Ramos v. Sedgwick County Sheriff's Dept.

785 F. Supp. 1457

Roy RAMOS, Plaintiff, v. SEDGWICK COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT and Det. Gregg W. Etter, Defendants.

No. 87-956-CIV.

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

October 29, 1991.

Jesus F. Bujan, Miami, Fla., for plaintiff.

Miles A. McGrane, III, Kubicki, Bradley, et al., Miami, Fla., for defendants.

ORDER

MARCUS, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff's post-trial Motion for Judgment Not Withstanding the Verdict or in the Alternative for a New Trial, and Defendants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and Renewed Motion for Directed Verdict. Three questions are raised by these post-trial motions: (1) whether as a matter of law Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity; (2) whether as a matter of law there existed probable cause to arrest Plaintiff; and (3) whether Plaintiff stipulated and agreed during trial that a finding of qualified immunity was a bar to his pendent state-law claims. For the reasons which follow, we answer these questions in the affirmative. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion is DENIED, and Defendants' motion is GRANTED.

Plaintiff Roy Ramos ("Ramos") brought suit against Defendants Sedgwick County Sheriff's Department (the "Department") and Detective Gregg W. Etter ("Etter"), alleging the violation of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count VIII), arising out of Plaintiff's arrest in connection with the rape and assault of Donna Flowers in the state of Kansas. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that he was arrested by Defendant Det. Etter without probable cause, albeit pursuant to a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate, and in the course of this illegal arrest was assaulted, slandered, and falsely imprisoned. Plaintiff also filed a number of pendent state-law claims (Counts I, II, III, IV) arising out of the same set of facts, namely false imprisonment, assault, battery, and malicious prosecution. The Defendants claimed that there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, and in any event, that they were entitled to qualified immunity since there was "arguable probable cause." All issues were submitted to the jury, with instructions that, among other things, if either probable cause was found, or if the Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, the inquiry was ended, the jury need not address the pendent state claims, and the jury was to sign the Verdict Form and return to the courtroom.¹ Upon deliberation, the jury concluded that no probable cause was present, but that the Defendants were nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff now moves the court for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict ("JNOV") as to Count VIII on the issue of Defendants' entitlement to qualified immunity,² and for a New Trial as to Counts I-IV on the grounds that qualified immunity is not properly a defense to the pendent state law claims. Defendants, in turn, also move the Court for JNOV on the issue of probable cause. Defendants also argue that, during the trial, Plaintiff agreed that in this case a finding of qualified immunity would operate as a bar to the pendent state law claims.

The Eleventh Circuit has set forth the applicable standard for review on the motion for JNOV:

On motions for directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict the Court should consider all of the evidence —not just that evidence which supports the non-mover's case—but in the light and with all reasonable inferences most favorable to the party opposed to the motion. If the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the Court believes that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict, granting of the motions is proper. On the other hand, if there is substantial evidence opposed to the motions, that is, evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions, the motions should be denied, and the case submitted to the jury. A mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient to present a question for the jury. The motions for directed verdict and judgment n.o.v. should not be decided by which side has the better of the case, nor should they be granted only when there is a complete absence of probative facts to support a jury verdict. There must be a conflict in substantial evidence to create a jury question.

Von Stein v. Brescher, 904 F.2d 572, 578 (11th Cir.1990) (quoting Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374-75 (5th Cir. 1969)) (en banc). And regarding the motion for a new trial,

A district court can grant a motion for a new trial if the jury's verdict is contrary to the great weight of the evidence. Unlike the standard employed in deciding a motion for judgment n.o.v., the court can reweigh the evidence in deciding whether to grant a new trial.

Von Stein v. Brescher, 696 F.Supp. 606, 615 (S.D.Fla.1988) (quoting Popham v. City of Kennesaw, 820 F.2d 1570, 1577 (11th Cir.1987)), rev'd on other grounds, 904 F.2d 572 (11th Cir.1990). Against this framework, we proceed to evaluate the parties' respective motions.

At the outset it is necessary to define the concepts of probable cause and qualified immunity. As to the former,

a law enforcement officer has probable cause to arrest a suspect if the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge, of which he or she has reasonably trustworthy information, would cause a prudent person to believe, under the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.... The existence of probable cause to arrest is based on objective standards.

Von Stein, 904 F.2d at 578 (citations omitted). The standard of probable cause is to be measured against a reasonable commonsense understanding of the term. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1310-11, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949). The qualified immunity standard is likewise an objective one, and "does not include an inquiry into the officers' subjective intent or beliefs." Von Stein, 904 F.2d at 579 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). Further,

in determining whether qualified immunity exists, the issue is "not probable cause in fact but `arguable' probable cause." Gorra v. Hanson, 880 F.2d 95, 97 (8th Cir.1989) (quoting Floyd v. Farrell, 765 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir.1985)). Actual probable cause is not necessary for an arrest to be objectively reasonable. Indeed, "it is inevitable that law enforcement officials will in some cases reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present, and ... in such cases those officials ... should not be held personally liable." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039-40, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987).

904 F.2d at 579. Here, for the reasons which follow, we conclude that the facts clearly warrant a finding of "arguable probable cause," and therefore of qualified immunity. In fact, we believe that the facts strongly support a finding of actual probable cause as a matter of law. Accordingly, we find that Defendant Det. Etter had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, and is therefore not liable on either the section 1983 or pendent state law claims.³

The threshold issue is whether a reasonable police officer in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as Det. Etter would have believed that Plaintiff had committed a crime, or that probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff. The answer derived from the full trial record must strongly be yes. Beyond that, we hold that the facts clearly warrant a finding of arguable probable cause, and therefore a finding of qualified immunity. We begin by noting that if the magistrate who issued the arrest warrant for Plaintiff Ramos had before him all of the information with all of the qualifications and provisos suggested by the Plaintiff, there still would clearly be probable cause, and surely there would be arguable probable cause. In the first place, the affidavit submitted by Defendant Det. Etter in support of the arrest of Plaintiff accurately stated that Donna Flowers, the victim of a brutal rape and assault, prepared an identikit or composite of a "second Cuban" involved in the assault soon after the incident, that this identikit was given to Metro Dade Officers Carter, Hernandez, and Delgado, and finally that all three officers categorically stated that the Plaintiff Roy Ramos looked like the composite or identikit prepared by the victim. The Plaintiff has presented nothing whatsoever to undermine that statement in the affidavit. Standing alone, that proof makes a finding of probable cause more likely than not. Second, the facts adduced at trial established that Carter in fact told Defendant Etter that Roy Ramos was present when his brother, Raul Ramos, was arrested for the same offense, at which time, according to Carter, Roy Ramos had blond hair and was clean shaven. Carter added, however, that the next time he saw Roy Ramos, Ramos had changed his hair color and had grown a moustache.⁴ Third, if the affidavit had included Donna Flowers's physical description of the Plaintiff—including that the second Cuban was 24-30, had a baby face, was a Hispanic male, weighed between 165-170 lbs., was stocky, was clean shaven, and had green eyes—the description would not have vitiated a finding of probable cause. The Plaintiff in fact is stocky, was 19 years old at the time of the incident, has a baby face, and has blue eyes. And while it is true that he does not speak with an accent, and that Flowers's description of his weight was off by as much as 30-40 lbs., we believe that this does not alter a finding of probable cause. Fourth, Flowers's account of the entire incident was corroborated independently in a number of material ways including the following:

1. Her description of the farmhouse where she was taken and at which she was assaulted and repeatedly raped was corroborated by viewing and ultimately

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