Ramsdell v. Hartford Hospital

Taryn RAMSDELL v. HARTFORD HOSPITAL et al.

No. HHDCV176082676S

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Hartford, Hartford

January 14, 2019

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

OPINION

MATTHEW DALLAS GORDON, J.

The defendant, Connecticut Children’s Medical Center (Medical Center) has filed a motion to strike counts one through four of the plaintiff’s complaint alleging, respectively negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, and invasion of privacy. The defendant Hartford Hospital (Hospital) has filed a motion to strike the second, third, and fourth counts of the plaintiff’s complaint. For the reasons explained, the court denies Medical Center’s motion to strike the first count and grants the motions to strike filed by both Medical Center and Hospital regarding counts two, three and four.

Facts and Procedural History

The plaintiff’s complaint alleges that Medical Center and Hospital were "specially-chartered corporations organized and existing under the laws of the State of Connecticut, operating a hospital in Hartford, Connecticut providing in-patient hospital care, including neo-natal intensive care services, to the general public." Compl. ¶ 1. The complaint also alleges that on or about October 6 2015, the plaintiff "was a patient at the Defendants ... where she gave birth to her daughter, Kali Nelson." Compl. ¶ 2. "Thereafter, through and including November 17, 2015, the Plaintiff’s daughter was admitted to the neo-natal intensive care unit (‘NICU’) at the Defendants ..." Compl. ¶ 3. "As part of the care and treatment of Kali Nelson in the NICU, the Plaintiff’s medical history was included in the medical records for her infant daughter." Compl. ¶ 4. "Said medical history was factually inaccurate as to the Plaintiff’s prior conditions and contained private information." Compl. ¶ 5. "Said medical records were left unsecured in the NICU near the baby’s isolette by the Defendants ... their agents, servants and/or employees." Compl. ¶ 6. "At some point after October 6, 2015 and prior to November 17, 2015, the father of Kali Nelson and his family members were able to view the unsecured medical information in Kali Nelson’s chart, which contained the Plaintiff’s inaccurate medical history, as well as her private medical information, without the Plaintiff’s knowledge or permission, causing her to sustain and suffer emotional distress, great embarrassment, humiliation and causing her to lose custody of her daughter." Compl. ¶ 7.

Legal Standard

"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ... the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ... to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). "It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant’s motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Asylum Hill Problem Solving Revitalization Assn. v. King, 277 Conn. 238, 246, 890 A.2d 522 (2006). "The role of the trial court in ruling on a motion to strike is to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the [plaintiff], to determine whether the [pleading party has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Coe v. Board of Education, 301 Conn. 112, 117, 19 A.3d 640 (2011). "[A] motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Geysen v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc., 322 Conn. 385, 398, 142 A.3d 227 (2016). In analyzing the defendants’ motions, and the plaintiff’s various objections, the court is required to construe the plaintiff’s complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency. Coppola Construction Co. v. Hoffman Enterprises Ltd. Partnership, 309 Conn. 342, 350-51, 71 A.3d 480 (2013).

Analysis

1. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

"To prevail on a claim of negligent infliction of distress, the plaintiff is required to prove that (1) the defendant’s conduct created an unreasonable risk of causing the plaintiff emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s distress was foreseeable; (3) the emotional distress was severe enough that it might result in illness or bodily harm; and (4) the defendant’s conduct was the cause of the plaintiff’s distress." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hall v. Bergman, 296 Conn. 169, 183, 994 A.2d 666 (2010).

Medical Center asserts that the plaintiff’s claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress is insufficient as a matter of law because Medical Center did not owe the plaintiff any duty of loyalty or confidentiality. It is Medical Center’s position that the plaintiff’s reliance on Byrne v. Avery Center for Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C., 327 Conn. 540, 175 A.3d 1 (2018), wherein the Supreme Court recently recognized a common-law cause of action based on a healthcare provider’s alleged breach of the duty of confidentiality regarding its patient’s medical records while complying with a third-party subpoena, is misplaced. In Byrne, Medical Center argues, there was no question that the plaintiff was a patient of the defendant healthcare provider, whereas the plaintiff in this case was not Medical Center’s patient. Medical Center also contends that the plaintiff had no right of privacy or confidentiality in connection with her daughter’s medical records, and that any duty of loyalty and confidentiality was owed to the daughter in her capacity as Medical Center’s patient, not to the plaintiff.

The court agrees that any duty of confidentiality owed to the plaintiff by Medical Center must arise from the healthcare provider/patient relationship, not from the plaintiff’s relationship with her daughter. See, e.g., Abbhi v. AMI, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-96-0382195-S (June 3, 1997, Silbert, J.) (19 Conn.L.Rptr. 493) (1997 WL 325850).

In Abbhi, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant physicians and members of their medical practice knew or should have known that their failure to properly instruct, advise, and consult with the plaintiff regarding how to respond when and if the plaintiff’s daughter experienced an anaphylactic reaction to peanuts created an unreasonable risk of harm to the daughter and an unreasonable risk of distress to the plaintiff in her capacity as the child’s mother. The plaintiff also claimed that when her daughter ultimately did experience an anaphylactic reaction to peanuts, the plaintiff was helpless to respond and suffered extreme emotional distress as a result.

In dismissing the plaintiff’s claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, the Abbhi court observed that the plaintiff’s complaint did not assert that any of the defendants were actually providing medical care and treatment to the plaintiff at any time pertinent to allegations of the complaint, and that the plaintiff’s claim that the risk of harm to her was foreseeable was insufficient to establish that the duty the defendants owed to the daughter as their patient also ran to the plaintiff in her capacity as the daughter’s mother. Id., *17. According to the court, "[t]he plaintiff suggests that to allow emotional distress claims where the child is in utero, but not following birth, creates an artificial distinction between antenatal and postnatal concern, responsibility and involvement of a mother toward her child and manifests a basic misunderstanding of the relationship between mother and child, the closest and most precious of relationships ... The distinction, however, is not so much based on whether the child is in or out of the womb as it is on whether the parent is a recipient of the physician’s care. While the child is in utero, the mother as well as the unborn child are the subjects of the physician’s duty. Although under some circumstances the doctor-patient relationship with the mother, and hence the duty toward her, may continue for a period of time after birth, depending on the mother’s condition, at some point it becomes apparent that only the child is the patient." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., *17.

In Ravalese v. Lertora, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV- 13- 6042237-S (September 25 2014, Huddleston, J.) (2014 WL 5471986), the court struck a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress asserted against a psychologist who had treated the plaintiff’s minor child during protracted litigation between the plaintiff and his ex-wife. The plaintiff’s complaint alleged that the psychologist disclosed confidential information about the plaintiff in violation of General Statutes § 52-146c, which provides for privileged communications between a psychologist and a patient, in a report released to the child’s mother characterizing the plaintiff as a child abuser and a sociopath. The court concluded that the plaintiff’s allegation of negligent infliction of emotional distress was insufficient as a matter of law because the defendant’s statutorily imposed duty of confidentiality was owed only to the defendant’s patient, the minor child, not the plaintiff in his capacity as the child’s parent. According to the court, "[i]n providing mental health services to a child, a psychologist may be required to form opinions about factors affecting the child, including the child’s relationship with his or her parents. To impose a duty on the psychologist to refrain from expressing those opinions would infringe on [the psychologist’s] duty to her patient, the child. Our Supreme Court...