Ramirez–Lluveras v. Pagan–Cruz

857 F.Supp.2d 221

Evelyn RAMIREZ–LLUVERAS, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Javier PAGAN–CRUZ, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 08–1486 (FAB).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

April 23, 2012.

Judith Berkan, Mary Jo Mendez–Vilella, Berkan & Mendez, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.

Eliezer Alberto Aldarondo–Lopez, Michael C. McCall, Simone Cataldi–Malpica, Aldarondo & Lopez Bras, PSC, Michael S. Corona–Munoz, Damaris Delgado–Vega, Guaynabo, PR, Pedro J. Landrau–Lopez, San Juan, PR, Carlos E. Cardona–Fernandez, Carolina, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

BESOSA, District Judge.

This litigation arises out of Miguel A. Caceres–Cruz's (“Caceres”) murder by former Puerto Rico Police Department (“PRPD”) officer Javier Pagan–Cruz (“Pagan”). Pagan was convicted by the Puerto Rico Court of First Instance, Humacao Division, of First Degree Murder, P.R. Laws Ann. Tit. 33, § 4734, for shooting and killing Caceres while attempting to arrest him. Caceres' widow, Evelyn Ramirez–Lluveras, and their three children, Jenitza Caceres, MC and MAC (collectively, the “plaintiffs”) bring suit against Pagan, on behalf of themselves and Caceres, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“section 1983”) and Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5141 (“article 1802”).¹ (Docket No. 64.)

Before the Court is the plaintiffs' unopposed motion requesting partial summary judgment regarding Pagan's liability.² (Docket No. 365.) The principal issue is whether there is a genuine issue of material fact that Pagan violated the plaintiffs' rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution when Pagan was convicted of First Degree Murder. For the reasons set forth below, the Court: (1) GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the plaintiffs' motion; (2) GRANTS summary judgment in Pagan's favor with respect to plaintiffs' claims under the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; (3) DISMISSES plaintiffs' section 1983 claim brought in their personal capacities against Pagan; and (4) ORDERS PLAINTIFFS TO SHOW CAUSE why the Court should not grant summary judgment in favor of defendants Diaz and Sustache–Sustache with respect to plaintiffs' claims brought pursuant to the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

The Court's discretion to grant summary judgment is governed by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 56 states, in pertinent part, that the court may grant summary judgment only if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” See also Santiago–Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir.2000).

Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” SeeRule 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

Once a properly supported motion has been presented, the opposing party has the burden of demonstrating that a trial-worthy issue exists that would warrant the court's denial of the motion for summary judgment. For issues where the opposing party bears the ultimate burden of proof, that party cannot merely rely on the absence of competent evidence, but must affirmatively point to specific facts that demonstrate the existence of an authentic dispute. See Suarez v. Pueblo Int'l., Inc., 229 F.3d 49 (1st Cir.2000).

In order for a factual controversy to prevent summary judgment, the contested facts must be “material” and the dispute must be “genuine.” “Material” means that a contested fact has the potential to change the outcome of the suit under governing law. The issue is “genuine” when a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party based on the evidence. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). It is well settled that “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” is insufficient “to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. It is therefore necessary that “a party opposing summary judgment must present definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion.” Maldonado–Denis v. Castillo–Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir.1994).

In making this assessment, the Court “must view the entire record in the light most hospitable to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging in all reasonable inference in that party's favor.” Griggs–Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir.1990). The Court may safely ignore, however, “conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation.” Medina–Muñoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990).

DISCUSSION

The plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to partial summary judgment on liability because the issue preclusion doctrine conclusively establishes Pagan's liability when Pagan was found guilty of murdering Caceres.³ After addressing the plaintiffs' standing to bring suit under section 1983, the Court analyzes whether the plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment.

I. Section 1983 Standing

“Standing is the determination of whether a specific person is the proper party to bring a particular matter to the court for adjudication.” Benjamin v. Aroostook Med. Ctr., Inc., 57 F.3d 101, 104 (1st Cir.1995) (citing Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 2.3, at 48 (1989)). Plaintiffs bring suit against Pagan on their own behalf and a survival claim on Caceres' behalf. (Docket No. 64.) The Court may review whether the plaintiffs have standing to bring suit sua sponte. Pagan v. Calderon, 448 F.3d 16, 26 (1st Cir.2006) (internal citations omitted).

Plaintiffs have standing to assert a section 1983 action on Caceres' behalf because Puerto Rico law permits a decedent's heirs to recover for the decedent's pain and suffering prior to death. Ramirez–Lluveras v. Pagan–Cruz, 833 F.Supp.2d 151, 157–59 (D.P.R.2011) (“Ramirez–Lluveras I ”) (internal citations omitted). In contrast, plaintiffs have standing to bring suit in their individual capacities pursuant to section 1983 only if Pagan's conduct was aimed at the familial relationship. Robles–Vazquez v. Tirado Garcia, 110 F.3d 204, 206 n. 4 (1st Cir.1997). In Ramirez–Lluveras I, this Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring suit against supervisory defendants in their personal capacities. There, the Court reasoned that the plaintiffs' allegation that the supervisory defendants' conductdeprived them of the enjoyment of Caceres' company was not aimed at the familial relationship. Id. (citing Soto v. Flores, 103 F.3d 1056, 1062 (1st Cir.1997); Reyes Vargas v. Rosello Gonzalez, 135 F.Supp.2d 305, 308–09 (D.P.R.2001); Gonzalez Rodriguez v. Alvarado, 134 F.Supp.2d 451, 452–53 (D.P.R.2001)). Accordingly, here, like in Ramirez–Lluveras I, the plaintiffs' section 1983 action brought in their personal capacities against Pagan is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

II. The Preclusive Effect of State Criminal Convictions on Subsequent Civil Actions

The plaintiffs argue that Pagan's conviction conclusively establishes Pagan's liability under section 1983. (Docket No. 365 at ¶ 1.) The plaintiffs do not cite to any authority addressing the preclusive effect of a state court criminal conviction on a subsequent federal civil suit.⁴ Nevertheless, the Court will delve into the lacuna left by the plaintiffs and determine to what extent, if any, the Court may use Pagan's criminal conviction.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1738, “judicial proceedings of any court of any ... State, Territory or Possession ... shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States ... as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.” Thus, because the plaintiffs attempt to use Pagan's Puerto Rico criminal conviction to establish liability in this civil suit, Puerto Rico law governs the preclusive effect of the conviction. SeeAllen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980) (internal citations omitted) (“Congress has specifically required all federal courts to give preclusive effect to state-court judgments whenever the courts of the state from which the judgment emerged would do so.”).

Puerto Rico's issue preclusion law is codified at P.R. Laws Ann. tit 31, § 3343 (“section 3343”).⁵ Under Puerto Rico law, the issue preclusion doctrine precludes relitigation of an issue determined by a Puerto Rico criminal court in a subsequent federal civil suit only “ ‘if in the adjudication of the prior case, facts which are necessarily decisive for the second [case] were clearly and directly considered and adjudged.’ ” Perry v. Capitol Air, Inc., 649 F.Supp. 1260, 1264–65 (D.P.R.1986) (quoting Pueblo v. Ortiz Marrero, 106 D.P.R. 140, 144 (1977)); Canales Garcia v. Santiago, Case No. N3CI2007–00299, 2011 WL 4018185, at *4 (TCA July 15, 2011). The facts necessary for Pagan's criminal conviction are not identical to those required to establish liability in this case. A prima facie case under section 1983 requires, among other things, the defendant to be acting under the color of state law. Gutierrez–Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 559 (1st Cir.1989) (internal citations omitted). In contrast, the Puerto Rico Penal code defines First Degree Murder as any murder committed “by means of ... premeditation.” P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 33, § 4733. The prosecution need not establish that the accused was acting under the color of law to sustain a conviction. Therefore, Pagan's guilty conviction is not entitled to full preclusive effect in this case. See Perry, 649 F.Supp. at 1264–65.

Nevertheless, the Puerto Rico...