Randolph v. Rodgers

Page 342

253 F.3d 342 (8th Cir. 2001)

RONNIE RANDOLPH, APPELLEE, v. BILL RODGERS; DON ROPER; PAUL DELO; MICHAEL BOWERSOX; DORA SCHRIRO, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES, APPELLANTS, MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, DEFENDANT.

No. 00-1897

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

Submitted: January 12, 2001

Filed: June 12, 2001

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.

Before Richard S. Arnold, Fagg, and Bowman, Circuit Judges.

Bowman, Circuit J.

Ronnie Randolph, a deaf inmate at the Jefferson City Correctional Center (JCCC), brought suit against the Missouri Department of Corrections (MDOC) and five prison officials for failing to provide him with a sign-language interpreter during disciplinary proceedings, the administration of medical care, and certain other prison proceedings while he was incarcerated at the Potosi Correctional Center (PCC) from 1989 to 1996. The Eleventh Amendment shields the State and the MDOC from many of Randolph's claims; this appeal considers the extent to which Randolph can avoid the bar of Eleventh Amendment immunity and obtain injunctive relief under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (requiring state officials to comply with federal law).

I.

Randolph sued the MDOC and the named prison officials in their individual and personal capacities. He raised claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101-12213 (1994 & Supp. II 1996); 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794 (1994); 42 U.S.C. 1983 (1994) and Missouri law. ¹ The District Court granted summary judgment for the MDOC and the prison officials on the due process and equal protection claims that Randolph asserted under 1983, and for the prison officials in their individual capacities on the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims. ² Randolph v. Rodgers, 980 F. Supp. 1051, 1057-58, 1060-61 (E.D. Mo. 1997) (subsequent history omitted). The court granted summary judgment for Randolph as to the injunctive relief sought against the MDOC on the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and state-law claims, id. at 1061-63, and reserved for trial Randolph's ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims seeking money damages against the MDOC, and the state- law claim seeking damages against the named prison officials. The District Court also issued a permanent injunction that mandated sign-language interpreter services for Randolph during various prison proceedings and activities. Id. at 1064. The State brought an interlocutory appeal. We reversed the District Court's order granting Randolph's motion for summary judgment against the MDOC on the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and state-law claims; vacated the injunction; and remanded the case to the District Court for further proceedings. Randolph v. Rodgers, 170 F.3d 850, 860 (8th Cir. 1999).

Upon remand, the State moved to dismiss, arguing that Randolph's claims are prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment. ³ The District Court granted the State's motion in part, and dismissed the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims against the MDOC and the state-law claims for injunctive relief against the prison officials in their official capacities. The District Court allowed Randolph's ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims "for prospective injunctive relief . . . against the state official defendants in their official capacities" to proceed under Ex parte Young. Mem. and Order at 4. The District Court also allowed Randolph to maintain his state-law claims for money damages against the state officials in their individual capacities.

The State brings this interlocutory appeal arguing that the District Court erred in applying Ex parte Young and that the District Court should have dismissed Randolph's remaining ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims against the prison officials in their official capacities on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds. We affirm and remand for further proceedings.

II.

As a preliminary matter, we note that we have jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal under the collateral-order doctrine. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-47 (1949); see, e.g., Murphy v. Arkansas, 127 F.3d 750, 753-54 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting that an order denying a claim of Eleventh Amendment immunity is properly appealable as a collateral order). We review de novo a district court's disposition of a motion to dismiss. Hafley v. Lohman, 90 F.3d 264, 266 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1149 (1997).

A.

The State argues that the District Court erred in permitting Randolph's ADA claims to proceed against the individual prison officials under Ex parte Young. ⁴ Ex parte Young and its progeny teach that a private party may seek prospective injunctive relief in federal court against a state official, even if the state is otherwise protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity. See, e.g., Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985).

As a threshold jurisdictional matter, we hold that the Ex parte Young ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims are moot with respect to four of the five prison officials. These four officials--Rodgers, Roper, Delo, and Bowersox--were employed at PCC while Randolph was an inmate at that facility. All were involved to varying degrees with decisions about whether to provide Randolph a sign-language interpreter. In 1996, the MDOC transferred Randolph from PCC to JCCC, where he is currently incarcerated. Rodgers, Roper, Delo, and Bowersox remained employed at PCC after the transfer. ⁵

As we noted earlier, Ex parte Young permits only prospective injunctive relief against state officials. With Randolph currently imprisoned at JCCC and Rodgers, Roper, Delo, and Bowersox employed at PCC, any prospective injunctive relief based upon the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims as to those four defendants will be of no consequence to Randolph. See Beck v. Mo. State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 18 F.3d 604, 605 (8th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (noting that a case is moot when circumstances change to such a degree that "a federal court can no longer grant effective relief"). The actions required by an injunction would be impossible for those four defendants to execute; their authority and power is limited solely to PCC, and any injunctive relief would necessarily be directed at accessibility to hearing-impaired services at JCCC. See Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985) (concluding that claim for injunctive relief against warden was moot because prisoner was transferred to another prison). ⁶ Dora Schriro, however, has authority over the entire MDOC and an injunction against her would have effect no matter where in the MDOC system Randolph is incarcerated. The Ex parte Young ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims are moot with respect to Rodgers, Roper, Delo, and Bowersox but may proceed against Schriro. ⁷

The State next contends that the existence of a detailed remedial scheme in the ADA precludes Randolph from relying on Ex parte Young. The State relies upon Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 74 (1996), wherein the Court held that "where Congress has prescribed a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement against a State of a statutorily created right, a court should hesitate before casting aside those limitations and permitting an action against a state officer based upon Ex parte Young." The State then points to our holding in Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1011 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc), cert. granted, 528 U.S. 1146, cert. dismissed, 529 U.S. 1001 (2000), where we concluded that Title II of the ADA provides a detailed remedial scheme barring a 1983 action against state officials in their individual capacities.

We agree with the District Court that Randolph's Ex parte Young ADA claim is not governed by Alsbrook's holding that Title II of the ADA contains a comprehensive remedial scheme. The remedies available to the plaintiff in Alsbrook under Title II of the ADA are entirely different from those available to Randolph. The enforcement provision of Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 12133, incorporates 29 U.S.C. 794a (1994), the remedies provision of the Rehabilitation Act. The appropriate remedy under the Rehabilitation Act depends on the status of the plaintiff. Employees and applicants for employment, such as the plaintiff in Alsbrook, are subject to the subsection of the ADA that tracks 28 U.S.C. 791 and incorporates the remedies of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f) to (k). 29 U.S.C. 794a(a)(1). The remedies found in 2000e-5(f) to (k) are highly detailed and constitute a comprehensive remedial scheme. ⁸ Alsbrook, 184 F.3d at 1011.

Aggrieved persons who are not employees or applicants for employment, such as prisoners like Randolph, are subject to the subsection of 794a that tracks 29 U.S.C. 794 and incorporates the remedies of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000d to 2000d-7. 29 U.S.C. 794a(a)(2). Title VI and the regulations promulgated thereunder provide for judicial review following a federal department or agency's determination that a program or activity receiving federal funds has violated Title VI. ⁹ An aggrieved individual, however, may proceed directly to federal court on a claim under Title II of the ADA. ¹⁰ Unlike the plaintiff in Alsbrook, Randolph was not limited by a comprehensive remedial scheme established under Title II of the ADA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Instead, the path was open for him to bring an action directly in federal court. ¹¹ Accordingly, Seminole Tribe and Alsbrook do not prohibit Randolph from proceeding under Ex parte Young.

Here, the District Court's injunction ordering future compliance with the ADA with respect to hearing-impaired services for Randolph was narrowly written to merely reiterate the existing duty that the state officers owe Randolph under the ADA. ¹² The order in this case does not require, as the State contends, "retrospective" monetary relief for past...