Ramrattan v. Guzman

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JERRY RAMRATTAN, Plaintiff, v. GUZMAN, MS. LEWIS and MS. MORRIS, Defendants.

No. 9:22-CV-025 (GTS/ATB)

United States District Court, N.D. New York

August 17, 2023

JERRY RAMRATTAN, Plaintiff, pro se AIMEE COWAN, Asst. Att'y General, for Defendant

ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION

ANDREW T. BAXTER U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Presently before the court is a motion to dismiss the amended complaint (“AC”) for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). (Dkt. No 43). Plaintiff responded in opposition to the motion defendants filed a reply, and the court accepted what it interpreted to be a surreply from plaintiff for consideration with the pending motion. (Dkt. Nos. 49, 52, 55). This motion has been referred to me for Report and Recommendation by the Honorable Glenn T. Suddaby, United States District Judge. For the following reasons, this court recommends granting defendants' motion in part, and denying defendants' motion in part.

I. Motion to Dismiss

To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555). When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted); Int'l Audiotext Network, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 62 F.3d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1995). The court must heed its particular obligation to treat pro se pleadings with liberality. Phillips v. Girdich, 408 F.3d 124, 128 (2d Cir. 2005); Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam).

When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court's consideration is limited to the factual allegations as stated in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint as exhibits or incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which the court can take judicial notice. Portillo v. Webb, No. 16 Civ. 4731, 2017 WL 4570374, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2017) (quoting Brass v. Am. Film Tech., 987 F.2d 142, 150 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1991)). A court may take judicial notice of a public record pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 201(b). Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 92 (2d Cir. 2000).

Defendants have also moved to dismiss based on a lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). The Rule 12(b)(1) motion is applicable only to the defendants' argument that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law negligence claims pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment and N.Y. Corr. Law § 24.2. (See infra. at 15-16). The analysis applicable to a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is slightly different than that applicable to Rule 12(b)(6). In a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court is not bound by the face of the pleadings and may resolve disputed factual issues by reference to evidence outside the pleadings. JTE Enterprises, Inc. v. Cuomo, 2 F.Supp.3d 333, 338-39 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).

II. Factual Contentions

Pursuant to Judge Suddaby's initial review of the amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the following of plaintiff's claims remain:

1) First Amendment retaliation claims against defendants Morris and Guzman;

2) claims pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act against defendants Morris, Guzman, and Lewis; and 3) negligence claims against defendants Morris, Guzman, and Lewis.

(Dkt. No. 26 at 18). The court will summarize plaintiff's allegations as stated in the amended complaint, and the exhibits attached thereto, to the extent they are relevant to plaintiff's surviving claims.

Plaintiff, who identifies as “legally blind,” was an incarcerated individual in the custody of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision at all times relevant to the underlying allegations. In September 2019, plaintiff was transferred from Five Points Correctional Facility to Eastern Correctional Facility (“Eastern C.F.”). (AC at 4). Plaintiff alleges that upon arriving to Eastern C.F., he was “immediately placed within the medical unit due serious pre-[existing] injuries (Legally Blind) and (Hearing Impaired)[.]” (Id.). Plaintiff also states that at the time of his transfer he had access to a “blind-cane,” “sunglasses,” and “[reasonable accommodation] programs/services,” which were issued to him at a prior correctional facility based upon “prior medical evaluations, confirming serious pre-existing[] injuries.” (Id.). Shortly after plaintiff arrived AT Eastern C.F., he was placed in the Sensorial Disability Unit (“SDU”); housing for the visually and hearing impaired. (Id.).

After “several months” at Eastern C.F., plaintiff “began experiencing difficulties in receiving adequate [reasonable accommodations] . . . such as devices, assistance from qualified interpreter [defendant Ms. Lewis,]” and other “necessary mandated entitlement[s]” through the SDU housing program, which he alleges was supervised by defendant Deputy Superintendent of Programs, Ms. Morris. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that he notified various advocacy agencies of these deficiencies, including Disability Rights of New York (“DRNY”) and the Legal Aid Society (“LAS”), which agencies in turn requested that various incarcerated individuals housed in the SDU complete questionnaires regarding conditions within the unit. (Id.).

On or about January 16, 2021, advocates from both DRNY and LAS visited Eastern C.F. and conducted “one-on-one interviews” with various incarcerated individuals within the SDU, including plaintiff. (Id. at 5). Plaintiff alleges that “approximately that same day[,]” after the advocates conducted their interviews, unidentified officials at Eastern C.F. notified defendant “head physician” Mikhail Guzman, who “began to strategically prob[e] into plaintiff's medical files . . . to find a way to remove [plaintiff] from [SDU] housing and strip[] him of all [reasonable accommodations] so [plaintiff would] no longer cause any further problems.” (Id.).

Plaintiff was instructed to “immediately report” to the SDU resource room, where he was instructed by Ms. Lewis to “immediately turn over all [reasonable accommodation] devices[.]” (Id.). Plaintiff complied. (Id.). Plaintiff was then instructed to sign a “waiver in forfeiture” of his reasonable accommodations. (Id.).

Plaintiff “questioned” Ms. Lewis's actions, who responded “sarcastically” that she had been “ordered by [Ms. Morris and Dr. Guzman] to confiscate all [plaintiff's reasonable accommodation] devices, before he is transferred to general population housing unit.” (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that, in addition to the confiscation of the devices, his access to various services was discontinued, including the SDU computer, resource room, mobility sight-guide, “free matter for the blind postage,” and the “recreational basement.” (Id. at 5-6). Plaintiff was transferred to general population on or about January 17, 2021. (Id. at 6).

In June 2020, plaintiff renewed his request for reasonable accommodations. (Dkt. No. 22-3 at 111, 114). In response, Dr. Guzman apparently executed a medical verification indicating that plaintiff refused an optometry consultation, and plaintiff's request was denied. (Id.). Plaintiff filed another request for reasonable accommodations in February 2021, which Dr. Guzman denied due to “no medical verification.” (Dkt. No. 22-3 at 102). In September 2021, plaintiff submitted a third request for accommodations, which appears to be signed by Ms. Lewis. (Dkt. No. 22-2 at 17-18). Dr. Guzman denied plaintiff's request, noting “non-significant hearing loss” and “no medical verification on file.” (Id.).

Plaintiff alleges that as a result of the revocation of his reasonable accommodations, he has, among other things, been unable to read or write in the context of “attempting to litigate within his prison cell and in law library,” and has been forced to skip meals for fear of his safety, as well as avoid the “outside yard activities.” (AC at 3-4).

III. Retaliation

A. Legal Standards

To state a First Amendment claim of retaliation, an inmate must allege facts plausibly suggesting that (1) the speech or conduct at issue was protected, (2) the defendant took adverse action against the plaintiff, and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected conduct and the adverse action. Holland v. Goord, 758 F.3d 215, 225 (2d Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). The court must keep in mind that claims of retaliation are “easily fabricated” and “pose a substantial risk of unwarranted judicial intrusion into matters of general prison administration.” Faulk v. Fisher, 545 Fed.Appx. 56, 58 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Bennett v Goord, 343 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 2003)). In other words, we must examine prisoners' claims of retaliation with “skepticism and particular care.” Rivera v. Goord, 119 F.Supp.2d 327, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 872 (2d Cir. 1995)). Accordingly, a First Amendment retaliation claim must be supported by “specific and detailed factual allegations,” and not stated in “wholly conclusory terms.” Dolan v. Connolly, 794 F.3d 290, 295 (2d. Cir. 2015) (quoting Flaherty v. Coughlin, 713 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir.1983), overruled on other...