Ramos Padro v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico

100 F.Supp.2d 99

Dr. Rosalina RAMOS PADRO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 95-1770(HL).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

June 15, 2000.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Judith Berkan, Rio Piedras, PR, for Rosalina Ramos-Padro.

Judith Berkan, Rio Piedras, PR, Suzanne B. Goldberg, Lambda Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., New York City, Colleen Meenan, New York City, for Gay Officers Action League.

Russell A. Del-Toro, Del Toro & Santana, U.S. Dept. of Justice, San Juan, PR, for Pedro A. Toledo-Davila.

John M. Garcia-Nokonechna, Garcia & Fernandez Law Offices, Hato Rey, PR, for Eric Serrano-Gonzalez, Carlos Haddock.

OPINION AND ORDER

LAFFITTE, Chief Judge.

Before the Court is Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees and costs. Plaintiffs are Dr. Rosalina Ramos Padró ("Ramos"), Carroll Hunter, Thomas Jeans, and the Gay Officers Actions League ("GOAL"). Defendants are the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and Pedro Toledo, the superintendent of the Puerto Rico Police Department.¹ Plaintiffs brought this action for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. One of their claims was for a declaratory judgment that the Puerto Rico Police Department's internal regulation number 29 ("Regulation 29") was unconstitutional. In addition to their challenge to Regulation 29, Plaintiffs brought other claims seeking monetary relief for police conduct in February 1995 and June 1996 which they claim violated their constitutional rights.

Following extensive discovery on these issues, the parties submitted a flurry of motions for summary judgment on all of the claims. On September 30, 1998, the Court issued a series of opinions and orders resolving these motions. In the Regulation 29 claim, the Court ruled in favor of Plaintiffs and declared that the regulation was unconstitutional because it unduly encroached upon GOAL's First Amendment associational rights.² The Court entered summary judgment dismissing some of the other claims, and the parties ultimately settled the remaining claims.

Defendants moved to alter the Court's partial judgment entered on the Regulation 29 claim.³ The Court denied the motion.⁴ Pursuant to a status conference held shortly after the Court had resolved these dispositive motions, the Court ordered Toledo to take affirmative steps to bring the Police Department's regulations into compliance with the Court's order finding the regulation to be unconstitutional.⁵ Defendants filed a revised version of regulation for the Department.⁶ This revised version, however, contained ambiguous language that risked setting off another round of litigation. The Court responded by amending the partial judgment entered on this issue and permanently enjoining Toledo, his successors, agents, and employees from punishing any member of the Police Department because that person had associated with a person who is homosexual.⁷ Defendants moved to alter or amend this partial judgment.⁸ The Court again denied the request.⁹

Plaintiffs now petition the Court to recover pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 their attorneys' fees and costs incurred in the prosecution of their Regulation 29 claim. Defendants challenge this petition and argue that Plaintiffs should not be considered prevailing parties; that the requested time and hourly rate are unreasonable; that the work done by Plaintiffs' counsel was duplicative or unnecessary; and that the amount claimed is simply not reasonable. Defendants also contest the request for costs. The Court grants Plaintiffs' petition, subject to certain modifications explained below.

DISCUSSION

1. Prevailing party status

In order to qualify for attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, a section 1983 plaintiff must be a prevailing party. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 109, 113 S.Ct. 566, 572, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). The statute provides that the district court "in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fees ...." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988(b) (West Supp. 2000). Although this language appears to make an award of attorneys' fees discretionary, courts have generally held that a prevailing party should be compensated for its reasonable attorneys' fees, unless special circumstances would make such an award unjust. Stanton v. Southern Berkshire Regional Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 574, 576 (1st Cir.1999); Williams v. Hanover Housing Auth., 113 F.3d 1294, 1300-01 (1st Cir.1997). Thus, the successful civil rights litigant will be presumptively entitled to an award of attorneys' fees. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429, 103 S.Ct. at 1937; Williams, 113 F.3d at 1300-01; Casa Marie Hogar Geriatrico, Inc. v. Rivera-Santos, 38 F.3d 615, 618 (1st Cir.1994). The party seeking attorneys' fees must submit evidence to support the hours and rates sought. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. at 1939; Weinberger v. Great Northern Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d 518, 527 (1st Cir.1991). Withal, the attorneys' fees issue should not turn into a second round of litigation. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437, 103 S.Ct. at 1941; Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., Inc., 191 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir.1999).

The apparently straightforward question of whether a plaintiff is a prevailing party is often fraught with complexity. The Supreme Court has styled prevailing party status as having a "generous formulation." See Farrar, 506 U.S. at 109, 113 S.Ct. at 572 (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. at 1939 (internal quotations omitted)). A plaintiff must obtain at least some relief on her claim in order to qualify as a prevailing party. Id. at 111, 113 S.Ct. at 573. For a plaintiff to be a prevailing party, there must be a judgment enforceable against the defendant or some other comparable relief, through a settlement or consent decree. Id. There must be some resolution of the dispute which changes the legal relationship between plaintiff and defendant. Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 1493, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989). The plaintiff will have prevailed if the "actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff." Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111-12, 113 S.Ct. at 573. Put another way, the plaintiff must win "significant practical relief favorable to its position." Stanton, 197 F.3d at 576-77.

In the present case, the first cause of action in Plaintiffs' amended complaint was a request to have Regulation 29 declared unconstitutional on First Amendment and equal protection grounds.¹⁰ Plaintiffs were successful in achieving the result sought in this cause of action. The Court granted declaratory relief declaring the regulation unconstitutional. Later, it permanently enjoined Defendants from punishing any member of the Police Department because that person had associated with a person who is homosexual. Thus, Plaintiffs would appear to be prevailing parties on this matter.

Defendants argue, however, that Plaintiffs' victory on this issue was merely a technical one and that therefore Plaintiffs should not be granted prevailing party status. A party's success on a claim may be so de minimis or insignificant that prevailing party status will not be justified. Garland, 489 U.S. at 792, 109 S.Ct. at 1493; Coutin v. Young & Rubicam Puerto Rico, Inc., 124 F.3d 331, 339 (1st Cir.1997). Defendants argue that because no Puerto Rico police officer was ever disciplined under Regulation 29, the striking down of the rule was a purely technical victory.

The Court disagrees. The Court's ruling did alter the legal relationship between the parties in this case. The Court has enjoined Defendants and their successors from ever disciplining a police officer for associating with a homosexual person. As the Court stated in its opinion and order on Regulation 29, Plaintiff GOAL is an organization whose membership is primarily made up of gay law enforcement officers. The group's objectives include providing support to openly gay law enforcement personnel and combating discrimination against gays.¹¹ There was evidence in the record that when GOAL members met with Puerto Rico police officers, they did so clandestinely in order to protect the confidentiality of the local police officers.¹² In its opinion, the Court concluded that the rule prevented GOAL from carrying out its activities.¹³ The elimination of this rule will facilitate GOAL's ability to meet with Puerto Rico police officers and to promote its agenda in Puerto Rico. Local police officers may now meet with GOAL without the threat that they will be disciplined under Regulation 29 or a similar rule. Defendants are bound by the Court's permanent injunction from taking adverse measures against any police officer who attends such a meeting.

Thus, the Court's ruling materially altered the legal relationship between GOAL and Defendants in a way directly beneficial to GOAL. See Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111-12, 113 S.Ct. at 573. The Court declared Regulation 29 to be unconstitutional. Other courts have held that a plaintiff who successfully persuades a court to declare a statute unconstitutional is a prevailing party. See Wyatt v. Cole, 928 F.2d 718, 723-24 (5th Cir.1991), rev'd on other grounds, 504 U.S. 158, 112 S.Ct. 1827, 118 L.Ed.2d 504 (1992); Solomon v. City of Gainesville, 796 F.2d 1464, 1466 (11th Cir.1986) (Plaintiff was prevailing party when he succeeded in having a city ordinance declared violative of the First Amendment); Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391, 405-06 (5th Cir.1980) ("granting of declaratory relief and nominal damages, based on our having found [state statute] to be unconstitutional, adequately justifies an award of attorney's fees"); Putnam v. Davies, 960 F.Supp. 1268, 1275-76 (...