Ramirez v. Stephens, CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:12-CV-410

JOHN H RAMIREZ, Petitioner, v. WILLIAM STEPHENS, Respondent.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:12-CV-410

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION

June 10, 2015

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

In 2008, a jury convicted John Henry Ramirez of capital murder for a killing committed during the course of a robbery. A separate punishment hearing resulted in a death sentence. After exhausting state avenues for relief, Ramirez now petitions for federal habeas corpus relief. Respondent William Stephens has filed an answer. Having reviewed the record, pleadings, and the applicable law—giving special consideration to the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's ("AEDPA") deferential standards—the Court will deny Ramirez's petition.

I. BACKGROUND

At around closing time on July 19, 2004, Pablo Castro exited the convenience store where he worked to empty the trash. A few minutes later, a girl entered the store and told Castro's co-worker that a bleeding man was lying in the parking lot. Castro's co-worker called 9-1-1 and went outside, only to find Castro covered in blood on the pavement. Castro died from the 29 stab wounds that he received at Ramirez's hands.

At trial, Ramirez's co-defendant Christina Chavez described the events leading up to the murder and those that transpired afterwards. Ramirez had spent a few days partying with Chavez and her girlfriend Angela Rodriguez. The group binged on substances including cocaine, Xanax, "psych meds," marijuana, and alcohol. Tr. Vol. 18, p. 130.¹ When the group ran out of drugs and did not have any money to purchase more, they came up with a plan to "grab some people and not hurt them . . . just take their money and leave." Tr. Vol. 18, p. 133. They drove to the convenience store where Castro worked. Chavez stayed in the car and watched the others approach Castro. Ramirez began "wrestling around" with Castro and then was "just stabbing that man. He was stabbing him until he fell on his knees." Tr. Vol. 18, p. 137. After Castro fell to the ground, Chavez saw Rodriguez searching the victim's pockets. Other eyewitnesses testified that Ramirez also searched Castro's body for money. They only took $1.25. Ramirez and his friends then fled.

The group went to clean Castro's blood off before proceeding to attempt other robberies. Police officers soon engaged the group in an extensive chase that ended with Chavez and Rodriguez under arrest. Ramirez eluded the manhunt, but was finally apprehended four years later near the border with Mexico.

The State of Texas charged Ramirez with intentionally or knowingly causing Castro's death by stabbing him while in the course of committing or attempting to commit robbery. Clerk's Record, p. 2; Tex. Penal Code § 19.03(a)(2). Ramirez stood trial in the 94th Judicial District Court for Nueces County, Texas, with the Honorable Bobby Galvan presiding. The trial court appointed Edward F. Garza and John Grant Jones to represent Ramirez at trial.²

The prosecution presented a highly incriminating case showing Ramirez's commission of the murder, and the subsequent attempts at aggravated robbery. The defense conceded that Ramirez killed Castro, but challenged the robbery element that elevated his crime to a capital offense. In particular, trial counsel disputed the eyewitness testimony that Ramirez had participated in searching Castro for money.³ The jury found Ramirez guilty of capital murder.

After the jury convicted Ramirez, the trial court held a separate punishment hearing. A Texas jury determines a capital defendant's sentence through answers to special issue questions. In this case, the trial court's instructions required the jury to decide (1) whether Ramirez would be a future societal danger and (2) whether sufficient circumstances mitigated against the imposition of a death sentence. Clerk's Record, p.259; Tex. Code Crim. Pro. art. 37.071 § 2. The parties presented weighty evidence in the sentencing phase. The State's numerous witnesses described Ramirez's lengthy history of bad acts and lawlessness. See Ramirez, 2011 WL 1196886, at *1-6 (summarizing the prosecution's punishment-phase case). As its first witness, the defense called Ramirez's father to provide insight into his upbringing. The next morning, the defense announced that Ramirez had ordered them not to call any additional witnesses. After the trial court inquired into Ramirez's decision, the defense ended its punishment-phase case. Under Ramirez's direction, the defense's closing argument consisted of reading a single verse from the Holy Bible. The jury answered Texas's special issues in a manner requiring the imposition of a death sentence.

Through appointed counsel,⁴ Ramirez challenged his conviction and sentence on automatic direct appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. On March 16, 2011, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed in an unpublished decision. Id. at *1. Ramirez's conviction became final when the time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court expired.

Under Texas law, state appellate and habeas review run concurrently. Tex. Code Crim. Pro. art. 11.071 § 4. Through appointed habeas counsel, Ramirez filed a state application for a writ of habeas corpus raising five points of error that challenged his conviction and sentence, most of which he renews in federal court. Ramirez tried to dismiss his state habeas action. The state habeas court authorized an expert to perform acompetency evaluation, and the expert found Ramirez competent. Ramirez, however, apparently decided to continue judicial review of his habeas application.

The state habeas court designated issues needing resolution in an evidentiary hearing. State Habeas Record, pp. 366-67. The state habeas court held a three-day hearing in which several witnesses, including both trial attorneys, testified. On January 9, 2012, the state habeas court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law and recommended that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals deny habeas relief. Based on the lower court's recommendation and its own review of the record, the Court of Criminal Appeals denied relief in an unpublished decision. Ex parte Ramirez, No. WR-72,735-03, 2012 WL 4834115 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

Federal review followed. Ramirez's federal habeas petition raises five grounds for relief:

1. Ramirez's absence from the courtroom during a pre-trial hearing in which the parties agreed to excuse several veniremembers violated his due process rights.

2. Closed proceedings during one day of voir dire violated Ramirez's federal right to a public trial.

3. Ramirez's rights to due process and a fair trial were denied because the jury was aware that he had been shackled for trial proceedings.

4. Trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by: (a) not adequately questioning potential jurors about their views on the death penalty; (b) inadequately presenting mitigating evidence; (c) failing to make certain objections; (d) not ensuring Ramirez's competency to waive the presentation of additional evidence during the penalty phase; and (e) failing to preserve a claim for appellate review.

5. Vagueness renders Texas's capital sentencing statute unconstitutional.

Respondent has filed an answer arguing that procedural and substantive law precludes habeas relief on Ramirez's claims. D.E. 23. Ramirez has filed a reply. D.E. 30. This matter is ripe for adjudication.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

The writ of habeas corpus provides an important, but narrow, examination of an inmate's conviction and sentence. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983). "Society's resources have been concentrated at [a criminal trial] in order to decide, within the limits of human fallibility, the question of guilt or innocence of one of its citizens." Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977); see also McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 859 (1994) (stating that a "criminal trial is the 'main event' at which a defendant's rights are to be determined"). States, therefore, "possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law. In criminal trials they also hold the initial responsibility for vindicating constitutional rights. Federal intrusions into state criminal trials frustrate both the States' sovereign power to punish offenders and their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights." Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982). With that respect for the state-court system, several principles circumscribe both federal habeas review and the availability of federal habeas relief.

As an initial matter, AEDPA "unambiguously provides that a federal court may issue the writ to a state prisoner 'only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.'" Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 16 (2010) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)). Accordingly, "federal habeas corpus reliefdoes not lie for errors of state law." Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011) (quotation omitted); see also Corcoran, 562 U.S. at 16; Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991).⁵ How an inmate has litigated his claims in state court determines the course of federal habeas adjudication. Under the exhaustion doctrine, AEDPA precludes federal relief on constitutional challenges that an inmate has not first raised in state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). As a corollary to exhaustion, the procedural-bar doctrine requires inmates to litigate claims in compliance with state procedural law. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 392 (2004); Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 523 (1997); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991). A federal court may only review an inmate's unexhausted or procedurally barred claims if he shows: (1) cause and actual prejudice or (2) that "a constitutional violation has 'probably resulted' in the conviction of one who is 'actually innocent . . . . '" Haley, 541 U.S. at 393 (quoting Murray v. Carrier...