Ramsey v. Runion

CHARLES CLAUDE RAMSEY, Petitioner,

v. KIMBERLY H. RUNION, Director of the Virginia CenterFor Behavioral Rehabilitation, Respondent.

Civil Action No.: 2:11cv396

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Norfolk Division

Dated: September 5, 2012

OPINION AND FINAL ORDER

This matter was initiated by petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The petition alleges violations of federal rights pertaining to Petitioner's civil commitment as a sexually violent predator ("SVP") under Virginia's Sexually Violent Predators Act. (ECF No. 10.) By order entered December 9, 2008, the Petitioner was committed to the custody of the Virginia Department of Mental Health as an SVP. See id.

The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (c) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as Rule 72 of the Rules of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The Magistrate Judge filed his Report and Recommendation (referred to as "R and R" or "Report") on May 31, 2012, and recommended dismissing the petition. (ECF No. 23.) By copy of the R and R, each party was advised of the right tofile written objections to the findings and recommendations of the Magistrate Judge. Petitioner was also advised of his right to file a motion for a certificate of appealability.

On June 7, 2012, the court received Petitioner's objections. (ECF No. 24.) On June 12, 2012, Petitioner filed a motion to appoint counsel and for issuance of a certificate of appealability. (ECF No. 27.) Also on June 12, 2012, Respondent filed objections to the R and R and a motion to alter or amend judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF Nos. 2526.)¹ On June 14, 2012, Respondent filed a motion to amend her objections. (ECF No. 28.) On June 20, 2012, Petitioner filed a response, objecting to Respondent's motion to amend. (ECF No. 29.) The time for filing objections has expired, and the parties' motions are ripe for disposition. Pursuant to Rule 78 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court will decide these matters based on the parties' submissions, finding oral argument unnecessary.

I. RESPONDENT'S MOTIONS AND OBJECTIONS

A. Respondent's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment

Respondent's motion to alter or amend judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e), which was filed on June 12, 2012, is DENIED. Rule 59(e) pertains to the entry of judgments, and a magistrate judge's Reportis not a judgment.

B. Respondent's Motion to Amend Her Objection

Respondent's June 12, 2012, filings raise an objection to a perceived typographical error in the R and R. On June 14, 2012, Respondent filed a motion requesting leave to file an additional objection, explaining that she also contests the Magistrate Judge's decision to treat the petition as one filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 rather than 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner opposes Respondent's motion to amend, arguing that Respondent was obligated to file all of her objections in a single document. Respondent's motion to amend her objections is GRANTED because she filed it within the period for filing objections.

C. Respondent's Objections

Respondent's first objection is to the statement, on page 25 of the Report, that "no Virginia court would not have felt compelled to make an on the record determination that [Petitioner] knowingly and voluntarily relinquished his due process rights of presentation, confrontation, and cross-examination at hearing by stipulating that he was an SVP." (emphasis added). As Respondent points out, this statement contradicts the statement, on page 27 of the R and R, that "a Virginia state court would not have felt constitutionally compelled to make such an inquiry at the time Petitioner's commitment became final," and the ultimate recommendation that Petitioner's Claim (C)(1) be dismissed. It isevident that the inclusion of "not" after "no Virginia court would" on page 25 of the Report was merely a scrivener's error and that the finding should read "no Virginia court would have felt compelled." Accordingly, Respondent's first objection is SUSTAINED.

Respondent also objects to the treatment of the petition as one filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.² The Magistrate Judge analyzed the petition under the stricter § 2241 standard of review, and, citing Gaster v. South Carolina Department of Corrections, 67 F. App'x 821 (4th Cir. 2003) (unpublished per curiam), the Magistrate Judge determined that Petitioner's Claim (C)(1), the only claim to survive procedural default, was entitled to de novo review under § 2241. R and R at 6, 16-17.³ Section 2241 applies to petitions for writs of habeas corpus filed by persons "in custody in violation ofthe Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a)(3). Section 2254, on the other hand, applies to petitions for writs of habeas corpus filed by persons "in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

Respondent argues that even though Petitioner's commitment was not the product of a criminal conviction, he is "in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court" under the plain text of § 2254. A fair reading of § 2254 supports Respondent's contention. Petitioner was, in fact, committed to the custody of the Virginia Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation, and Substance Abuse Services pursuant to a judgment of a state court, and nothing in the AEDPA appears to limit § 2254's coverage to judgments in criminal cases. Indeed, the Supreme Court addressed the scope of § 2254 in dicta:

Incarceration pursuant to a state criminal conviction may be by far the most common and most familiar basis for satisfaction of the "in custody" requirement in § 2254 cases. But there are other types of state court judgments pursuant to which a person may be held in custody within the meaning of the federal habeas statute. For example, federal habeas corpus review may be available to challenge the legality of a state court order of civil commitment or a state court order of civil contempt.

Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 176 (2001) (emphasis added). In fact, the Fourth Circuit appears to be the only circuit to have construed habeas petitions filed by state civil committees under§ 2241.⁴ See, e.g., Young v. Murphy, 615 F.3d 59, 64-67 (1st Cir. 2010); Banda v. New Jersey, 134 F. App'x 529, 531 (3d Cir. 2005) (unpublished table decision); Brown v. Waters, 599 F.3d 602, 611 (7th Cir. 2010); Poole v. Goodno, 335 F.3d 705, 708 (8th Cir. 2003); Smith v. Richards, 569 F.3d 991, 992-93 (9th Cir. 2009); Walker v. Hadi, 611 F.3d 720, 722-23 (11th Cir. 2010).

While an unpublished case, Gaster, is not binding on this court,⁵ it is not without serious review that the court rejects the Magistrate Judge's finding that the petition be characterized as one under § 2241. The plain language of § 2254, Duncan, and the overwhelming support for this position in other circuits, convinces this court that the instant petition should be characterized as one filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Accordingly, Respondent's second objection is SUSTAINED.

As Respondent acknowledges, the fact that the Magistrate Judge analyzed the petition under § 2241, rather than § 2254, does notaffect the ultimate disposition of Petitioner's claims. See supra note 2; infra Part II.A.⁶

II. PETITIONER'S MOTIONS AND OBJECTIONS

A. Petitioner's Objections

Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that any objections to a magistrate judge's report be specific. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Petitioner's pro se objections are difficult to discern. He has primarily reiterated the facts and arguments raised in Claims (C) (1) and (C) (2) of his petition. Petitioner also appears to argue that he was prevented from adequately raising ineffective assistance of counsel claims in his state habeas petitions because he lacked counsel in the state habeas proceedings.⁷ The court construes this argument as an objection to the Magistrate Judge's finding that Petitioner failed to show cause for procedurally defaulting Claims (A)(l)-(3) and (B). See R and R at 14-15.

The Magistrate Judge found that, with the exception of Claim (C)(1), Petitioner's claims were procedurally defaulted. R and R at 7-15.⁸ In Claim (C)(2), Petitioner argues that the trial court violated his constitutional due process rights by erroneously relying on his attorney's stipulation that he was an SVP, rather than requiring the government to establish that he was an SVP by clear and convincing evidence. The Magistrate Judge found that Petitioner's Claim (C)(2) was procedurally defaulted because Petitioner failed to raise the claim on direct appeal, and he is now prevented by an independent and adequate state procedural rule from bringing it in a state collateral proceeding. R and R at 10-11. Nothing in Petitioner's objections or the court's independent review of the record rebuts this finding. Accordingly, Petitioner's arguments on the merits of Claim (C) (2) are futile, and his objection regarding the Magistrate Judge's finding that Claim (C) (2) is procedurally defaulted is OVERRULED.

The Magistrate Judge also found that each of the four ineffective assistance claims that Petitioner has raised are procedurally defaulted. R and R at 12-13. The Magistrate Judge further found that Petitioner had not established cause fordefaulting on these claims. R and R at 14. Claims (A)(l)-(3) relate to the effectiveness of Petitioner's state-appointed counsel for his civil commitment proceeding, and Claim (B) relates to the effectiveness of Petitioner's state-appointed counsel on appeal from his civil commitment proceeding. Petitioner apparently objects to the Magistrate Judge's findings regarding his ineffective assistance claims, arguing that the absence of counsel in his state habeas proceedings constituted cause for defaulting on these claims.⁹ Petitioner's arguments are...