Ramos v. Tomasino

ANTHONY E. RAMOS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOHN R. TOMASINO, Clerk of Court Office of the Clerk ofCourt of the Supreme Court of Florida, RICHARD LISS,JOHN F. HARKNESS, JR., BARBARA PARIENTE, et al., Defendants-Appellees,THOMAS D. HALL, Defendant.

No. 16-15890

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

July 7, 2017

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

Non-Argument Calendar

D.C. Docket No. 9:16-cv-80681-BB

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida Before MARCUS, JORDAN and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.

MARCUS, Circuit Judge:

Anthony Eladio Ramos, a disbarred Florida attorney proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal of his antitrust case alleging violations of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. Ramos brought suit against: (1) the Florida Supreme Court, the Office of the Clerk of the Florida Supreme Court (the "Office of the Clerk"), a Florida Supreme Court justice, and the current and former Clerks of the Florida Supreme Court (collectively the "Florida Supreme Court"); (2) the Florida Bar and three individual employees (collectively the "Florida Bar"); and (3) the Florida Board of Bar Examiners (the "Board of Bar Examiners"). In the complaint, Ramos alleged that the defendants conspired to violate the Sherman Act in connection with his Florida Bar disciplinary proceedings, which ended before he filed this case and before he decided to become licensed to practice law in the State of New York and the District of Columbia ("D.C."). In order to apply to those jurisdictions in 2014, Ramos requested a certified copy of records from his Florida Bar disciplinary proceedings from the Office of the Clerk, who responded that the records had been destroyed "in accordance with approved destruction schedules." Ramos alleged that because he was "unable to certify either his identity or status" with the Florida Bar, he had to withdraw his applications from New York and D.C. Ramos's complaint included four counts, all of which were dismissed by the district court. Counts 1 and 2 alleged Sherman Act violations by the individual defendants and the "Institutional Defendants," respectively, claiming they conspired to monopolize the attorney admissions process and to deny him the ability to practice law by destroying his records. Count 3 sought to enjoin the Florida Supreme Court to enter an order stating that Ramos had been a member in good standing before the court since 1981 and to remove all internet and other references to his ineligibility to practice. Count 4 sought to enjoin the court from disseminating any information other than the judgment requested in Count 3.

On appeal, Ramos argues, inter alia, that the district court erred in dismissing his case based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine¹ and on immunity grounds. After careful review, we affirm in part and remand in part.

Application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a threshold jurisdictional matter that we review de novo. Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009); Narey v. Dean, 32 F.3d 1521, 1523 (11th Cir. 1994). We also review a district court's application of immunity de novo. Danner Const. Co. v. Hillsborough Cty., 608 F.3d 809, 812-13 (11th Cir. 2010). We may affirm the judgment of the district court on any ground supported by the record, even if thedistrict court did not rely on it. Kernel Records Oy v. Mosley, 694 F.3d 1294, 1309 (11th Cir. 2012).

First, we conclude that the district court did not err in dismissing on Rooker-Feldman grounds the counts of Ramos's complaint that challenge the results of his Florida Bar proceedings. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes lower federal courts "from exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments." Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1268 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). The Supreme Court has indicated that the doctrine should be confined only to "cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." Id. (quotation omitted); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005). In other words, the doctrine bars the losing party "from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of" the state court's judgment. Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 611 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2010).

We have specifically applied Rooker-Feldman to claims against the Florida Supreme Court for refusing to grant admission to the bar. Uberoi v. Supreme Court of Fla., 819 F.3d 1311, 1313 (11th Cir. 2016). There, the plaintiff sought to enjoin the Florida Supreme Court from refusing to grant her bar application, arequest we said was clearly a challenge to a state court judicial proceeding resulting in the denial of her application. Id.

Here, the district court correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to hear the portion of Ramos's claims concerning his Florida state disbarment proceedings. The Florida Supreme Court conclusively resolved Ramos's disbarment prior to the filing of this action, and since then, has sanctioned Ramos for submitting numerous additional filings long after his case was finalized. See Fla. Bd. of Bar Examiners ex rel. Ramos, 17 So. 3d 268, 269, 271 (Fla. 2009) (prohibiting Ramos from making further filings without the assistance of a licensed Florida attorney due to the volume and frivolity of Ramos's post-disbarment and post-petition-for-reinstatement filings); Fla. Bar v. Ramos, 717 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 1998) (case nos. 91,562 and 91,564) (table); Fla. Bar v. Ramos, 703 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 1997) (table). In part, Counts 3 and 4 of Ramos's complaint sought injunctive relief requiring the appellees to certify that he has been a bar member in good standing since 1981. This relief would nullify his state court proceedings concluding otherwise, which ended well before Ramos filed this lawsuit. As a result, the district court properly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over these counts.

However, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies only to state judicial decisions, not state administrative decisions. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486("United States District Courts . . . have subject matter jurisdiction over general challenges to state bar rules, promulgated by state courts in non-judicial proceedings, which do not require review of a final state court judgment in a particular case. They do not have jurisdiction, however, over challenges to state court decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the state court's action was unconstitutional."); Narey, 32 F.3d at 1525-26 (holding that federal courts have jurisdiction to entertain challenges to unreviewed state administrative agency decisions); Staley v. Ledbetter, 837 F.2d 1016, 1017-18 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that a district court lacked jurisdiction to review a county agency's decision that had been upheld by the state court of appeals). In Uberoi, we held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not deprive the district courts of subject matter jurisdiction over "general challenges to state bar rules" like Uberoi's due process claim. Uberoi, 819 F.3d at 1313 (quotation omitted).

Ramos seeks, in Counts 1 and 2, damages for the destruction of records related to his bar proceedings, and in part of Counts 3 and 4, injunctive relief barring the appellees from making any references or disseminating any information suggesting that Ramos has not been a member in good standing since 1981. Because these challenges involve state administrative rules or practices concerning the destruction of records and the dissemination of bar status information, wecannot say that the district court lacked jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman to hear these claims. See id. Thus, these claims should not have been dismissed on Rooker-Feldman grounds.

But even if the district court had jurisdiction over these claims, his pursuit of those remaining claims is nonetheless barred by state action immunity. The Sherman Act is a federal antitrust law enacted in 1890 to prohibit combinations and conspiracies in restraint of trade (Section 1), and to regulate monopolies (Section 2). 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2. In Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), the Supreme Court established a general immunity from antitrust liability for state entities and officials acting pursuant to state law, a concept known as "Parker immunity" or "state action immunity." Danner, 608 F.3d at 812-13. The Supreme Court has applied Parker immunity to state supreme courts acting in a lawmaking capacity. Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 568 (1984). Hoover addressed Parker's application to the challenged conduct of four members of Arizona's bar admissions committee. Id. at 560, 571-72. Under the Arizona Constitution, the Arizona Supreme Court had plenary authority to regulate bar admissions, and in an exercise of that authority, it created the admissions committee to carry out certain responsibilities. Id. at 561-62. It reserved, however, the ultimate authority to grant or deny admission. Id.

Hoover squarely held that Parker immunity barred the Sherman Act claims at issue in that case. Id. at 581-82. In so holding, the Supreme Court focused on "the incontrovertible fact that under the law of Arizona only the State Supreme Court had authority to admit or deny admission to practice law." Id. at 581. While the Sherman Act claims involved the committee and its actions, they were really claims against the state. Id. at 572-73. Notably, the Supreme Court declined to apply the test for antitrust immunity articulated in Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980), which requires the challenged restraint to be clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy, and the policy to be actively supervised by the state itself, id. at 106. Hoover said Midcal only applied when...