Ramos v. Municipality Grande

Carlos L. Rosario Ramos, et al., Plaintiffs v. The Municipality of Río Grande, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL NO. 18-1050 (PG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

February 22, 2019

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the court is the motion to dismiss filed by the defendants Municipality of Río Grande (henceforth "Municipality"), Hon. Angel B. González Damudt (henceforth "González-Damudt"), Rey O. Caraballo Rodríguez (henceforth "Caraballo-Rodríguez"); Leysla Ortiz Sánchez (henceforth "Ortiz-Sánchez"), Jose A. Adorno Aponte (henceforth "Adorno-Aponte"), and Evelyn González Robles (henceforth "González-Robles") (collectively as "Defendants"). See Docket No. 18. In their motion, Defendants request the dismissal of this case arguing that plaintiffs Carlos L. Rosario Ramos (henceforth "Rosario-Ramos"), Ivelisse Rosario Méndez (henceforth "Rosario-Méndez"), and Ricardo Torrens Osorio (henceforth "Torrens-Osorio") (collectively as "Plaintiffs") failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiffs filed a timely response to said motion (Docket No. 27), to which Defendants have not replied. After considering the parties' pleadings and the applicable law, Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. BACKGROUND

On January 31, 2018, Plaintiffs filed the present complaint against the Municipality and the other individual Defendants in their official and personal capacities pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violations to their rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The complaint also includes claims for damages under Article 1802 of Puerto Rico's Civil Code, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 5141. In sum, plaintiffs Rosario-Ramos and Rosario-Méndez allege that Defendants violated their First Amendment rights by retaliating against them after having made constitutionally-protected public expressions.

Specifically, on August 3, 2009, Rosario-Ramos started work as a heavy equipment driver under a temporary contract with the Public Works Department of the Municipality of Río Grande. See Docket No. 1 at page 2. On September 25, 2016, Rosario-Ramos wrote a Facebook message stating: "Populares de Río Grande with Davis [sic] Acosta, (Popular Party Members with David Acosta)." Id. Through this message, Rosario-Ramos changed his political affiliation from the Popular Democratic Party (henceforth "PDP") to the New Progressive Party (henceforth "NPP"). See id. The next day, Mayor González-Damudt purportedly ordered the PDP administration of Río Grande to commence a program of persecution and discrimination against Rosario-Ramos. Said pattern of discrimination by co-defendants Mayor González-Damudt, Caraballo-Rodríguez, and Ortiz-Sánchez culminated with Rosario-Ramos' termination on January 31, 2017, even though he allegedly had a perfect performance and track record, and Mayor González-Damudt had promised him on July 2016 that he would be reclassified as a regular permanent employee. See id.

On the other hand, on July 19, 2013, Rosario-Méndez began to work as a temporary employee in the Purchasing Office of the Municipality of Río Grande. During her tenure as a purchasing officer, Rosario-Méndez dealt with several irregularities perpetrated by Mayor González-Damudt and the special assistant to the mayor, co-defendant Adorno-Aponte. Specifically, they purportedly ordered Rosario-Méndez to purchase materials using public funds for the private home of Attorney Noemí Caraballo López and a tire for a private truck. See id. at 3-4. At an undisclosed date, Rosario-Méndez received a telephone call from a radio commentator, José Cruz Jiménez (henceforth "Cruz-Jiménez"), requesting information about the use of public municipal funds for private use and she felt compelled to tell the truth. See id. at 4. Cruz-Jiménez made the information public, and he subsequently filed several still-pending complaints against the Municipality of Río Grande, Mayor González-Damudt and other municipal officers for the use of public municipal funds for private use.

At some point on September 2016, Adorno-Aponte allegedly told another purchasing agent, Elizabeth Sánchez, "that by orders from the top (referring to Mayor González-Damudt), Ivelisse Rosario Méndez would not perform any work, and no telephone calls could be received by her at work." Id. Subsequently, on September 29, 2016, co-defendant Adorno-Aponte demoted Rosario-Méndez within the Purchasing Office by eliminating some of her duties. See id. Additionally, on October and December 2016, Rosario-Méndez provided, under oath, information on the illegal use of private funds to Justice Department investigators. As a result of these events, Rosario-Méndez was not assigned any work from September 2016 until December 31, 2016, when Adorno-Aponte resigned and was replaced by co-defendant González-Robles, who began to assign Rosario-Méndez "irrelevant jobs" once every one or two weeks. This situation continued until she was terminated on August 31, 2017. See id. at 5-6.

Additionally, Torrens-Osorio, conjugal partner of Rosario-Méndez, claims damages under Puerto Rico's Torts statute for the persecution and discrimination that he purportedly suffered in his workplace at the Public Works Department of the Municipality of Rio Grande due to his wife's public interest expressions. See Docket No. 27 at pages 7-8.

Because of the events outlined above, Plaintiffs filed the present complaint requesting compensatory and punitive damages of no less than $300,000 for Rosario-Ramos, $300,000 for Rosario-Méndez, $50,000 for Torrens-Osorio, and a final $50,000 for their conjugal partnership. See id. at 9. Furthermore, Plaintiffs request equitable relief in the form of a permanent injunction ordering Defendants to reinstate plaintiffs Rosario-Ramos and Rosario-Méndez at their previous positions, as well as any attorney's fees, costs and expenses incurred in connection to the present action. See id. at 9-10.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When ruling on a motion to dismiss brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a district court must "accept as true the well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint, draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the plaintiff's favor, and determine whether the complaint, so read, limns facts sufficient to justify recovery on any cognizable theory." Rivera v. Centro Medico de Turabo, Inc., 575 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing LaChapelle v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 142 F.3d 507, 508 (1st Cir. 1998)). Even though detailed factual allegations are not necessary for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do . . . ." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Those nonconclusory factual allegations that the court accepts as true must be sufficient to give the claim facial plausibility. See Quiros v. Muñoz, 670 F.Supp.2d 130, 132 (D.P.R. 2009). "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Furthermore, "[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

III. DISCUSSION

On August 23, 2018, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).¹ Each of Defendants' arguments for dismissal will be discussed in turn.

A. Defendants' Argument that Plaintiffs' Claims are Duplicative

Plaintiffs Rosario-Ramos and Rosario-Méndez request injunctive and monetary relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,² contending that they have been deprived of their First Amendment rights. In their motion to dismiss, Defendants request the dismissal of all claims brought against co-defendants Mayor González-Damudt, Caraballo-Rodríguez, Ortiz-Sánchez, Adorno-Aponte, and González-Robles in their official capacities. In sum, they contend that "suing the mayor of the Municipality of Río Grande or any other official in their official capacity while the Municipality of Río Grande is being included as a defendant is redundant and unnecessary." Docket No. 18 at page 14.

Defendants' argument is correct, as "[w]hen a municipality is sued directly, claims against municipal employees in their official capacities are redundant and may be dismissed." Diaz-Garcia v. Surillo-Ruiz, 13-cv-1473-FAB, 2014 WL 4403363 at *5 (D.P.R. Sept. 8, 2014). See Trafford v. City of Westbrook, 256 F.R.D. 31, 33 (D.Me. 2009) (explaining how "an official capacity claim is not necessary when a Section 1983 claim is brought against a municipality"); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985) (explaining that "[t]here is no longer a needto bring official-capacity actions against local government officials, for under Monell, local government units can be sued directly for damages and injunctive or declaratory relief") (referencing Monell v. Dep't. of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). Plaintiffs failed to distinguish how the relief that they may obtain from their official capacity claims against the individual defendants is any different from that which they may obtain through their § 1983 claims against the Municipality of Río Grande. Thus, this court finds those claims are indeed duplicative and the motion to dismiss all claims against co-defendants Mayor González-Damudt, Caraballo-Rodríguez, Ortiz-Sánchez, Adorno-Aponte, and González-Robles in their official capacities is hereby GRANTED.

B. Defendants' Claim that the Municipality of Rio Grande is Immune to Punitive Damages

Defendants also contend that municipalities are immune...