Ramirez v. State

326 P.3d 474

Phillip G. RAMIREZ, Jr., Plaintiff–Appellee/Cross–Appellant,

v.STATE of New Mexico ex rel. CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES DEPARTMENT, Dorian Dodson, in her individual and official capacities, Ron West, in his individual and official capacities, Barbara Auten, in her individual and official capacities, Roger Gillespie, in his individual and official capacities, Ted Lovato, in his individual and official capacities, Tim Holesinger, in his individual and official capacities, and Daniel Berg, in his individual and official capacities, Defendants–Appellants/Cross–Appellees.

No. 31,820.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

March 3, 2014.

Certiorari Granted, May 1, 2014, No. 34,613.

Vega Lynn Law Offices, LLC, Rosario D. Vega Lynn, Lorenz Law, Alice T. Lorenz, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee/Cross–Appellant.

Hinkle, Hensley, Shanor & Martin, L.L.P., Ellen S. Casey, Jaclyn M. McLean, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellants/Cross–Appellees.

The Reserve Officers Association of America, Samuel F. Wright, Washington, D.C., Law Office of Thomas G. Jarrard, PLLC, Thomas G. Jarrard, Spokane, WA, Struebel Kochersberger Mortimer LLC, David A. Streubel, Albuquerque, NM, for Amicus Curiae The Reserve Officers Association of America.

Legal Panel Member, ACLU–NM, Matthew L. Garcia, Albuquerque, NM, for Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union.

Damon Martinez, United States Attorney, Manuel Lucero, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Albuquerque, NM, Office of the Solicitor, M. Patricia Smith, Solicitor of Labor, Department of Justice/Appellate Section, Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney General, Nathaniel S. Pollock, Jessica Dunsay Silver, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae United States.

OPINION

FRY, Judge.

{1} Plaintiff, a member of the New Mexico National Guard, filed suit pursuant to the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301 to 4335 (1994, as amended through 2011), against his former employer, the New Mexico Children, Youth, and Families Department (CYFD), following his termination. The issue presented by this appeal is whether CYFD, as an arm of the State, is entitled to constitutional state sovereign immunity in regard to Plaintiff's claim. Because we determine that Congress cannot override a state's sovereign immunity when acting pursuant to its war powers and because the New Mexico Legislature has not waived the State's sovereign immunity for USERRA suits, we conclude that CYFD is immune from Plaintiff's claim and accordingly reverse the district court's contrary determination.

BACKGROUND

{2} Plaintiff began working for CYFD as a community support officer in 1997. At that time, Plaintiff had been a member of the New Mexico National Guard for approximately six years. Plaintiff continued his military service throughout his term of employment with CYFD and, in 2005, Plaintiff was deployed to Iraq.

{3} By all accounts, Plaintiff served admirably while deployed. Upon his return from active duty, Plaintiff was re-employed by CYFD in his previous position. Plaintiff testified that soon after his return, his new supervisors began harassing him. His allegations of harassment included claims that supervisors placed unrealistic goals on his employment responsibilities, initiated unnecessary disciplinary action against him, and leveled unfounded charges of insubordination. Plaintiff voiced his complaints of harassment with both his supervisors and those higher in the CYFD chain of command. However, Plaintiff's working relationship with his supervisors continued to deteriorate, and he was placed on administrative leave and subsequently terminated in the spring of 2008. {4} Plaintiff brought suit against CYFD alleging, in part, that he was discriminated against and wrongfully terminated because of his military service, in contravention of USERRA, 38 U.S.C. § 4311. CYFD argued on multiple occasions throughout the proceedings that, as a state agency, it was immune to USERRA claims by private individuals. The district court rejected CYFD's argument, and the case proceeded to trial, where Plaintiff succeeded in his USERRA claim and was awarded damages. CYFD now appeals.

DISCUSSION

{5} The primary issue in this appeal is whether constitutional state sovereign immunity, as recognized by Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida and its progeny, precludes Plaintiff's USERRA claim against CYFD. 517 U.S. 44, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) (holding that Congress cannot subject non-consenting states to suit in federal court when acting under its Article I powers); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999) (holding that Congress cannot use its Article I powers to subject non-consenting states to suit in state court). This determination rests on two inquiries: (1) whether Congress has the authority to subject a state to a USERRA suit by a private individual in the state's own courts and, (2) if not, whether New Mexico has waived sovereign immunity for USERRA claims and therefore consented to suit. We address these issues in turn.

Standard of Review

{6} “We review de novo the validity of a claim of sovereign immunity.” State ex rel. San Miguel Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Williams, 2007–NMCA–036, ¶ 20, 141 N.M. 356, 155 P.3d 761. Furthermore, to the extent that issues in this case require us to interpret statutory language, interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review de novo. Morgan Keegan Mortg. Co. v. Candelaria, 1998–NMCA–008, ¶ 5, 124 N.M. 405, 951 P.2d 1066.

Congress Does Not Have the Authority to Subordinate State Sovereign Immunity Under the War Powers Clause

{7} Our Supreme Court has previously discussed the United States Supreme Court's controversial recognition of constitutional state sovereign immunity and the impact of the Seminole Tribe line of cases on Congress's authority to permit private suits for damages against non-consenting states. See State ex rel. Hanosh v. State ex rel. King, 2009–NMSC–047, ¶ 6, 147 N.M. 87, 217 P.3d 100 (“As a principle of federalism, constitutional sovereign immunity circumscribes the power of the U.S. Congress to create statutory rights and enforce them against the states absent their consent.” (emphasis omitted)); Gill v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Bd. of Pub. Emps. Ret. Ass'n of N.M., 2004–NMSC–016, ¶¶ 5–6, 135 N.M. 472, 90 P.3d 491 (discussing the principles of federalism underlying the United States Supreme Court's decision in Seminole Tribe ); see also Cockrell v. Bd. of Regents, 2002–NMSC–009, ¶¶ 4–8, 132 N.M. 156, 45 P.3d 876. Rather than reiterate the development of the constitutional sovereign immunity doctrine, we begin instead by discussing the history of USERRA in relation to the evolution of this jurisprudence.

{8} USERRA was enacted by Congress with the stated purpose of “encourag[ing] noncareer service in the uniformed services by eliminating or minimizing the disadvantages to civilian careers and employment which can result from such service.” 38 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(1). In addition to “providing for the prompt reemployment of [service members] upon their completion of such service,” USERRA aims to fulfill its goal by “prohibit[ing] discrimination against persons because of their service in the uniformed services.” Section 4301(a)(2), (3). Because the purpose of USERRA is to encourage military service, it is generally accepted—and undisputed by the parties in this case—that it was enacted pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the United States Constitution, also known as the War Powers Clause. See Bedrossian v. Nw. Mem'l Hosp., 409 F.3d 840, 843–44 (7th Cir.2005).

{9} USERRA originally provided for federal court jurisdiction over suits brought by private individuals against state employers. See USERRA, Pub.L. No. 103–353, § 2(a)(c)(1)(A) 108 Stat. 3149, 3165 (1994) (current version at 38 U.S.C. § 4323(b)(1) (2008)) (providing that “[t]he district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction” over all USERRA actions, including suits against a state employer). However, the United States Supreme Court's decision in Seminole Tribe cast significant doubt on Congress's authority to subject states to USERRA suits by private individuals in federal court.¹Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 45, 116 S.Ct. 1114 (“The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction.”); see Palmatier v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 981 F.Supp. 529, 532 (W.D.Mich.1997) (“Applying the lesson of Seminole Tribe, it necessarily follows that Congress, acting under Article I, could not effectively abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity in USERRA [as originally enacted].”). Congress, therefore, in an apparent attempt to provide an alternative avenue of relief for private individuals seeking to enforce rights under USERRA against state employers, amended USERRA in 1998 to provide that “[i]n the case of an action against a [s]tate (as an employer) by a person, the action may be brought in a [s]tate court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the laws of the [s]tate.” 38 U.S.C. § 4323(b)(2).

{10} Soon after USERRA was amended to purportedly vest jurisdiction in state courts for private suits against state employers, the United States Supreme Court, in Alden, extended its holding in Seminole Tribe when it addressed the corollary question of whether Congress could subject non-consenting states to suit in state court. The Court held that it could not. Alden, 527 U.S. at 712, 119 S.Ct. 2240 (“We hold that the powers delegated to Congress under Article I of the United States Constitution do not include the power to subject non[-]consenting [s]tates to private suits for damages in state courts.”). In framing the issue, the Court examined whether there was “compelling evidence” that “Congress may subject the [s]tates to private suits in their own courts” pursuant to its Article I powers by virtue of ...