof of its existence or non-existence might affect the outcome of the litigation, and a dispute is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

In undertaking this analysis, the court views the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. "After making all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor, there is a genuine issue of material fact if a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party." Pignataro v. Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J., 593 F.3d 265, 268 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Reliance Ins. Co. v. Moessner, 121 F.3d 895, 900 (3d Cir. 1997) ). While the moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, meeting this obligation shifts the burden to the non-moving party who must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

The following facts are not disputed or construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff:

1. Plaintiff was born in the Dominican Republic. (ECF 19–2, p. 38.)

2. Plaintiff's first language is Spanish. (ECF 19–2, p. 38.)

3. When Plaintiff moved to the United States in 1984, he did not speak any English. (ECF 19–2, p. 39.)

4. When Plaintiff moved to the United States, he took classes in English as a second language for over two years. (ECF 19–2, p. 39.) Plaintiff testified that these classes only taught him the basics of how to communicate, not formal English grammar. (ECF 19–2, p. 40.)

5. When Plaintiff later attended technical school in New York, he took classes in formal English grammar. (ECF–2, pp. 41–42.)

6. Plaintiff described those classes as "a real struggle," and testified, "I guess at that point, I couldn't get it together in school grammatically." (ECF 19–2, p. 42.)

7. Plaintiff took about five (5) classes in formal English grammar, but did not pass all of them. (ECF 19–2, p. 43.)

8. None of these classes addressed the subject of English writing. (ECF 19–2, p. 43.)

9. Plaintiff testified that he still needs to take classes in English writing and grammar, because he could use improvement in those areas. (ECF 19–2, p. 69.)

10. By letter dated October 25, 2013, Plaintiff was notified by Palmer Township Manager Christopher Christman ("Christman") that he was being hired as Probationary Police Officer for a term of one-year, with his effective date of employment beginning on November 11, 2013. (ECF 19–3.)

11. Plaintiff understood that, as a Probationary Police Officer, "you are going to have a year to prove yourself and then after that year, you may continue with your job." (ECF 19–2, p. 85.)

12. Plaintiff understood that the position at Palmer Township was not a civil service position. (ECF 19–2, p. 57.)

13. Plaintiff testified that he understood that this meant that Palmer Township could select who they wanted to bring in to interview. (ECF 19–2, p. 57.)

14. Plaintiff testified that at the time Plaintiff was hired, Defendant Palmer Township Police Chief Louis Palmer ("Chief Palmer") knew that Plaintiff was Hispanic, had emigrated from the Dominican Republic, and spoke with an accent. (ECF 19–2, p. 87.)

15. In fact, when Plaintiff came in for his interview at Palmer Township, he assisted in translating in Spanish for someone who was waiting in the lobby. (ECF 19–2, p. 82.)

16. Several people at Palmer Township, including Chief Palmer, Lieutenant Wayne Smith, Sergeant Timothy Ruoff, and Officers Christopher Watt, Brent Lear, Jeffrey Karp, and Kenneth McPherson, told Plaintiff that his bilingual skills were an asset to the Palmer Township Police Department. (ECF 19–2, p. 106–107.)

17. Plaintiff believes that Chief Palmer hired him because Plaintiff's bilingual skills were an asset to the Palmer Township Police Department. (ECF 19–2, p. 108.)

18. Plaintiff's employment at Palmer Township was his first job as a municipal police officer. (ECF 19–2, p. 86.)

19. Officer Christopher Watt, a Caucasian, who was hired at the same time as Plaintiff as a probationary police officer, already had eight to ten (8–10) years of experience as a municipal police officer in another state. (ECF 19–2, p. 86.)

20. After they were hired, Plaintiff and Officer Watt both spent several weeks reading department policies and procedures. (ECF 19–2, p. 87–88.)

21. After those few weeks, Plaintiff and Officer Watt began field training. (ECF 19 2, pp. 89–90.)

22. Defendant Sergeant Michael Vangelo reviewed and signed-off on every Field Training Daily Observation Report ("FTO"). (ECF 19–4, p. 45.)

23. On December 4, 2013, Officer Jeremiah Santo rated Plaintiff a "2" (below standards) for knowledge of ordinances and for radio articulation.

Officer Santo also noted that Plaintiff needed to pay closer attention to the numbers of addresses, as Plaintiff "forgot or provided a wrong numeric to a house." (ECF 19–5.)

24. On January 1, 2014, Officer Santo noted that Plaintiff "drives to [sic] fast to non priority calls." (ECF 19–6.)

25. On the same day, Officer John Smoke noted that Plaintiff "exceeds expectations of roads-sides/main" but that he "must be more observant of side street stop signs." (ECF 19–7.)

26. On January 9, 2014, Officer Steven Steckel noted that Plaintiff "needs to be re-trained in firearm safety," including the police shotgun. Officer Steckel wrote, "I asked if he was shown to properly load and unload the shotgun, he stated yes, but needs to do it more often." (ECF 19–8.)

27. In light of this concern, Sergeant Vangelo requested that Lieutenant (then Sergeant) Wayne Smith provide this additional training. (ECF 19–9.)

28. Officer Steckel also noted that Plaintiff "[n]eeds more work on report writing" and "driving speed changes stops where there are no stop signs and stops at green lights fails to use turns signals." (ECF 19–8.)

29. The additional firearm training was provided to Plaintiff on January 20, 2014. (ECF 19–10.)

30. Sergeant Wayne Smith noted that Plaintiff properly handled the police shotgun and rifle without issue. (ECF 19–10.)

31. On January 20, 2014, Officer Steckel noted again that Plaintiff "[n]eeds more work on report writing." (ECF 19–11.)

32. On January 23, 2014, Officer Steckel reported that Plaintiff "[n]eeds to improve on report writing," and "[n]eeds to go over the [AR–15] with Sgt. Smith again." Steckel did note that Plaintiff "did well handling the calls, spoke with complainants, gained all info for the report, found his way to the calls without a map." (ECF 19–12.)

33. On January 28, 2014, Officer Steckel noted that Plaintiff's "[r]eport writing needs work." (ECF 19–13.)

34. Officer Steckel also noted that Plaintiff was able to speak to an individual in Spanish, which helped in a certain incident. (ECF 19–13.)

35. On January 29, 2014, Officer Steckel reported that Plaintiff "[s]till needs work on reports." (ECF 19–14.)

36. On February 3, 2014, Officer Steckel reported that Plaintiff "[s]till needs work on reports." (ECF 19–15.)

37. On February 12, 2014, Officer Steckel reported that Plaintiff "[s]till needs work on the reports putting all info into the report from the information that was given to him. Needs to read over his reports before sending it [sic] to the sgt." (ECF 19–16.)

38. In light of the issues identified by the Field Training Officers, a decision was made to extend Plaintiff's Field Training for an additional two to four (2–4) weeks. (ECF 19–16.)

39. On February 16, 2014, Officer Steckel noted that Plaintiff "needs to write down the address, may have gone to wrong address if I didn't advise." (ECF 19–17.)

40. In that report, Officer Steckel also noted, "Martin was given back a few reports from Sgt. Nelson to correct and send back. Martin needs to slow down with the reports. Several corrections are needed." (ECF 19–17.)

41. On February 28, 2014, Officer Jeffrey Karp noted, "Drove to domestic with lights siren activated. Stopped for red lights + stop signs, paying close attention to other traffic on the

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