Randolph v. Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC

1

GRACE C. RANDOLPH, individually and TRUSTEE OF THE ROGER K. RANDOLPH TRUST, DATED MAY 5, 2004, Plaintiff, v. COLUMBIA GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 3:23-00006

United States District Court, S.D. West Virginia, Huntington Division

August 16, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ROBERT C. CHAMBERS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pending before the Court is Defendant Columbia Gas Transmission LLC's (“Columbia Gas”) Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 30) and its Motion in Limine or, in the Alternative to Strike. ECF No. 32. Plaintiff Grace C Randolph, individually and as the Trustee of the Roger K Randolph Trust, Dated May 5, 2004, opposes the motions. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS, in part, and DENIES, in part, the Motion for Summary Judgment and DENIES the Motion in Limine or, in the Alternative to Strike.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff states that she is the Trustee over certain property located in Putnam County, West Virginia. On or about November 3, 2017, Plaintiff and her now deceased husband, Roger K. Randolph, as the former Trustee, granted Columbia Gas an easement and right-of-way across the property “for the construction, maintenance, and operation of a gas transmission pipeline[.]” Am. Compl. ¶9, ECF No. 14. Plaintiff contends that, after the pipeline was installed, Columbia Gas failed to properly reclaim the property, which caused drainage and water retention problems. Id. ¶¶11, 12.

As a result, Plaintiff asserts two causes of action against Defendant. First, Plaintiff alleges a breach of contract by failing to reclaim the property to a similar condition that existed prior to the installation of the pipeline. Second, Plaintiff alleges Columbia Gas was negligent in restoring the property to its previous condition. Columbia Gas argues both of these claims fail.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To obtain summary judgment, the moving party must show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court will not “weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter[.]” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). Instead, the Court will draw any permissible inference from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986).

Although the Court will view all underlying facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the nonmoving party nonetheless must offer some “concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his [or her] favor[.]” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Summary judgment is appropriate when the nonmoving party has the burden of proof on an essential element of his or her case and does not make, after adequate time for discovery, a showing sufficient to establish that element. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

The nonmoving party must satisfy this burden of proof by offering more than a mere “scintilla of evidence” in support of his or her position. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Negligence

The Court first addresses Columbia Gas's argument that Plaintiff's negligence claim must be dismissed under the gist of the action doctrine. Under West Virginia's “gist of the action” doctrine, “[a]n action in tort will not arise for breach of contract unless the action in tort would arise independent of the existence of the contract.” Soyoola v. Oceanus Ins. Co., 986 F.Supp.2d 695, 707 (S.D. W.Va. 2013) (quoting Syl. Pt. 9, Lockhart v. Airco Heating & Cooling, Inc., 567 S.E.2d 619 (W.Va. 2002)). “Whether a tort claim can coexist with a contract claim is determined by examining whether the parties' obligations are defined by the terms of the contract.” Gaddy Eng'g Co. v. Bowles Rice McDavid Graff & Love, LLP, 746 S.E.2d 568, 577 (W.Va. 2013) (per curiam) (citing Goldstein v. Elk Lighting, Inc., 2013 WL 790765, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2013)). The purpose of the doctrine is to prevent contract claims from “masquerading as a tort.” Covol Fuels No. 4, LLC v. Pinnacle Min. Co., 785 F.3d 104, 116 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As this Court stated at the motion to dismiss stage of this matter, a tort action is barred in situations

(1) where liability arises solely from the contractual relationship between the parties;

(2) when the alleged duties breached were grounded in the contract itself;

(3) where any liability stems from the contract; [or] (4) when the tort claim essentially duplicates the breach of contract claim or where the success of the tort claim is dependent on the success of the breach of contract claim.

Randolph, Tr. of Roger K. Randolph Tr. v. Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC, No. CV 3:2300006, 2023 WL 5602316, at *2 (S.D. W.Va. Aug. 29, 2023) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Although this Court did not dismiss Plaintiff's negligence claim as an alternative theory of recovery at the motion to dismiss stage, Plaintiff must offer some evidence at summary judgment of an independent negligence claim, separate from her contract claim. In her Response to Columbia Gas's motion, however, Plaintiff offered no evidence of an independent negligence claim and, in fact, did not even address Columbia Gas's gist of the action argument. Therefore, without any argument or evidence by Plaintiff to refute that her negligence claim is simply a duplication of her contract claim, the Court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of Columbia Gas on Count Two.

B. Breach of Contract

The Court next addresses Columbia Gas's argument it is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's breach of contract claim. In support, Columbia Gas asserts there is no language in either of the relevant easement and right-of-way contracts that impose upon it a duty to restore, remediate, or repair any damage to the property. Therefore, Columbia Gas argues it could not have breached any such terms in the contracts. The Court disagrees.

Here, it appears undisputed that there were two easement and right-of-way agreements signed on November 3, 2017.^[1]In relevant part, the contracts are identical and provide:

6. Indemnity. Grantee agrees to indemnify and hold harmless Grantor from, against, and in respect of any and all liability, claims, damages, costs, and losses of whatever character (collectively, “Claims”) arising from personal injury or death or damage to property of Grantor and any and all Claims of whatever character claimed by third parties, to the extent such Claims result from action, negligence or willful misconduct of Grantee . . . in connection with the exercise of Grantee's rights under this Agreement. Grantor agrees to indemnify and hold harmless Grantee . . . from, against, and in respect of any and all Claims resulting from personal injury or death or damage to property of Grantee . . . and any and all Claims of whatever character asserted by third parties, to the extent such Claims result from the action, negligence or willful misconduct of Grantor or Grantor's invitees or licenses.

Notwithstanding the foregoing or anything to the contrary herein, Grantor acknowledges and agrees that Grantee has compensated Grantor, in advance, for any and all damages, costs and expenses which may arise out of, are connected with, or relate in any way to Grantor's conveyance, or Grantee's exercise, of the rights set forth herein, including but not limited to, any and all tree, crop, plant, timber, harvest or yield loss damages, or any other damages costs and expenses attributable to or arising from Grantee's proper execution of the initial construction, mitigation, and restoration activities within the Right of Way and Temporary Work Spaces and the proper installation, presence or operation of the Facilities upon the Property. Notwithstanding the foregoing, nothing contained herein shall be construed to release Grantee from liability for any damages, costs or expenses caused solely by the gross negligence or willful misconduct of Grantee.

Easement and Right-of-Way Agreements, ¶6 (emphasis added), ECF Nos. 30-1 & -2. Columbia Gas argues the language in these two paragraphs does not impose upon it any obligation to reclaim or restore damage to the Grantor's property as the Grantor received advance compensation for any damage. Instead, Columbia Gas insists these paragraphs only concern indemnification against third-party claims.

As to the first paragraph, the Court agrees with Columbia Gas that it details the indemnification obligations of both the Grantee and the Grantor in the event of a third-party claim. However, the second paragraph speaks directly to the extent of any liability Columbia Gas may have to the Grantor for damages. Pursuant to this paragraph, there is an agreement that the Grantor already has received compensation for damages that may occur to certain assets on the property or “any other damages costs and expenses attributable to or arising from Grantee's proper execution of the initial construction, mitigation, and restoration activities . . . [and] the proper installation presence or operation of the Facilities upon the Property.” Id. (emphasis added). However, this provision does not provide that the Grantor has been compensated if the Grantee acted improperly in performing these tasks. Indeed, the very next sentence provides that, notwithstanding the compensation the Grantor already received, the agreement does not release the “Grantee from liability for any damages, costs or expenses caused solely by the gross negligence or willful...