Randall v. State

CRYSTAL RANDALL v. STATE OF MARYLAND

No. 2273, 529

COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND

September Terms, 2016, 2017

January 4, 2018

Circuit Court for Montgomery County

Case No. 118756C

UNREPORTED

Nazarian, Shaw Geter, Davis, Arrie W., (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned) JJ.

Opinion by Davis, J.

* This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.

Following a trial on August 12-14, 2013, Appellant, Crystal Randall, was tried and convicted by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County (Boynton, J.) of theft between $10,000 and $100,000 and embezzlement for retaining approximately $80,000, the proceeds of the sale of her deceased aunt's house. On October 17, 2013, Appellant was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment, with all but 18 months suspended, five years' probation and she was ordered to pay $80,104.59 in restitution.

On July 7, 2016, Appellant agreed to the sale of her home to bring her restitution payments current, rather than have a 10-year prison sentence imposed. On July 29, 2016, Appellant filed a Motion for Appropriate Relief, which was denied at a subsequent hearing on December 16, 2016. Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.

On January 17, 2017, the circuit court appointed John Monahan as trustee to sell the home and, on April 25, 2017, Monahan's motion to change the locks to Appellant's residence was granted. Appellant filed another Notice of Appeal, which led to the consolidated appeals now before this Court, wherein Appellant posits the following questions for our review:

1. Did the lower court err by ordering the sale of Appellant's home, without a finding of a violation of probation, where the home was also owned by her husband and located in Arizona?

2. Did the lower court err by excluding Appellant from her home by ordering the locks changed?

FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

Background

The following factual background is excerpted from Randall v. State, 223 Md. App. 519, 528 (2015), an appeal from the circuit court action that undergirds the instant case.

In 2009, Alma Matthews Lynch—a Montgomery County, Maryland resident—passed away, leaving a will devising, among other things, real property located in Arizona to the beneficiaries of her residuary estate. As designated under the will, the Register of Wills for Montgomery County appointed Ms. Lynch's niece, Appellant Crystal Hayslett Randall, and Ms. Lynch's partner, Clifton Terry, as co-personal representatives of the estate. These appointments proved ill-fated. Appellant, an Arizona resident, sold the Arizona property, failed to account for the sale within the Maryland Estate, and took the lion's share of the proceeds for herself.

With the proceeds,¹ Appellant purchased a property located at 2613 East Jessica Lane in Phoenix, Arizona. The property was in the names of Appellant and her husband. The sale price was $60,000 and it was a cash only transaction, without financing. See Randall, 223 Md. App. at 532-36.

A Montgomery County grand jury indicted Appellant for embezzlement and theft on July 21, 2011. The following day, the Circuit Court for Montgomery Countyissued a bench warrant. The Sheriff's Office entered the warrant into a national database, but efforts to confirm Appellant's address in Arizona delayed her arrest until December 7, 2012.

After several failed attempts to fight her extradition to Maryland, Appellant filed a motion to dismiss alleging denial of her right to a speedy trial. The circuit court denied that motion after holding a hearing. Additionally, before trial and then during her motion for acquittal, Appellant challenged the State of Maryland's jurisdiction to prosecute the charges filed against her, contending that jurisdiction existed in Arizona where the alleged crime occurred. The circuit court denied the motion for acquittal, concluding that Appellant had a duty to account for the proceeds to the Maryland estate and that the effect of the crime was felt in Maryland. At the close of her trial on August 14, 2013, the jury convicted Appellant of both charges[.]

Id. at 528-29.

Sentence

On October 17, 2013, Judge Boynton, imposed a sentence of 10 years' incarceration, all but 18 months suspended, five years' probation and ordered $80,104.59 in restitution, concluding that was the total amount of the theft. A civil judgment in that amount was also entered on the judgment index. At that time, the court did not establish any schedule of payments for the restitution. However, the probation order that Appellant signed, required her to pay the restitution "as ordered by the court or as directed by your supervising agent through a payment schedule." The supervising agent created a payment schedule, whereupon Appellant would be required to pay $1,400 per month for the duration of her probationary period. Appellant's place of residence was Arizona; therefore, her probation was transferred there so that she could be supervised by an Arizona probation agent.

At a hearing on February 11, 2014, Judge Boynton denied Appellant's Motion toReconsider her sentence. Appellant indicated that she was unsure of the status of her real estate license and that she wanted to go to culinary school and obtain employment as a chef. The court expressed concern that her real estate license might be suspended or revoked when her conviction was discovered. The court later said it doubted "highly"' that Appellant would be able to get back into real estate.

On May 25, 2016, a violation of probation hearing was scheduled for failing to pay restitution as required. Appellant did not appear and she was subsequently arrested in Arizona and brought to Maryland on May 31, 2016. Appellant remained in jail until another hearing was held on July 7, 2016. At the time of the hearing, Appellant had paid less than $600 toward her restitution obligation, failing to meet the required monthly amount set by her supervising probation agent.

In support of the petition for violation, the State noted that Appellant had used the proceeds to purchase a residence in Arizona for $60,000 cash. Appellant's Counsel, however, noted that Appellant made $900 after taxes "on a good month," that probation was costing her in excess of $1,400 per month, that she was paying $20 to $50 per month and that, at the time of the hearing, Appellant had been incarcerated 38 days. Counsel also said that Appellant was taking classes, had found a job as a prep chef and that a majority of the beneficiaries of the Estate had written to say that they did not want her to be incarcerated. The court asked why Appellant had not "sold the house to pay the restitution back?" Counsel responded that she would still need to live somewhere and that her expenses were already higher than her income. The court stated that she could make "ahuge impact immediately" on the restitution if she sold the Arizona property. The court also stated that the sentence it had imposed on Appellant had been based on "her offer to make sizable payments per month" based on her employment as a real estate broker.

After a recess, the court reiterated its concern that Appellant had only made $600 in restitution payments and that she was living in a house that she purchased for cash after selling the house from the estate of her aunt. Recounting the procedural history, the court observed:

All right. So I guess we are here at a situation where at the time of sentencing the defendant was sentenced to a brief term of incarceration with suspended time and was directed to pay restitution. That was almost three years ago, two years and nine months ago. She's now made about $600 of payments out of $90,000.

And, I guess the most concerning thing is the fact that she has the ability to make some substantial restitution payments in this case, and she's choosing not to. Instead, she's working a number of hours per week, and she's sending $20.00 or $25.00 per month when the record clearly shows that the fact that she has the ability to make some substantial restitution payments in this case, and she's choosing not to. Instead, she's working a number of hours per week, and she's sending in $20 or $25 per month when the record clearly shows that, as a result of her criminal activity, he sold the house that was part of the estate of her aunt. And rather than debiting it to the rightful heirs, she took the cash and she purchased the house for cash. That's where she now lives.

So clearly, she has the ability to pay restitution, if not in full, substantial amounts. But she is now choosing not to because she's choosing not to sell the asset which is the object of her ill-gotten gains.

So I guess the question now becomes whether or not she wants to sell the house and make restitution, or whether she wants me to simply impose the sentence and issue a judgment, and have the parties go on with their life [sic], so.

Appellant's counsel responded that Appellant "would be willing" to sell the house. Counsel, noting that the house is titled in both Appellant's and her husband's names,counsel added:

So that ties our hands our hands a little bit. I would ask you to consider setting a hearing six months from now releasing Ms. Randall, obviously, to go back to work and school, with the instruction that she, as part of her probation, she needs to sell the house for restitution. And perhaps her probation officer in Arizona, since the State has contact with her, can be told of the situation and make sure that that process is occurring.

In response to the court's suggestion that a timeline be established during which the house would be listed for sale within 30 days and so within six months, Appellant asked the court to allow time to make repairs to the house and asked that the State withdraw its petition for violation. The proposal was accepted by the court, allowing 30 days for repairs to be made and 60...